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Mallory

Indra

Also known asindra

Indra is a threat actor/hacktivist alias that has been linked in the provided reporting to disruptive operations against Iranian transportation and fuel infrastructure and to data-theft activity against commercial organizations. Check Point attributed a July 2021 Iranian rail-system attack to a group calling itself Indra; the same reporting says the group was named after the Hindu god of war, had previously targeted firms in Syria, and claimed to be an anti-government partisan resistance group. Related reporting also describes Indra as an anti-Iranian regime hacktivist group. The rail attack was later cited as resembling the October 2021 cyberattack on Iran’s fuel distribution system, including use of the message "cyberattack 64411," although separate reporting in the provided content says the fuel attack was claimed by Predatory Sparrow. In 2025–2026 reporting, an actor using the alias "Indra" claimed responsibility on BreachForums for the ManoMano breach, alleging theft of approximately 43 GB of data including 37.8 million user records, 935,000 support tickets, and 13,500 attachments. For the ManoMano incident, the reported access path was compromise of a third-party customer-support subcontractor’s Zendesk account, with no evidence of malware deployment, software-vulnerability exploitation, or compromise of ManoMano’s core infrastructure. ATT&CK techniques explicitly mapped in the provided content for that intrusion include Valid Accounts (T1078), External Remote Services (T1133), Data from Information Repositories (T1213), Exfiltration Over Web Service (T1567.002), and Data Leak (T1537). Known alias in the provided content: Indra.

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Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Transportation

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇮🇷 Iran
  • 🇸🇾 Syria
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

9 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

7 of 15 tactics14 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
T1195×4
Supply Chain Compromise
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1133
External Remote Services
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1213×3
Data from Information Repositories
TA0010
Exfiltration
3 techniques
T1020
Automated Exfiltration
T1537
Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
T1567.002
Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
TA0040
Impact
2 techniques
T1498
Network Denial of Service
T1565
Data Manipulation
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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping9

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.