Skip to main content
Live Webinar with SANS (June 25)— Agentic CTI Automation for Fun & ProfitRegister Free
Mallory

Babuk

Also known asbabuk

Babuk, also known as Babyk and Babuk Locker, is a ransomware operation that surfaced at the beginning of 2021 and targeted businesses in double-extortion attacks. The group became notable for high-profile activity including the April 2021 attack on the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department, after which stolen data was leaked publicly. Babuk later announced it was retiring from ransomware operations and shifting toward data theft and extortion-only activity, and reporting cited in the content describes Babuk as one of the early adopters of encryption-less extortion. The group used Windows, VMware ESXi, and NAS ransomware tooling. Babuk was one of the early players in ESXi ransomware, and its leaked 2021 builder/source code exposed C++-based Linux ELF ESXi tooling, Golang-based NAS tooling, and C++-based Windows tooling. Subsequent reporting in the content states that this leak enabled many other ransomware families to build Babuk-derived ESXi/Linux lockers, complicating attribution. Tactics and techniques directly mentioned in the content include DLL sideloading using the legitimate NTSD.exe debugger to deliver ransomware, and deletion of shadow copies via vssadmin delete shadows /all /quiet. The content also attributes common Babuk-associated initial access activity to exploitation of VPN and email server vulnerabilities, including Fortinet and ProxyLogon, though some of that reporting is framed through statements by alleged operator Mikhail Matveev. The content links Babuk closely to Russian cybercriminal Mikhail Pavlovich Matveev, also known as Wazawaka, Boriselcin, Orange, Biba99, TetyaSluha, and Uhodiransomwar. Reporting cited here describes Boriselcin as the public-facing persona of the Babuk affiliate program, and Orange/Wazawaka as the administrator who later launched the RAMP cybercrime forum using Babuk infrastructure after internal disputes and the group’s splintering. The content also references Babuk V2 and later Babuk-branded or resurrected/impersonation activity, including Babuk 2.0 and a purported 2025 revival, but also notes that some later Babuk-branded operations were assessed as impersonation or scam activity rather than continuity of the original group. Sub-groups and related entities directly mentioned in the content include Babuk V2, Groove, and RAMP. The content states McAfee assessed Groove as a former affiliate or subgroup of Babuk, and multiple reports describe RAMP as emerging from disputes among Babuk members. The content does not provide high-confidence state attribution for Babuk as a nation-state actor.

Share:
Are they targeting you?

Know when an actor pivots toward your sector

Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

12 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

7 of 15 tactics19 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1078
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1078
Valid Accounts
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
TA0007
Discovery
2 techniques
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
TA0010
Exfiltration
3 techniques
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1537×2
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
TA0040
Impact
3 techniques
T1486×8
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1490
Inhibit System Recovery
T1657×2
Financial Theft
IOCS

Observables

4 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping12

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables4

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.