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Financially Motivated46 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

FIN7

Also known asCARBON SPIDERELBRUSFIN7g0046GOLD NIAGARAITG14Sangria Tempest

FIN7 is a financially motivated cybercriminal threat group, active since at least 2012/2013, with origins in Russia according to the provided reporting. Known aliases include Carbon Spider, ELBRUS, G0046, Gold Niagara, ITG14, Sangria Tempest, and Carbanak. The group has targeted organizations across hospitality, retail, finance, energy, and high-tech sectors, and reporting also notes targeting of U.S.-based chain restaurants, manufacturing, legal, public-sector, and automotive organizations. Earlier activity focused on point-of-sale and payment card theft; since 2020, the group shifted toward ransomware operations, with reported affiliations or collaboration with REvil, Conti, Maze, Egregor, Black Basta, and operations described as Darkside and later BlackMatter. The content describes FIN7 as technically sophisticated and organized, using customized malware, phishing, underground personas, and staged infrastructure. Reported tooling includes Carbanak, DiceLoader/Lizar/IceBot, Powertrash, Core Impact implants, an SSH-based persistence backdoor, AvNeutralizer/AuKill, the JScript backdoor Bateleur, GGLDR, Tinymet, and activity overlapping with the GrayAlpha cluster. GrayAlpha is described as overlapping with FIN7 and using loaders such as PowerNet and MaskBat to deliver NetSupport RAT via fake browser update pages, fake 7-Zip sites, and TAG-124 traffic distribution. FIN7 has also recently been observed deploying the Python-based Anubis backdoor. Initial access and delivery tradecraft in the provided content includes phishing with macro-enabled Word documents, lures themed as encrypted Outlook or Google documents, and attachments that trick victims into double-clicking images that execute hidden LNK files. FIN7 has staged trojanized legitimate software containing an Atera agent installer on Amazon S3. The group has also been linked to automated SQL injection attacks against public-facing applications and use of the Checkmarks platform. Sophos reported a separate cluster, STAC5143, copying the Storm-1811 playbook and possibly connected to FIN7/Sangria Tempest/Carbon Spider with medium confidence; that activity used email bombing, fake IT support contact over Microsoft Teams, Teams remote screen control, Java payloads, ProtonVPN sideloading, and Python RPivot components. Observed FIN7 execution, persistence, and evasion behaviors in the content include use of Windows services, Registry Run and RunOnce keys, Startup folder items, scheduled tasks, WMI to install malware, cmd.exe obfuscation techniques, and anti-analysis/sandbox-evasion logic. Bateleur creates a scheduled task named GoogleUpdateTaskMachineSystem for persistence and communicates over HTTPS. FIN7 malware has created new Windows services and added them to startup directories. The group has used cmd.exe /C quser for user session discovery, tasklist /v for process discovery, and developed a custom video-recording capability to monitor victim environments. A major theme in the reporting is FIN7’s commercialization of offensive tooling. SentinelOne assessed with high confidence that FIN7 used the underground personas goodsoft, lefroggy, killerAV, and Stupor to advertise and sell AvNeutralizer on darknet and criminal forums. AvNeutralizer is described as a custom security-evasion tool designed to disable or bypass endpoint protections, customized for buyers’ target security products, and sold for roughly $4,000 to $15,000. Reporting states it was developed beginning in April 2022 and later used by multiple ransomware operators, including intrusions involving AvosLocker, MedusaLocker, BlackCat, Trigona, and LockBit. The latest version reportedly used ProcLaunchMon.sys together with a Process Explorer driver to interfere with protected security processes. The content also links FIN7 to exploitation of Veeam Backup & Replication vulnerabilities and notes overlap or possible connections with Black Basta and Cuba-related activity. Proofpoint attributed Bateleur to FIN7 with high confidence, while Sophos assessed only medium-confidence links between FIN7 and STAC5143. Where attribution in the source material is qualified, that uncertainty is retained here.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

56 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

14 of 15 tactics77 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
2 techniques
T1587
Develop Capabilities
T1587.001
Malware
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002
Tool
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1189
Drive-by Compromise
T1190×3
Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566×2
Phishing
T1566.001×4
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
5 techniques
T1047×2
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×3
Scheduled Task
T1059×3
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×5
PowerShell
T1059.003×5
Windows Command Shell
T1059.005×3
Visual Basic
T1059.006
Python
T1059.007×5
JavaScript
T1203×2
Exploitation for Client Execution
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002×2
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
4 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×3
Scheduled Task
T1112
Modify Registry
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009×2
Shortcut Modification
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
5 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005×3
Scheduled Task
T1068
Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001×2
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
T1547.009×2
Shortcut Modification
T1548
Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism
TA0005
Stealth
9 techniques
T1027×4
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1036×3
Masquerading
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.004
File Deletion
T1140
Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
T1211
Exploitation for Stealth
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.010×2
Regsvr32
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
T1620
Reflective Code Loading
T1622×2
Debugger Evasion
TA0112
Defense Impairment
1 technique
T1112
Modify Registry
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1056
Input Capture
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
TA0007
Discovery
5 techniques
T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
T1057×2
Process Discovery
T1082×2
System Information Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.001
System Checks
T1622×2
Debugger Evasion
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.004
SSH
TA0009
Collection
4 techniques
T1005×2
Data from Local System
T1056
Input Capture
T1113
Screen Capture
T1125
Video Capture
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1102
Web Service
T1105×2
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219
Remote Access Tools
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1048
Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040
Impact
4 techniques
T1485
Data Destruction
T1486×2
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1489
Service Stop
T1499
Endpoint Denial of Service
WEAPONIZED

Associated vulnerabilities

11 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 11 of them exploited in the wild.

CVE-2021-31207Post-auth Arbitrary File Write in Microsoft Exchange Server (ProxyShell)In the wildEvidence4

The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.

CVE-2021-34473ProxyShell Autodiscover SSRF in Microsoft Exchange ServerIn the wildEvidence2

The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.

CVE-2021-34523Microsoft Exchange PowerShell Backend Elevation of Privilege (ProxyShell)In the wildEvidence2

The Checkmarks platform, developed by the FIN7 group as an automated attack system primarily aimed at exploiting public-facing Microsoft Exchange servers. The platform conducts extensive scanning and exploitation by leveraging the ProxyShell exploit, which takes advantage of CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523 and CVE-2021-31207 vulnerabilities.

CVE-2025-9491Microsoft Windows LNK File UI Misrepresentation Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityIn the wildEvidence2

This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.

CVE-2019-0604Microsoft SharePoint Remote Code Execution VulnerabilityIn the wildEvidence1

CVE-2019-0604, a critical vulnerability opening unpatched Microsoft SharePoint servers to attack, is being exploited by attackers to install a web shell... A remote code execution vulnerability exists in Microsoft SharePoint when the software fails to check the source markup of an application package...

6 more CVEs tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.

IOCS

Observables

295 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping56

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal46

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs11

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables295

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.