ForceMemo
ForceMemo is a supply chain campaign documented in March 2026 that compromised GitHub Python repositories through account takeover and force-push of malicious code. Reporting cited in the provided content attributes the campaign to credentials stolen via the GlassWorm VS Code extensions, with SecurityWeek describing approximately 150 affected GitHub Python repositories and StepSecurity documenting more than 240 compromised repositories during March 8-13, 2026. The content explicitly states ForceMemo is separate from TeamPCP. A BGI investigation further linked the same Solana wallet infrastructure used in a Lazarus Group TraderTraitor campaign and the GlassWorm VS Code extension worm to the ForceMemo GitHub repository compromise campaign, indicating shared infrastructure or a common operational team, but the provided content does not directly attribute ForceMemo itself with high confidence to Lazarus Group. Known alias in the provided content: ForceMemo.
Know when an actor pivots toward your sector
Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.
Targeting
Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.
Who they target
Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.
- Software & Services
Tradecraft
1 distinct technique observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A separate supply chain campaign using credentials stolen via malicious VS Code extensions to force-push malicious code into GitHub Python repositories.
A separate supply chain campaign using credentials stolen via malicious VS Code extensions to force-push malicious code into GitHub Python repositories.
A campaign compromising GitHub Python repositories via account takeover and force-push, injecting code that reads C2 instructions from the same Solana wallet dead-drop infrastructure.
The version that knows your environment.
Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.
Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.
CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.