Bearlyfy
Bearlyfy, also known as Labubu, is a pro-Ukrainian threat group that has been attributed by F6 to more than 70 cyber attacks against Russian companies since emerging in January 2025. F6 describes the group as a dual-purpose actor pursuing both financial extortion and sabotage, with operations intended to inflict maximum damage on Russian business while also generating ransomware revenue. The group initially targeted smaller Russian companies but later expanded to larger enterprises, and F6 assessed it became a major threat to Russian business within about a year. Bearlyfy has used multiple ransomware families and variants over time. Early attacks used LockBit 3 (Black) and Babuk-derived encryptors, including a modified Babuk variant for Linux systems. Beginning in May 2025, the group used a modified PolyVice variant. Since March 2026, Bearlyfy has used self-developed ransomware, including a custom Windows ransomware family called GenieLocker. F6 assessed that GenieLocker borrows cryptographic schemes and approaches from the Venus and Trinity ransomware families and includes anti-analysis techniques. According to F6, Bearlyfy commonly gains initial access by exploiting external services and vulnerable applications. The group has deployed MeshAgent for remote access and then used that access to enable encryption, destruction, or modification of victim data. F6 characterized its operations as rapid-fire attacks with minimal preparation and swift encryption. Bearlyfy often delivers ransom notes separately rather than generating them directly through the ransomware, although GenieLocker-related attacks can automatically generate notes. Some ransom messages are minimal and contain only contact details, while others include mocking or psychologically coercive language intended to pressure victims. F6 reported that Bearlyfy’s ransom demands increased from roughly €80,000 in earlier campaigns to hundreds of thousands of dollars, and that about one in five victims paid. F6 also identified overlaps between Bearlyfy’s tooling and infrastructure and PhantomCore, and reported collaboration with the more experienced pro-Ukrainian group Head Mare, while assessing that Bearlyfy maintains a distinct operational style.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇷🇺 Russia
Where they're from
Attributed origin per open-source reporting.
- UA
Tradecraft
6 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
6 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
1 additional family tracked in Mallory.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE this actor has used in observed campaigns. 1 of them exploited in the wild.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Dual-purpose ransomware and sabotage group targeting Russian businesses, conducting rapid attacks for both extortion and destructive impact.
Pro-Ukrainian ransomware and disruptive operations targeting Russian companies, combining political and financial motives and escalating from small-business attacks to larger enterprises with custom ransomware.
Проукраинская группа, осуществившая более 70 атак на российские компании с января 2025 года, совмещая вымогательство с диверсионной деятельностью. Сначала использовала чужие и модифицированные ransomware-семейства, а с марта 2026 года перешла на собственные шифровальщики, включая GenieLocker.
Newly described ransomware group; noted as having a connection to PhantomCore.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.