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🇨🇳 CN2 malware families

UNK_FistBump

Also known asUNK_FistBump

UNK_FistBump is a China-aligned threat actor cluster tracked by Proofpoint as distinct from APT41/TA415, although Proofpoint noted overlap in tooling through use of the custom Voldemort backdoor. Between March and June 2025, the actor targeted Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem, including semiconductor design, manufacturing, packaging, testing, and supply chain organizations, and specifically targeted HR and recruiting personnel. Proofpoint assessed the activity as espionage-motivated. The actor used employment-themed spearphishing, often posing as graduate students or job applicants and sending emails from compromised Taiwanese university accounts. Campaigns used password-protected archives or PDF attachments linking to archives hosted on Zendesk or Filemail. Malware delivery involved DLL sideloading chains. Proofpoint reported delivery of both Cobalt Strike Beacon and the custom C-based Voldemort backdoor. In late May 2025, UNK_FistBump used two distinct infection chains from the same password-protected archive, one leading to Cobalt Strike and the other to Voldemort. Reported tradecraft includes use of LNK-triggered execution, VBS scripts, javaw.exe-based DLL sideloading, RC4-encrypted payload decryption, persistence via a Run registry key, and use of CiscoCollabHost.exe to sideload CiscoSparkLauncher.dll for Voldemort delivery. Voldemort used Google Sheets / the Google Sheets API for command and control. Proofpoint stated that Voldemort had previously been associated with TA415/APT41, but assessed UNK_FistBump as a separate cluster due to notable TTP differences.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Software & Services
  • Financial Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇹🇼 Taiwan

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • CN
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

13 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

6 of 15 tactics18 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566
Phishing
T1566.001×2
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.005
Visual Basic
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1036
Masquerading
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1620
Reflective Code Loading
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2
Web Protocols
T1090
Proxy
T1090.002
External Proxy
IOCS

Observables

17 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping13

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal2

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables17

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.