APT19
APT19 is a threat actor also referred to in the provided content as Deep Panda, Black Vine, C0d0so0, Codoso/Codoso Team, Checkered Typhoon, Chlorine, G0073, KungFu Kittens, PinkPanther, Red Gargoyle, Shell Crew, Sunshop Group, TG-3551, WebMasters, and ATG50. The content describes APT19 using spearphishing emails with malicious RTF and XLSM attachments for initial exploitation, downloading and launching code within an SCT file, and using PowerShell scripts to download and execute programs in memory without writing them to disk. It has obtained and used publicly available tools such as Empire. For lateral movement, Deep Panda is noted as using WMI. The actor performed host and network discovery, including use of the Microsoft Tasklist utility to enumerate running processes, collection of system architecture information, and use of HTTP and Port 22 malware variants to gather hostname, CPU, MAC, and IP address information from victim machines. The content also attributes persistence and registry modification to APT19, including an HTTP malware variant establishing persistence via HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\Windows Debug Tools-%LOCALAPPDATA%, and a Port 22 malware variant modifying several registry keys. For obfuscation and command-and-control, an APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64-encoded communications to the C2 server, APT19 used Base64 to obfuscate payloads, and an HTTP malware variant decrypted strings using single-byte XOR keys.
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Tradecraft
49 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
15 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
10 additional families tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
6 CVEs this actor has used in observed campaigns. 6 of them exploited in the wild.
This detection identifies instances where Windows Explorer.exe spawns PowerShell or cmd.exe processes, particularly focusing on executions initiated by LNK files. This behavior is associated with the ZDI-CAN-25373 Windows shortcut zero-day vulnerability, where specially crafted LNK files are used to trigger malicious code execution through cmd.exe or powershell.exe. This technique has been actively exploited by multiple APT groups in targeted attacks through both HTTP and SMB delivery methods.
FireEye recently identified another targeted attack campaign that leveraged both the recently announced Internet Explorer zero-day, CVE-2013-1347, as well as recently patched Java exploits CVE-2013-2423 and CVE-2013-1493. ... If a visitor to one of these compromised website was running Internet Explorer 8.0 the malicious javascript would redirect them to a page at www[.]sunshop[.]com[.]tw hosting a CVE-2013-1347 exploit. ... The Internet Explorer (CVE-2013-1347) exploit code pulled down a “9002” RAT from another compromised site at hk[.]sz181[.]com.
The second jar file had a MD5 of 3fbb7321d8610c6e2d990bb25ce34bec and exploited CVE-2013-1493. ... The jar that exploited CVE-2013-1493 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of 42bd5e7e8f74c15873ff0f4a9ce974cd. ... The exploit site at sunshop[.]com[.]tw previously hosted a different malicious jar file on April 2, 2013. This jar file had a MD5 of 51aff823274e9d12b1a9a4bbbaf8ce00. It exploited CVE-2013-1493 and dropped a Poison Ivy RAT.
The java exploits were packaged as two different jar files. One jar file had a MD5 of f4bee1e845137531f18c226d118e06d7 and exploited CVE-2013-2423. The jar that exploited CVE-2013-2423 dropped a 9002 RAT with a MD5 of d99ed31af1e0ad6fb5bf0f116063e91f. This RAT connected to a command and control server at asp[.]homesvr[.]linkpc[.]net.
It is our hypothesis that these legitimate compromised sites were all compromised sometime after early November using CVE-2015-7501 [7,8] and publicly available exploit code [9].
1 more CVE tied to this actor tracked in Mallory.
Observables
203 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the PowerShell P/Invoke process injection API chain detection and related ATT&CK techniques.
Listed as a threat actor associated with PowerShell execution behavior relevant to this detection analytic.
Listed as a threat actor associated with the detection for Metasploit-based Atlassian Confluence exploitation activity.
Referenced in the detection annotations as a threat actor associated with reconnaissance/exploitation behavior relevant to Netspy-style network scanning.
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Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.