GlassWorm
GlassWorm is an ongoing software supply-chain threat actor/campaign targeting software developers and developer ecosystems since at least early 2025. It has operated across GitHub, npm, Python packages, Microsoft Visual Studio Marketplace, and Open VSX, using malicious or trojanized packages, compromised repositories, and malicious IDE extensions to steal developer credentials, tokens, secrets, cryptocurrency wallet data, and to gain broader supply-chain access. Reporting also describes infected systems being abused as SOCKS proxies, hidden VNC servers, and remote execution nodes. Observed GlassWorm tradecraft includes malicious VS Code/OpenVSX extensions, poisoned npm and Python packages, compromised GitHub repositories, force-pushed malicious commits, and hidden payloads embedded with invisible Unicode characters. Later activity included sleeper and impersonation extensions, abuse of extensionPack and extensionDependencies for transitive delivery, and a counterfeit WakaTime extension that deployed a Zig-compiled dropper outside the JavaScript sandbox and propagated across compatible IDEs including VS Code, Cursor, Windsurf, VSCodium, and Positron. GlassWorm has also been linked to fake browser extensions, including a malicious Chrome extension used for persistence and theft. Its malware and infrastructure are described as resilient and multi-stage. Reported command-and-control mechanisms include Solana blockchain transaction memo fields, the BitTorrent DHT network, Google Calendar event titles, and VPS-hosted servers. Reported malware capabilities include credential theft from npm, GitHub, and Git; theft of browser data and cryptocurrency wallet data; arbitrary code execution; keylogging, clipboard monitoring, screenshot capture, and persistence. The malware has been referred to as GlasswormRAT in reporting. GlassWorm has been associated with large-scale compromises, including more than 300 poisoned GitHub repositories in some reporting, at least 151 compromised GitHub repositories in March 2026, and broader waves affecting hundreds of repositories, packages, and extensions. A named offshoot/sub-campaign, ForceMemo, used stolen GitHub tokens to force-push malicious code into Python repositories while preserving original commit metadata. Multiple reports assess GlassWorm as likely operated by Russian-speaking threat actors, citing Russian-language comments and malware logic that avoids execution on systems in Russia or CIS countries. This attribution is reported as an assessment rather than confirmed fact. Known alias/sub-campaign directly mentioned in the content: ForceMemo.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Software & Services
Tradecraft
44 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
1 malware family attributed to this actor across reporting.
Observables
37 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.
Recent activity
20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Supply-chain-focused threat activity targeting developers via malicious VS Code extensions, poisoned npm/Python packages, and compromised GitHub repositories to steal developer credentials, cryptocurrency wallet data, and gain access to software supply chains.
A malware distribution operation using poisoned developer-focused repositories and C2 infrastructure to infect machines and pursue access to CI/CD environments, developer credentials, and downstream enterprise environments.
Conducting supply chain attacks against software developers through trojanized VS Code/OpenVSX extensions, malicious npm and Python packages, and poisoned GitHub repositories using stolen developer credentials. The group operated resilient multi-channel C2 infrastructure and used GlasswormRAT to steal credentials, drain cryptocurrency wallets, and maintain persistent remote access.
Conducting software supply-chain attacks targeting developers through malicious OpenVSX and VS Code extensions, GitHub repositories, and npm packages, using a resilient multi-channel command-and-control architecture.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.