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Mallory
🇮🇷 IR

pay2key

Also known aspay2key

Pay2Key is an Iran-linked ransomware operation active since 2020 and described in the reporting as aligned with Iranian state interests, with ties to the Iranian government and to the Iranian state-sponsored group Fox Kitten (UNC757). It has been characterized as a ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation and as an Iranian state-backed ransomware operation. Reporting also notes recruitment of affiliates on Russian cybercriminal forums, marketing on Russian and Chinese dark web forums, possible ties to Russian-speaking threat actors, and uncertainty around ownership and operational control after the group reportedly attempted to sell the operation in late 2025. Historically, Pay2Key was associated with attacks on Israeli organizations, including hack-and-leak and data-wiping activity. More recent reporting says the group shifted toward Western targets and offered increased affiliate revenue share for attacks against "the enemies of Iran," particularly the United States and Israel. In late February 2026, Pay2Key targeted a U.S. healthcare organization. Halcyon and Beazley Security reported the actors had compromised an administrative account, remained in the environment for several days, used TeamViewer for interactive access, harvested credentials with Mimikatz, LaZagne, and ExtPassword, performed network discovery with tools including Advanced IP Scanner and a tool believed to be NetScan, interacted with Active Directory via dsa.msc, enumerated backup software, disabled Microsoft Defender using a "No Defender" toolkit, inhibited recovery, deployed ransomware through a self-extracting 7zip archive named abc.exe, encrypted the environment in about three hours, and cleared logs afterward. Multiple reports state no evidence of data exfiltration was found in that incident, and researchers assessed the operation appeared more destructive than financially motivated. Pay2Key has been reported to use enhanced evasion, execution, anti-forensics, and anti-detection capabilities in newer variants. Reporting also describes a Linux variant, Pay2Key.I2, first detected in the wild in late August 2025, targeting organizational servers, virtualization hosts, and cloud workloads. That Linux build reportedly requires root privileges, disables SELinux and AppArmor, kills services and processes, persists via cron, enumerates mounted filesystems, and uses ChaCha20 encryption. Separate analysis of a January 2026 Windows build described it as Mimic/Conti-derived, delivered in a self-extracting 7z archive, using Everything APIs for file enumeration, Restart Manager for file unlocking, and ChaCha20 plus Curve25519-based key protection. The content also states Pay2Key has targeted organizations in the United States, Israel, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates. Known aliases and related names directly mentioned in the content include Pay2Key.I2, Pay2Key.I2P, and Fox Kitten (UNC757) as a linked Iranian threat group.

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Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Health Care Equipment & Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇸 United States
  • 🇮🇱 Israel

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • IR
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

29 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

13 of 15 tactics37 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
TA0002
Execution
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003
Cron
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
T1106
Native API
T1569
System Services
TA0003
Persistence
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003
Cron
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
T1112
Modify Registry
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.003
Cron
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
3 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.001×2
Clear Windows Event Logs
T1070.004×3
File Deletion
T1078×6
Valid Accounts
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1112
Modify Registry
TA0006
Credential Access
1 technique
T1003×2
OS Credential Dumping
TA0007
Discovery
6 techniques
T1007
System Service Discovery
T1018
Remote System Discovery
T1046
Network Service Discovery
T1057
Process Discovery
T1082
System Information Discovery
T1083×2
File and Directory Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1560×2
Archive Collected Data
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1090
Proxy
T1090.003
Multi-hop Proxy
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
TA0040
Impact
4 techniques
T1485
Data Destruction
T1486×10
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489
Service Stop
T1490
Inhibit System Recovery
IOCS

Observables

3 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping29

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables3

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.