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Mallory
3 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

LazyScripter

Also known asLazyScripter

LazyScripter is a threat actor tracked in the provided content for phishing-led intrusion activity and script-based execution and persistence on Windows systems. The content states that LazyScripter has used spam emails weaponized with archive or document files as its initial infection vector and has lured users to open malicious email attachments, including activity associated with UDL-file-based spearphishing attachments. Observed tradecraft includes use of JavaScript, PowerShell scripts to execute malicious code, and Windows batch files to deploy open-source and multi-stage RATs. For persistence, LazyScripter has written a PowerShell script to the autorun registry key. The content also associates LazyScripter with ATT&CK techniques including T1204.002 (Malicious File Execution), T1059.003 (Windows Command Shell), T1059.001 (PowerShell), T1129 (Shared Modules), T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application), T1608.001 (Upload Malware), T1608.002 (Upload Tool), and T1027.010 (Command Obfuscation). No additional aliases or nation-state attribution are provided in the content.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

46 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics59 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1592
Gather Victim Host Information
TA0042
Resource Development
2 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.002
DNS Server
T1608×2
Stage Capabilities
T1608.001
Upload Malware
T1608.002
Upload Tool
TA0001
Initial Access
2 techniques
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566
Phishing
T1566.001×12
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×4
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
4 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×15
PowerShell
T1059.003×3
Windows Command Shell
T1059.005×2
Visual Basic
T1059.007
JavaScript
T1129
Shared Modules
T1204
User Execution
T1204.001
Malicious Link
T1204.002×7
Malicious File
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1137
Office Application Startup
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×5
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×5
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
6 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.005
Indicator Removal from Tools
T1027.010
Command Obfuscation
T1036
Masquerading
T1036.003
Rename Legitimate Utilities
T1036.008
Masquerade File Type
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005×3
Mshta
T1218.011×6
Rundll32
T1218.014
MMC
T1564
Hide Artifacts
T1564.006
Run Virtual Instance
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1187
Forced Authentication
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.001
Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
TA0007
Discovery
4 techniques
T1012
Query Registry
T1087
Account Discovery
T1087.002
Domain Account
T1482
Domain Trust Discovery
T1518
Software Discovery
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1557
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1557.001
Name Resolution Poisoning and SMB Relay
TA0011
Command and Control
5 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1071.004×2
DNS
T1090
Proxy
T1102
Web Service
T1105×5
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1573
Encrypted Channel
T1573.002
Asymmetric Cryptography
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
TA0040
Impact
1 technique
T1531
Account Access Removal
IOCS

Observables

6 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping46

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal3

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables6

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.