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🇨🇳 CN33 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

UNC3569

Also known asUNC3569

UNC3569 is a prolific and sophisticated PRC-nexus threat actor operating mostly out of China within the Chinese cybercriminal and cyber contractor-for-hire ecosystem. The group has targeted organizations worldwide, with operations concentrated in East and Southeast Asia but also extending to the United States and other regions. Reported victim sectors include government, education, technology, finance, media, telecommunications, airlines, heavy industry, energy, and the gambling sector. UNC3569 primarily gains access by exploiting known n-day vulnerabilities in internet-facing products from Apache, Microsoft, IBM, VMware, and Oracle. Reported exploitation includes CVE-2021-44228, CVE-2022-21587, CVE-2022-47986, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207, CVE-2021-31206, CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-27065, CVE-2021-31195, CVE-2021-31196, CVE-2017-15944, CVE-2021-21985, and CVE-2018-1207. After exploitation, the group commonly deploys the OXEEYE port-forwarding tool using the SIDESTEP launcher for reconnaissance and then installs Cobalt Strike BEACON for foothold establishment. Primary UNC3569 backdoors include DRAFTGRAPH, CROSSWALK, and the custom GRAYRABBIT backdoor. Additional loaders and evasion components include RABBITCAVE, AtomLdr, RABBITFUR, RABBITMOUND, RABBITNEST, RABBITASH, RABBITWING, and Rust-based shellcode runners. The group has also used SERVEPLUG, STREAMSERVE, ANGRYREBEL.LINUX, SKYNEEDLE, TROCHILUS, SOGU, ELECTRONAURA, and commercial Chinese remote-control software Ping32. UNC3569 has abused legitimate platforms including GitHub and Microsoft OneDrive for payload delivery and command-and-control, and has used public offensive tooling and custom loaders to evade antivirus detection. Reported operations include exploitation of an Aspera Faspex server at a U.S. media and entertainment company in February 2023 using CVE-2022-47986, followed by PowerShell-based component download, BEACON DLL sideloading, and lateral movement. In July 2023, UNC3569 was observed using OXEEYE and GRAYRABBIT in an operation that abused OneDrive as DRAFTGRAPH C2 infrastructure. A command log exposed from UNC3569 server 8.210.141.104 in late 2022 showed reconnaissance against targets in Southeast Asia and Oceania, including government agencies, educational institutions, telecom providers, airlines, and heavy industry and energy organizations, and showed downloads of public exploit and scanning tools. UNC3569 has also conducted cloud-hosted and supply-chain operations. In November 2021, the group launched a campaign against servers hosted on major cloud and VPS providers using SERVEPLUG and STREAMSERVE and delivering ANGRYREBEL.LINUX to Linux servers via an open directory; this cluster targeted victims in Eastern and Southeastern Asia and used malicious domains masquerading as Amazon Web Services and Microsoft Support Services. Supply-chain activity reportedly involved Bastion, Qianxin VPN, Comm100, Live Chat software, and LiveHelp100. After gaining access in such operations, UNC3569 used SKYNEEDLE and HackBrowserData to collect system information, browser data, Tencent QQ and WeChat data, and screenshots. Infrastructure analysis shows recurring patterns including spoofed domains impersonating Microsoft, Google Chrome, AWS, Alibaba Cloud, and the FBI; sibling subdomain segmentation by malware family; and concentration of C2 hosting in Hong Kong and Singapore, with more than 67% of observed C2 IPs located there and about 50% hosted by Choopa, Alibaba Cloud, and IT Novation Cloud. The reporting links UNC3569 to other PRC-nexus clusters UNC3246 and UNC251 through shared infrastructure traits, tooling overlap, and certificate or naming similarities, including a unique JARM fingerprint, overlapping use of FBI-themed domains, profanity-based naming conventions, a shared SSL certificate associated with ascnhub.com, and shared tooling such as CROSSWALK and KEYPLUG.LINUX. The February 2024 i-SOON leak reportedly exposed discussion logs referencing proxy server 8.218.67.52, which was also used with the UNC3569 ELECTRONAURA backdoor and the domain files.amazonawsgarages.com, suggesting a potential relationship between UNC3569 and the Sichuan-based contractor i-SOON. UNC3569 is also referenced in attribution overlaps with SHADOW-VOID-044. Reporting assessed SHADOW-VOID-044 with moderate-to-high confidence as linked to UNC3569 based on GRAYRABBIT overlaps, a C2 domain previously associated with UNC3569, and shared targeting of the Chinese gambling industry. Known alias in the provided content: unc3569.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Government & Administration
  • Academia & Research
  • Software & Services
  • Financial Services
  • Media & Entertainment
  • Telecommunication Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇸 United States

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • CN
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

24 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

11 of 15 tactics39 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
1 technique
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.006
Web Services
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1189×3
Drive-by Compromise
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1195
Supply Chain Compromise
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×2
PowerShell
T1059.007
JavaScript
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1505
Server Software Component
T1505.003
Web Shell
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1055
Process Injection
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
TA0005
Stealth
6 techniques
T1036
Masquerading
T1055
Process Injection
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.004
File Deletion
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005
Mshta
T1620
Reflective Code Loading
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1553
Subvert Trust Controls
T1553.002
Code Signing
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
TA0007
Discovery
1 technique
T1082
System Information Discovery
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
T1113
Screen Capture
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1090
Proxy
T1090.002
External Proxy
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping24

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal33

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs5

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.