Skip to main content
Live Webinar with SANS (June 25)— Agentic CTI Automation for Fun & ProfitRegister Free
Mallory
🇨🇳 CN4 malware families

CL-STA-1087

Also known asCL-STA-1087

CL-STA-1087 is a suspected China-linked, state-backed cyber espionage cluster tracked by Palo Alto Networks Unit 42. The activity has targeted military organizations in Southeast Asia since at least 2020 and is assessed as focused on long-term intelligence collection rather than bulk data theft. Reported collection priorities included military capabilities, organizational structures, C4I systems, official meeting records, joint military activities, operational capability assessments, and cooperation with Western armed forces. The campaign demonstrated persistent, stealthy tradecraft, including long-term access on unmanaged endpoints, dormant periods lasting months, reverse shells to multiple command-and-control servers, and lateral movement using WMI and .NET commands. Unit 42 reported APT-like characteristics including tailored delivery methods, defense evasion, stable infrastructure, and custom payload deployment. The exact initial access vector is currently not available. Observed malware and tooling included the AppleChris and MemFun backdoors and a custom credential harvester called Getpass. AppleChris was deployed via DLL hijacking and evolved across variants, including a tunneler variant with proxy capabilities. It supported file access, upload/download, deletion, drive and directory enumeration, process enumeration and control, remote shell execution, and silent process creation. AppleChris used sandbox evasion and delayed execution, generated host-tied session IDs, and resolved command-and-control infrastructure through encrypted or Base64-decoded dead drop content on Pastebin; one variant also used Dropbox with Pastebin as fallback. MemFun was a modular, multi-stage backdoor delivered through a loader, shellcode injection, an in-memory downloader, and a final DLL fetched at runtime from command-and-control. It operated largely in memory and used process hollowing, reflective DLL loading, timestomping, memory zeroing, and anti-forensic checks to reduce artifacts. Both AppleChris and MemFun used custom HTTP verbs/commands for command-and-control communications and shared Pastebin-based dead drop resolution. Getpass was described as a custom Mimikatz DLL masquerading as a Palo Alto tool. It escalated privileges and harvested credentials from lsass.exe memory, including plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and authentication data from multiple Windows authentication packages, with stolen data logged to WinSAT.db. Known alias in the provided content: CL-STA-1087.

Share:
Are they targeting you?

Know when an actor pivots toward your sector

Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Capital Goods

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • CN
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

36 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

10 of 15 tactics53 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1047×2
Windows Management Instrumentation
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.001×4
PowerShell
T1059.003×2
Windows Command Shell
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001×4
DLL
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003×2
Windows Service
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
T1055
Process Injection
T1055.012×4
Process Hollowing
T1134
Access Token Manipulation
T1134.001
Token Impersonation/Theft
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003×2
Windows Service
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
TA0005
Stealth
9 techniques
T1036×2
Masquerading
T1055
Process Injection
T1055.012×4
Process Hollowing
T1070
Indicator Removal
T1070.006×4
Timestomp
T1134
Access Token Manipulation
T1134.001
Token Impersonation/Theft
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1497×3
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.003
Time Based Checks
T1574
Hijack Execution Flow
T1574.001×4
DLL
T1620×3
Reflective Code Loading
T1622
Debugger Evasion
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1003×2
OS Credential Dumping
T1003.001×4
LSASS Memory
T1649
Steal or Forge Authentication Certificates
TA0007
Discovery
7 techniques
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1033
System Owner/User Discovery
T1057
Process Discovery
T1082
System Information Discovery
T1083×2
File and Directory Discovery
T1497×3
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.003
Time Based Checks
T1622
Debugger Evasion
TA0008
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
T1021
Remote Services
T1021.003
Distributed Component Object Model
T1570
Lateral Tool Transfer
TA0009
Collection
2 techniques
T1005
Data from Local System
T1213
Data from Information Repositories
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001
Web Protocols
T1090
Proxy
T1102
Web Service
T1102.001×4
Dead Drop Resolver
T1105×4
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
IOCS

Observables

16 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping36

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal4

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables16

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.