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🇺🇦 UA6 malware familiesExploits CVEs in the wild

Bearlyfy

Also known asBearlyfy

Bearlyfy, also known as Labubu, is a pro-Ukrainian threat group that has been attributed by F6 to more than 70 cyber attacks against Russian companies since emerging in January 2025. F6 describes the group as a dual-purpose actor pursuing both financial extortion and sabotage, with operations intended to inflict maximum damage on Russian business while also generating ransomware revenue. The group initially targeted smaller Russian companies but later expanded to larger enterprises, and F6 assessed it became a major threat to Russian business within about a year. Bearlyfy has used multiple ransomware families and variants over time. Early attacks used LockBit 3 (Black) and Babuk-derived encryptors, including a modified Babuk variant for Linux systems. Beginning in May 2025, the group used a modified PolyVice variant. Since March 2026, Bearlyfy has used self-developed ransomware, including a custom Windows ransomware family called GenieLocker. F6 assessed that GenieLocker borrows cryptographic schemes and approaches from the Venus and Trinity ransomware families and includes anti-analysis techniques. According to F6, Bearlyfy commonly gains initial access by exploiting external services and vulnerable applications. The group has deployed MeshAgent for remote access and then used that access to enable encryption, destruction, or modification of victim data. F6 characterized its operations as rapid-fire attacks with minimal preparation and swift encryption. Bearlyfy often delivers ransom notes separately rather than generating them directly through the ransomware, although GenieLocker-related attacks can automatically generate notes. Some ransom messages are minimal and contain only contact details, while others include mocking or psychologically coercive language intended to pressure victims. F6 reported that Bearlyfy’s ransom demands increased from roughly €80,000 in earlier campaigns to hundreds of thousands of dollars, and that about one in five victims paid. F6 also identified overlaps between Bearlyfy’s tooling and infrastructure and PhantomCore, and reported collaboration with the more experienced pro-Ukrainian group Head Mare, while assessing that Bearlyfy maintains a distinct operational style.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇷🇺 Russia

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • UA
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

6 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

4 of 15 tactics7 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
1 technique
T1587
Develop Capabilities
T1587.001
Malware
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1190
Exploit Public-Facing Application
TA0011
Command and Control
1 technique
T1219
Remote Access Tools
TA0040
Impact
3 techniques
T1485
Data Destruction
T1486×3
Data Encrypted for Impact
T1565
Data Manipulation
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Target overlap

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Tradecraft mapping6

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal6

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs1

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.