Snake Keylogger
Snake Keylogger is a .NET-based information stealer and keylogger first observed in 2020. The provided content describes it as a commodity or subscription-style stealer used in phishing and malspam campaigns, including spear-phishing operations. Reported targeting includes the oil industry, Turkey's defense and aerospace sectors, and broader credential-theft campaigns; the content also notes use by clusters tracked as TA2715 and TA2536. Snake Keylogger is associated with phishing-delivered attachments and archive/container-based execution patterns, and one report cited DLL sideloading as a loading technique.
Its documented capabilities include keystroke logging, theft of browser-stored information and credentials, browser cookies, geolocation data, and general system information. The content also links it to access of browser password stores and Discord LevelDB data, consistent with credential and user-data theft objectives. Exfiltration methods explicitly mentioned in the content include FTP, SMTP, and HTTP/web APIs.
Behaviorally, the content associates Snake Keylogger with browser credential theft, victim network and geolocation discovery via external IP-check services, network connections discovery via netsh, suspicious DNS queries to abused web services, FTP communications from non-standard process paths, and abuse patterns involving .NET-related utilities and signed-binary proxy execution tradecraft. Splunk reporting notes substantial overlap in tradecraft and tooling between Snake Keylogger and VIP Keylogger, including similar credential-theft goals, managed-code implementation, and obfuscation.
The content does not provide a definitive attribution to a single threat actor, but it does state that Snake Keylogger has been observed in campaigns linked to TA2715 and TA2536. One cited report describes a campaign as involving a 'Russian origin stealer programmed in .NET,' but broader attribution is not established in the provided material.
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Groups observed using it
4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
... TA2715 and TA2536, both of which favored Snake Keylogger ...
... TA2715 and TA2536, both of which favored Snake Keylogger ...
“The S2 Group’s intelligence team has identified… a new phishing campaign by Snake Keylogger, a Russian origin stealer programmed in .NET… The campaign… using spearphishing emails offering oil products… [and] the Sideloading Dll technique to load Snake Keylogger…”
“The S2 Group’s intelligence team has identified… a new phishing campaign by Snake Keylogger, a Russian origin stealer programmed in .NET… The campaign… using spearphishing emails offering oil products… [and] the Sideloading Dll technique to load Snake Keylogger…”
Techniques & procedures
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
Execution
1 technique
Execution
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
Stealth
3 techniques
Stealth
Execution of well-known .NET-related utilities when the parent appears to be a script launched from user-writable or non-standard locations is consistent with signed-binary proxy execution tradecraft (MITRE ATT&CK T1218) seen in stealer and loader workflows.
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
“SnakeStealer… can log keystrokes, steal saved credentials, take screenshots, and collect clipboard data.”
Description This analytic story contains detections that help security analysts identify endpoint activity that may be associated with VIP Keylogger, a .NET-based information stealer and keylogger
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Collection
4 techniques
Collection
“SnakeStealer… can log keystrokes, steal saved credentials, take screenshots, and collect clipboard data.”
Description This analytic story contains detections that help security analysts identify endpoint activity that may be associated with VIP Keylogger, a .NET-based information stealer and keylogger
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
IOCs tracked for this family
40 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
35 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Keylogger deployed in phishing-based campaigns.
A .NET-centric stealer and keylogger referenced as closely related in tradecraft to VIP Keylogger. It is described as having a long track record in commodity campaigns, emphasizing credential and browser-adjacent theft, often with managed code, obfuscation, and exfiltration via channels such as SMTP or web APIs depending on the build.
Keylogger malware referenced in the associated analytic stories.
Mentioned only as a malware family seen communicating with infrastructure associated with the VPN-hosted IP used for alternate staging; no campaign-specific Snake Keylogger technical details provided.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.