UAT-10027
UAT-10027 is a threat activity cluster tracked by Cisco Talos that has conducted an ongoing campaign since at least December 2025 targeting U.S. education and healthcare organizations. Talos reported the actor’s objective was to deliver a previously undisclosed backdoor/loader named Dohdoor. The intrusion chain was assessed as likely beginning with social-engineering phishing, followed by PowerShell and batch-script stages that downloaded a malicious DLL and executed it via DLL sideloading using legitimate Windows executables such as Fondue.exe, mblctr.exe, and ScreenClippingHost.exe. Talos also reported misuse of living-off-the-land binaries, anti-forensic cleanup including deletion of RunMRU history, clipboard clearing, and self-deletion of the batch script. Dohdoor uses DNS-over-HTTPS to Cloudflare DNS to resolve command-and-control infrastructure and then communicates over HTTPS through Cloudflare-backed infrastructure to blend with legitimate traffic. Reported subdomains included strings such as "MswInSofTUpDloAd" and "DEEPinSPeCTioNsyStEM," and Talos noted irregular capitalization and TLDs such as .online, .design, and .software. Dohdoor dynamically resolves APIs via hash-based lookups, downloads encrypted payloads, decrypts them with a custom XOR-SUB routine, and executes them in memory via process hollowing into legitimate Windows binaries including OpenWith.exe, wksprt.exe, ImagingDevices.exe, and wab.exe. Talos also reported EDR-evasion behavior involving unhooking or patching syscall stubs in ntdll.dll. Talos found OSINT suggesting a likely follow-on Cobalt Strike Beacon payload, but stated they did not recover a definitive downloaded payload. Cisco Talos assessed with low confidence that UAT-10027 may be North Korea-nexus based on tradecraft overlaps with Lazarus Group tooling, including similarities between Dohdoor and Lazarloader such as the XOR-SUB decryption routine and NTDLL unhooking techniques. Talos also noted that the campaign’s victimology differs from Lazarus’ more typical cryptocurrency and defense targeting. Attribution remains unconfirmed. No aliases or sub-groups beyond the tracking name UAT-10027 were directly identified in the provided content.
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Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Health Care Equipment & Services
Where they target
Geographies tied to known operations.
- 🇺🇸 United States
Tradecraft
26 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Associated malware families
2 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.
Recent activity
16 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Cluster targeting US education and healthcare to deploy the Dohdoor backdoor using DNS-over-HTTPS for C2; observed use of what appears to be Cobalt Strike Beacon; assessed as likely financially motivated based on victimology.
Threat cluster targeting U.S. education and healthcare to deploy the Dohdoor backdoor; uses DNS-over-HTTPS for C2 and reflective payload execution; observed follow-on use consistent with Cobalt Strike and assessed as likely financially motivated.
Campaign targeting U.S. education and healthcare organizations using the Dohdoor backdoor.
Ongoing stealth-focused intrusion campaign targeting US education and healthcare, using the Dohdoor backdoor with DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH) for C2, leveraging living-off-the-land executables for sideloading, and hiding C2 behind reputable cloud services (e.g., Cloudflare) to enable persistence, lateral movement, and data collection.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.