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Malware

NGate

NGate is an Android malware family focused on NFC relay fraud and theft of payment card data. It was first publicly documented by ESET in August 2024 and is also referred to as NFSkate in some reporting. The malware is used to capture and relay NFC payment card data from victims’ physical cards to attacker-controlled devices, enabling unauthorized contactless purchases and ATM cash withdrawals using the victims’ own cards. Multiple sources describe NGate as an Android NFC relay kit and banker used in recent NFC relay attacks.

Observed infection and delivery methods include phishing and social engineering. Reporting describes campaigns using phishing plus follow-up calls from fake bank support, fake banking or payment-related apps, fake Google Play pages, and lottery-themed lure sites. In the Brazil-focused campaign active since about November 2025, operators distributed a trojanized version of the legitimate Android app HandyPay via a fake Rio de Prêmios lottery site and a fake Google Play page offering the malware as Proteção Cartão. Earlier reporting also notes use of NFCGate in prior NGate activity, while newer variants abuse HandyPay instead.

Behaviorally, NGate prompts victims to set the malicious app as the default payment app, enter their payment card PIN, and tap their physical card against the phone. The malware then reads and relays NFC card data to attacker-controlled infrastructure or devices. Reporting states that PINs are exfiltrated to attacker-controlled servers over HTTP, and one report notes relayed data being linked to an attacker device via a hardcoded email address embedded in the app. The trojanized HandyPay variant reportedly requires no special permissions beyond being set as the default payment app, which may reduce user suspicion.

Targeting documented in the provided content includes Czech bank customers, users of Polish banks, and Android users in Brazil. CERT Polska observed samples tied to NGate targeting Polish bank users. ESET described a novel campaign in Czechia active since November 2023 that combined phishing, social engineering, and malware capabilities to clone and relay NFC payment card data without requiring device rooting. Later reporting describes Brazil as the first South American country specifically targeted by an NGate campaign, with Portuguese-language strings observed in at least one variant.

The malware has been associated with financial fraud operations rather than a named state actor. It is repeatedly discussed alongside other NFC-relay malware families such as SuperCard X, RelayNFC, ZNFC, and PhantomCard. ESET and WeLiveSecurity reporting on newer variants noted signs that some injected malicious code may have been AI-generated, including emoji-like artifacts in logs or debug strings, but definitive proof of AI involvement was not established. Additional reporting states NGate later received an upgrade adding contact stealing capabilities.

High-confidence indicators and artifacts mentioned in the content are limited. The malware has been distributed under the names HandyPay and Proteção Cartão in trojanized form, and one report states Google Play Protect can detect known versions of the malware. No stable malware hash or domain IOC specific to NGate is provided in the source content.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence5

The first uses a fake lottery website that impersonates a Brazilian state lottery organization called Rio de Premios. The site shows a rigged scratch card game where the user always wins R$20,000 and is then directed to send a WhatsApp message to claim the prize, after which they are guided to download the trojanized app.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The fake lottery website seeks to convince a user to tap a button to send a WhatsApp message to claim the prize money, at which point they are directed to likely download the poisoned version of the HandyPay app.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The campaign relies on two distribution methods... which eventually leads to downloading the malicious APK.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

A new variant of the NGate malware that steals NFC payment data is targeting Android users by hiding in a trojanized version of HandyPay, a legitimate mobile payments processing tool.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

A new variant of the NGate malware that steals NFC payment data is targeting Android users by hiding in a trojanized version of HandyPay, a legitimate mobile payments processing tool.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

The second channel is a fake Google Play page distributing the malware under the name Protecao Cartao, meaning Card Protection in English.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.001Gatekeeper BypassEvidence1

A campaign active since November 2025 is targeting Android users in Brazil using a new variant of the NGate malware family, this time embedded in a trojanized version of HandyPay, a legitimate NFC relay application available on Google Play since 2021.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Then, the victim is asked to enter the payment card PIN into the app and tap their card on the back of the NFC-enabled smartphone.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

In the earlier versions, the malware used an open-source tool called NFCGate to capture, relay, and replay the payment card information.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence3

Once installed on a victim’s phone, the trojanized version silently reads payment card data via NFC and forwards it to an attacker-controlled device.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence2

Then, the victim is asked to enter the payment card PIN into the app and tap their card on the back of the NFC-enabled smartphone.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

In the earlier versions, the malware used an open-source tool called NFCGate to capture, relay, and replay the payment card information.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

the malware can also capture the victim’s payment card PIN and send it to the attackers’ command-and-control (C2) server over HTTP.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

All the information collected this way is delivered to an attacker's email address that is hardcoded into the app.

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence2

the malware can also capture the victim’s payment card PIN and send it to the attackers’ command-and-control (C2) server over HTTP.

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Exploited vulnerabilities

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

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