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2 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters

Also known aslapsus$_huntersScattered LAPSUS$ Hunters (SLH)scattered_lapsus_huntersscattered_lapsus$_huntersslhslshtrinity_of_chaos

Scattered LAPSUS$ Hunters is a financially motivated cybercriminal collective described in the content as a loose alliance or conglomerate formed in mid-2025 from Scattered Spider, LAPSUS$, and ShinyHunters, and sometimes dubbed the "Trinity of Chaos." Reported aliases include SLH, SLSH, LPH, Trinity of Chaos, and variants of the name using different capitalization or separators. The group is described as typically young, reckless, and English-speaking. The content links the group to large-scale data theft, extortion, leak-site operations, and some ransomware-branded activity. Reported victimology includes SaaS and enterprise cloud environments, especially Salesforce-related compromises, as well as retail, hospitality, telecommunications, automotive, education, government, and software targets. Specific incidents and claims in the content include extortion demands directed at Salesforce; attacks or claimed attacks involving Instructure, Jaguar Land Rover, Marks & Spencer, Co-op, Harrods, SK Telecom, Discord/Zendesk-related exposure claims, and publication of apparent phone numbers and addresses of hundreds of government officials including nearly 700 DHS personnel. Tradecraft described in the content centers on social engineering rather than software exploitation. Reported techniques include voice phishing/vishing, help-desk impersonation, MFA-device registration, password resets, phishing and interactive social engineering, use of stolen credentials or tokens, and rapid exfiltration from SaaS platforms. The group is repeatedly associated with Salesforce data theft and broader enterprise cloud targeting. Related reporting in the content also describes overlap with identity-platform and SSO-focused operations, including Okta-targeting campaigns, and extortion workflows involving leak sites and Telegram channels. The content also describes affiliated or overlapping branding and sub-groups. ShinyHunters is repeatedly identified as part of the trio. CoinbaseCartel is described as a data-theft offshoot of the larger Scattered Lapsus$ Hunters collective. Public reporting cited in the content notes analytical overlap among labels including Scattered Spider, ShinyHunters, and LAPSUS$, and some reporting uses alternate shorthand such as SLSH or LPH for the collective.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

47 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

15 of 15 tactics62 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
3 techniques
T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1589.003
Employee Names
T1593
Search Open Websites/Domains
T1598×3
Phishing for Information
T1598.004×2
Spearphishing Voice
TA0042
Resource Development
1 technique
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
TA0001
Initial Access
5 techniques
T1078×7
Valid Accounts
T1190×4
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1195×5
Supply Chain Compromise
T1199
Trusted Relationship
T1566×5
Phishing
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
T1566.003
Spearphishing via Service
T1566.004×4
Spearphishing Voice
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.006
Python
T1203
Exploitation for Client Execution
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1078×7
Valid Accounts
T1098
Account Manipulation
T1098.001×2
Additional Cloud Credentials
T1098.003
Additional Cloud Roles
T1556
Modify Authentication Process
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
T1078×7
Valid Accounts
T1098
Account Manipulation
T1098.001×2
Additional Cloud Credentials
T1098.003
Additional Cloud Roles
T1484
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
TA0005
Stealth
1 technique
T1078×7
Valid Accounts
TA0112
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
T1484
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification
T1556
Modify Authentication Process
TA0006
Credential Access
9 techniques
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
T1003.001
LSASS Memory
T1056
Input Capture
T1528
Steal Application Access Token
T1552
Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001
Credentials In Files
T1552.004
Private Keys
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.005
Password Managers
T1556
Modify Authentication Process
T1557×3
Adversary-in-the-Middle
T1621
Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
T1649×2
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007
Discovery
2 techniques
T1069
Permission Groups Discovery
T1069.002
Domain Groups
T1654
Log Enumeration
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1185
Browser Session Hijacking
T1213×3
Data from Information Repositories
T1557×3
Adversary-in-the-Middle
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1090
Proxy
T1219
Remote Access Tools
TA0010
Exfiltration
4 techniques
T1020×2
Automated Exfiltration
T1041×9
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1567×3
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002×2
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040
Impact
4 techniques
T1486×9
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489
Service Stop
T1498
Network Denial of Service
T1657×5
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

2 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping47

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal2

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables2

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.