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Tengu

Also known astengu

Tengu Ransomware is a financially motivated ransomware-as-a-service (RaaS) operation first observed on 2025-10-09. It uses a double-extortion model, stealing data before encryption, and rebranded as Shisa Ransomware on 2026-03-10. In fewer than six months, it claimed approximately 50 victims across multiple continents. Early victimology included Qatar, Morocco, the UAE, Spain, and Brazil, later expanding to North America, Europe, India, Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. The group was also reported active in the META region in Q1 2026. Tengu operated a structured affiliate program advertised on dark web forums, offering an 80/20 revenue split in favor of affiliates, a dedicated TOX contact, and ransomware builds for Windows, Linux, and ESXi. The program prohibited attacks on Russia and CIS countries, and affiliates without victim data were required to provide a refundable $1,500 deposit. Verified partners could receive access to an EDR-killer and a custom multi-chain pivot tool. Its tradecraft emphasized hands-on intrusions and administration-like behavior until final encryption. Affiliates primarily gained initial access through brute-force attacks against exposed RDP and SMB services, spearphishing, exploitation of public-facing applications, and reuse of valid credentials from prior breaches. In at least one confirmed case, affiliates exploited ZeroLogon (CVE-2020-1472) against an unpatched domain controller to obtain domain administrator privileges. The group used custom exfiltration tooling including StealTENGU and StealTG, as well as Rclone and WinSCP, with MEGA as the primary storage destination and SFTP, PixelDrain, and StorJ as secondary options. During execution and defense evasion, Tengu used LOLBins including powershell.exe, cmd.exe, rundll32.exe, sc.exe, wevtutil.exe, and vssadmin.exe. It disabled Windows Defender with an unsigned .NET executable, stopped wscsvc and wuauserv via sc.exe, cleared event logs with wevtutil, deleted shadow copies, appended the .tengu extension to encrypted files, and dropped ransom notes including TENGU_README.txt. The ransomware used intermittent encryption targeting file headers to accelerate encryption speed. Tengu maintained a dedicated Tor-based data leak site displaying stolen documents, countdown timers, and sometimes ransom negotiation chat logs. The original leak site launched in October 2025, later underwent infrastructure changes in early 2026, and by February 2026 included a separate file server and backup onion domains. Research cited in the content identified operational security failures exposing infrastructure details and attack IPs. The group appears sector-agnostic, with technology and manufacturing specifically noted among the most affected sectors. Known aliases and related naming in the content are Tengu and Shisa Ransomware.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Capital Goods
  • Government & Administration
  • Public Safety
  • Banks
  • Utilities
  • Energy

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇹🇷 Türkiye
  • 🇦🇪 United Arab Emirates
  • 🇿🇦 South Africa
  • 🇪🇬 Egypt
  • 🇶🇦 Qatar
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

3 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

2 of 15 tactics3 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0010
Exfiltration
2 techniques
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1567
Exfiltration Over Web Service
TA0040
Impact
1 technique
T1486×2
Data Encrypted for Impact
What this page doesn’t show

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping3

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.