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Mallory
6 malware families

xHunt

Also known asxhunt

xHunt is a cyber-espionage threat actor first observed in July 2018, known for persistent, multi-year campaigns primarily targeting organizations in Kuwait—especially government, shipping, and transportation. The group uses a custom, evolving toolkit with many components named after characters from the anime “Hunter x Hunter,” and has been reported under the aliases SectorD01, Hive0081, Cobalt Katana, and Hunter Serpens. xHunt’s initial access has included compromise of web-facing infrastructure (notably Microsoft Exchange and IIS) and credential-harvesting operations. A documented operation used a watering-hole on a compromised Kuwaiti government website, injecting a hidden HTML reference (e.g., a visibility:hidden file:// URI to an attacker-controlled SMB share) to trigger Windows authentication and passively capture visitors’ NTLMv2 hashes. Post-compromise, xHunt deploys custom webshells and PowerShell backdoors, including the BumbleBee webshell for direct command execution and PowerShell backdoors such as TriFive and Snugy (described as a CASHY200 variant). Some implants use Exchange Web Services (EWS) for command-and-control by reading/writing commands and results as email drafts in mailbox folders such as Drafts or Deleted Items; TriFive is described as logging into a legitimate user mailbox with stolen credentials and retrieving a PowerShell payload stored as a draft. The actor emphasizes persistence and stealth via scheduled tasks (often with execution-policy bypass), including task masquerading (e.g., tasks named to resemble legitimate Windows components and placed under trusted task paths). Credential theft techniques described include LSASS credential dumping (mimikatz/sekurlsa::logonpasswords) and registry modification to enable WDigest plaintext credential storage (HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\SecurityProviders\WDigest UseLogonCredential=1). Lateral movement and internal access are supported via SSH tunneling (Plink) to reach internal services and interact with webshells. Operational security measures noted include use of VPN infrastructure (e.g., Private Internet Access) and frequent IP switching to hinder attribution and investigation.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

18 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

7 of 15 tactics22 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1047
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001
PowerShell
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1505
Server Software Component
T1505.003
Web Shell
TA0005
Stealth
1 technique
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.004
File Deletion
TA0007
Discovery
8 techniques
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1018
Remote System Discovery
T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
T1046
Network Service Discovery
T1082
System Information Discovery
T1083
File and Directory Discovery
T1124
System Time Discovery
T1135
Network Share Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.001
Remote Desktop Protocol
T1021.002
SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1570
Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1213
Data from Information Repositories
TA0011
Command and Control
1 technique
T1572
Protocol Tunneling
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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping18

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal6

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.

xHunt | Mallory