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12 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Paper Werewolf

Also known asGOFFEEpaper_werewolf

GOFFEE, also tracked as Paper Werewolf, is an APT cluster first observed in early 2022 that, according to the provided reporting, has exclusively targeted organizations in the Russian Federation. Reported victim sectors include media, telecommunications, construction, government, and energy, and multiple sources describe the group targeting Russian organizations and government entities. The content also states that GOFFEE/Paper Werewolf exploited WinRAR vulnerabilities CVE-2025-6218 and CVE-2025-8088 in 2025. The group’s primary initial access method is targeted phishing with malicious attachments. Reported delivery chains include RAR archives containing disguised executables or macro-enabled Office documents, malicious XLL add-ins, and Telegram-based lures. In 2024 campaigns, GOFFEE used malicious Word VBA documents that created HTA and PowerShell files, set the HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Windows\LOAD registry value for persistence, and launched JavaScript and PowerShell loaders. The content also notes GOFFEE previously used a modified Owowa IIS module from May 2022 through summer 2023, and later distributed modified malicious versions of explorer.exe through phishing. Malware and tooling directly associated with GOFFEE/Paper Werewolf in the content include PowerModul, PowerTaskel, FlashFileGrabber, USB Worm, EchoGather, PaperGrabber, a custom Mythic agent, and a Linux rootkit named Sauropsida. PowerModul is described as a PowerShell implant first observed in early 2024 that retrieves and executes additional PowerShell payloads from C2 and delivered payloads including PowerTaskel, FlashFileGrabber, and USB Worm. PowerTaskel is described as a non-public Mythic agent written in PowerShell that GOFFEE has used since early 2023 and that can execute arbitrary PowerShell commands and load a binary Mythic agent for lateral movement. The reporting further states GOFFEE increasingly shifted from PowerTaskel to a binary Mythic agent and likely developed its own Mythic agent implementations in PowerShell and C. FlashFileGrabber and USB Worm indicate a focus on removable-media theft and propagation. FlashFileGrabber searched removable media for targeted file types and copied them to staging directories, while USB Worm infected removable media by hiding original files and placing launchers and deceptive shortcuts. Separate reporting on PaperGrabber describes collection of files from local, network, and removable drives; theft of Telegram Desktop session data; extraction of browser credentials from Yandex Browser, Chrome, Opera, Edge, and Chromium using DPAPI; monitoring of newly attached removable drives; and exfiltration of archived data in chunks. GOFFEE/Paper Werewolf also ran Telegram- and Starlink-themed campaigns. The group used a dedicated Telegram channel to distribute the EchoGather RAT disguised as a Starlink restriction-bypass or exception-list application for users in Russia, and also distributed phishing links to steal Telegram accounts. Related phishing infrastructure included re-link[.]space, mystarlink[.]org, and web-tellegram[.]org/ru. In drone-themed operations, the group used battleflight[.]org and battleflight[.]pro to distribute EchoGather disguised as a BattleFlight UAV training simulator installer. Reporting links infrastructure such as battleflight[.]pro to GOFFEE and notes thematic and partial infrastructure overlap with HeartlessSoul. EchoGather is described as a backdoor/RAT used by GOFFEE/Paper Werewolf in multiple campaigns. Reported capabilities include anti-VM checks, host reconnaissance, HTTPS POST communications with hardcoded C2 infrastructure, command execution, file upload, and file download or remote file write depending on the variant. One late-2025 campaign used a malicious Excel XLL add-in to drop EchoGather, and infrastructure pivots linked that activity to Paper Werewolf/GOFFEE. Operationally, the group has used PsExec for privilege escalation, WinRM for lateral movement, mshta.exe, HTA polyglot payloads, obfuscated JavaScript and PowerShell chains, and the Windows LOAD registry value for persistence. The content also states GOFFEE used WinRM with the User-Agent string "Ruby WinRM Client." Multiple reports explicitly associate GOFFEE/Paper Werewolf with Mythic framework usage. Aliases directly supported by the content are GOFFEE and Paper Werewolf.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Military
  • Government & Administration
  • Capital Goods
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

48 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

11 of 15 tactics65 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1091
Replication Through Removable Media
T1189
Drive-by Compromise
T1566×3
Phishing
T1566.001
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002×2
Spearphishing Link
T1566.003
Spearphishing via Service
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1059.003×2
Windows Command Shell
T1059.005×2
Visual Basic
T1059.007×2
JavaScript
T1129
Shared Modules
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002×4
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009
Shortcut Modification
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1055×2
Process Injection
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009
Shortcut Modification
TA0005
Stealth
9 techniques
T1014
Rootkit
T1027×5
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.007
Dynamic API Resolution
T1027.013
Encrypted/Encoded File
T1036×4
Masquerading
T1055×2
Process Injection
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.005
Mshta
T1497×2
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×2
System Checks
T1497.003
Time Based Checks
T1564
Hide Artifacts
T1564.001
Hidden Files and Directories
T1620
Reflective Code Loading
TA0006
Credential Access
3 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
T1555.004
Windows Credential Manager
TA0007
Discovery
5 techniques
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
T1057
Process Discovery
T1082×4
System Information Discovery
T1497×2
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001×2
System Checks
T1497.003
Time Based Checks
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.006
Windows Remote Management
T1091
Replication Through Removable Media
TA0009
Collection
5 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1025×3
Data from Removable Media
T1039
Data from Network Shared Drive
T1056
Input Capture
T1056.001
Keylogging
T1560
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
3 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×4
Web Protocols
T1105×4
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1572
Protocol Tunneling
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1030
Data Transfer Size Limits
T1041×3
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

5 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 5 of them exploited in the wild.

IOCS

Observables

30 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping48

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal12

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs5

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables30

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.