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SafePay

Also known assafepay

SafePay is a ransomware and extortion group first observed in October 2024, with some reporting describing its launch in November 2024. The actors behind at least one investigated sample identified themselves as the “Safepay team.” Across the provided reporting, SafePay is described as one of the more active ransomware groups in 2025 and Q1 2026, with more than 450 victims claimed and one dataset attributing 475 victims to the group. SafePay has been cited among the most active groups in Q3 2025 and among the leading groups in Q1 2026. KELA reporting in the provided content says SafePay was one of five groups responsible for nearly 25% of incidents in its 2025 dataset. Google reporting cited in the content also lists Safepay among the most prominent and active ransomware brands in 2025. The group operates a Tor/dark web leak site and uses data leak extortion tactics, including listing victims, threatening publication of stolen data, and in some cases publishing data after apparent failed negotiations. SafePay claimed the July 2025 attack on Ingram Micro, listed the company on its Tor leak site, alleged theft of 3.5 TB of sensitive data, and later published the data. It also listed Conduent in February 2025 and threatened to publish 8.5 TB of allegedly stolen data. Reporting in the content states SafePay says on its leak site that it is not a ransomware-as-a-service operation and that it has never provided RaaS. Victims and claimed victims mentioned in the content include Ingram Micro, Conduent, Genealogy SA, Favelle Favco, Smile Team Orthodontics, Children’s Council of San Francisco, and US Mortgage Corporation. SafePay has also been linked in the provided reporting to eight government-related attacks in the first half of 2025, three of which were confirmed. The group has targeted organizations in Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, Italy, New Zealand, Canada, Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Barbados, and Argentina. Reporting in the content also highlights Germany, including the Mittelstand and professional services sector, as an area being targeted during the group’s global expansion. No additional aliases or sub-groups are directly supported by the provided content beyond the name SafePay / Safepay.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

14 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

9 of 15 tactics18 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
1 technique
T1589
Gather Victim Identity Information
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1195×2
Supply Chain Compromise
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1078
Valid Accounts
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1078
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
1 technique
T1078
Valid Accounts
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1074
Data Staged
T1213×4
Data from Information Repositories
TA0011
Command and Control
1 technique
T1090
Proxy
T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
TA0010
Exfiltration
3 techniques
T1020×2
Automated Exfiltration
T1041×4
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1567×3
Exfiltration Over Web Service
TA0040
Impact
4 techniques
T1486×18
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489
Service Stop
T1490
Inhibit System Recovery
T1657×4
Financial Theft
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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping14

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

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Observables

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