Skip to main content
Mallory
Financially Motivated7 malware families

Lunar Spider

Also known asgold_swathmoreLUNAR SPIDER

LUNAR SPIDER, also known as Gold Swathmore, is a Russian-speaking, financially motivated cybercriminal threat actor active since at least 2009. The group is assessed in the provided reporting as being behind the IcedID (BokBot) and Latrodectus malware families, and has continued operating despite law-enforcement disruption and leadership changes. One report states the group was previously led by Vyacheslav Igorevich Penchukov (aliases Tank, Zeus, Zevs, Father, TopBro), who was arrested in Switzerland in September 2022, extradited to the United States, and sentenced in 2024. The content links LUNAR SPIDER to malvertising, SEO poisoning, fake CAPTCHA/ClickFix delivery, and JavaScript-based infection chains. In an October 2024 campaign targeting the financial sector, the group used the heavily obfuscated Latrodectus JavaScript loader to deliver Brute Ratel C4. Victims searching for tax-related content were redirected to malicious JavaScript that downloaded an MSI installer, executed a malicious DLL via rundll32.exe, established persistence via HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, and communicated with attacker-controlled C2 domains. Separate reporting also states LUNAR SPIDER used Telegram on a FakeCaptcha panel to monitor victim clicks and send browser and visitor information through Telegram’s /sendMessage API. The provided content describes LUNAR SPIDER as an initial access broker within the cybercrime ecosystem. Reporting cited here assesses with high confidence that the group resumed operations after Operation Endgame disrupted IcedID infrastructure in May 2024, and that it has significant ties to ransomware operators. The content specifically mentions likely provision of initial access to WIZARD SPIDER, connections to ALPHV/BlackCat affiliates through shared infrastructure, and affiliations with Nemty (TRAVELING SPIDER) and TA2101 (TWISTED SPIDER). The reporting also notes that IcedID was made available to outside threat groups for ransomware campaigns and that Nemty and TA2101 leveraged IcedID for initial access. Infrastructure overlap is a recurring theme in the provided reporting. LUNAR SPIDER activity is described as using shared hosting and providers across IcedID and Latrodectus operations, including SHOCK-1 (ASN 395092), overlapping C2 infrastructure, and recurring SSL certificate issuer patterns such as "AU," "Some-State," and "Internet Widgits Pty Ltd." The content also states that analysts uncovered more than 200 malicious infrastructure elements associated with IcedID and Latrodectus and attributed them to LUNAR SPIDER.

Share:
Are they targeting you?

Know when an actor pivots toward your sector

Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Banks
  • Financial Services
  • Insurance
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

15 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

9 of 15 tactics27 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
2 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1608
Stage Capabilities
T1608.006
SEO Poisoning
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
TA0002
Execution
1 technique
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.007
JavaScript
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036
Masquerading
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.011
Rundll32
TA0006
Credential Access
3 techniques
T1003
OS Credential Dumping
T1003.001
LSASS Memory
T1552
Unsecured Credentials
T1552.001
Credentials In Files
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1048.003
Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 Protocol
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
IOCS

Observables

14 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping15

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal7

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables14

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.