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Mallory
🇷🇺 RU

STAC6405

Also known asSTAC6405

STAC6405 is a threat activity cluster tracked by Sophos. Sophos reported that this cluster conducted a phishing campaign beginning as early as April 2025, with most observed activity in October and November 2025, affecting more than 80 organizations across multiple sectors, predominantly in the United States. The campaign used invitation-themed phishing lures, including Punchbowl-style invitations and tender solicitation themes, with emails sent both from compromised trusted third-party accounts and from unknown senders. The cluster abused legitimate remote monitoring and management tools for initial access, primarily LogMeIn Resolve and in some cases ScreenConnect. Phishing emails linked to attacker-controlled distribution sites hosting legitimate LogMeIn Resolve installers preconfigured to register victim devices to attacker-controlled accounts. Sophos observed rotating infrastructure and themed landing pages, including Microsoft Teams- and Norton-themed branding, and domains including mastorpasstop[.]top, evitereview[.]de, evitesecured[.]top, and .ru[.]com infrastructure. Observed installer names included Invitation.exe, ContractAgreementToSign.exe, Diverse-Build-Solution.exe, invt-list2025.exe, SPCL_INVITE_RSVP_2025.exe, and statmts_PDF-10.25.exe. After execution, the attackers obtained unattended remote access through LogMeIn Resolve; the agent wrote a configuration file with a hard-coded attacker-controlled relay domain and registered a Windows service with a unique UID. In most observed cases, activity stopped after the RMM tool was installed. Sophos assessed this pattern as consistent with possible initial access brokerage, dormant persistence, or victim research prior to follow-on action. In two observed incidents, STAC6405 conducted second-stage activity. In one case, the actor used a pre-existing ScreenConnect installation to download 8776_6713_exe.zip, packed with HeartCrypt. The archive contained HideMouse.exe, which replaced the cursor with a transparent one to conceal remote activity, and 8776_6713.exe, an infostealer Sophos assessed as behaviorally similar to ValleyRAT. The malware delayed execution for roughly four to nine minutes, injected into csc.exe, decrypted an embedded payload at runtime using TripleDES, connected to 45[.]56.162.138, and harvested browser credentials, session artifacts, cryptocurrency wallet data, host information, security product information via WMI, and imaging and camera device information. In another incident, a downloaded binary named invite.exe installed ScreenConnect configured to connect to relay[.]aceheritagehouse[.]top:8041 as a Guest client, launched Java-based components RemoteAccess.jar and jwrapper_utils.jar inside a bundled JRE, enumerated firewall rules, abused JWrapper SimpleService.exe to register simplegateway.service, and executed Remote Access.exe, which Sophos assessed as related to SimpleHelp. Sophos and the affected customer contained that intrusion before further action occurred. No nation-state attribution is stated in the provided content. No aliases or sub-groups are provided beyond the Sophos tracking name STAC6405.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇺🇸 United States

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • RU
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

21 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

10 of 15 tactics30 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566
Phishing
T1566.002×2
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
2 techniques
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.005
Visual Basic
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1055×2
Process Injection
T1543
Create or Modify System Process
T1543.003
Windows Service
TA0005
Stealth
4 techniques
T1036
Masquerading
T1055×2
Process Injection
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.003
Time Based Checks
T1678
Delay Execution
TA0006
Credential Access
1 technique
T1555
Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003
Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0007
Discovery
4 techniques
T1016
System Network Configuration Discovery
T1082×2
System Information Discovery
T1497
Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion
T1497.003
Time Based Checks
T1518
Software Discovery
T1518.001
Security Software Discovery
TA0008
Lateral Movement
1 technique
T1021
Remote Services
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1119
Automated Collection
TA0011
Command and Control
4 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
T1219×2
Remote Access Tools
T1573
Encrypted Channel
IOCS

Observables

7 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping21

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables7

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.