Skip to main content
Mallory
🇨🇳 CN

GHOST STADIUM

Also known asghost_stadium

GHOST STADIUM is a Chinese-speaking, financially motivated threat actor tracked by Group-IB as part of a broader Chinese-language phishing ecosystem targeting the 2026 FIFA World Cup. Group-IB reported the actor was first observed in November 2025 and identified it as one of four independent threat actors targeting the tournament. The actor operated a coordinated phishing and ticket-fraud campaign across more than 300 active domains, while the wider infrastructure included more than 4,000 fraudulent domains registered since August 2025, with thousands reportedly parked for later activation. According to the reporting, GHOST STADIUM used a custom React-based phishing kit built with the Layui 2.7.6/2.7.6m UI framework to create near pixel-perfect clones of FIFA ticketing and authentication pages. The kit replicated FIFA’s PingIdentity-based single sign-on flow using a real client_id from the legitimate service, harvested credentials and personal data including email addresses, physical addresses, and phone numbers, and in some cases abused password reset functionality to lock victims out of their FIFA accounts. The phishing workflow then redirected victims to the legitimate FIFA site to make the compromise appear successful. Distribution and victim acquisition relied on Facebook Ads as a primary channel, along with search engine poisoning, Google search results, Telegram, and WhatsApp. Group-IB linked campaign infrastructure through shared Meta Pixel IDs, shared SSL certificates, identical HTML content, and a shared Tawk.to property ID. The phishing pages supported 11 languages and distinguished among Simplified Chinese, Traditional Chinese, and Hong Kong Chinese; Group-IB also reported Chinese-language comments in the source code as an attribution signal. The campaign targeted football fans seeking FIFA World Cup tickets, especially premium and hospitality tickets, and also stole FIFA account credentials. Reporting cited at least 47,000 victims, theft of up to $10,000 per ticket, and more than 2,500 FIFA account credentials circulating on dark-web markets. Group-IB estimated losses ranging from tens or hundreds of millions of dollars for premium-ticket fraud alone, with broader campaign losses potentially reaching into the billions. Known alias in the provided content: Ghost Stadium.

Share:
Are they targeting you?

Know when an actor pivots toward your sector

Mallory correlates actor tradecraft and target patterns against your stack, your sector, and your geography. See overlap before they land.

OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Consumer Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • 🇬🇧 United Kingdom
  • 🇵🇹 Portugal
  • 🇪🇸 Spain
  • 🇩🇿 Algeria
  • 🇺🇸 United States
  • 🇨🇦 Canada
  • 🇲🇽 Mexico
  • 🇧🇷 Brazil

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • CN
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

13 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

9 of 15 tactics19 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0043
Reconnaissance
2 techniques
T1589×2
Gather Victim Identity Information
T1598
Phishing for Information
TA0042
Resource Development
2 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1583.001×6
Domains
T1584
Compromise Infrastructure
T1584.006×2
Web Services
TA0001
Initial Access
3 techniques
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
T1189×2
Drive-by Compromise
T1566×7
Phishing
T1566.002×2
Spearphishing Link
T1566.003
Spearphishing via Service
TA0003
Persistence
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0005
Stealth
2 techniques
T1036×3
Masquerading
T1078×2
Valid Accounts
TA0006
Credential Access
2 techniques
T1056×6
Input Capture
T1539
Steal Web Session Cookie
TA0009
Collection
1 technique
T1056×6
Input Capture
TA0040
Impact
1 technique
T1531
Account Access Removal
IOCS

Observables

38 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: sector and geo overlap with your footprint, the IOCs they’re burning right now, detection coverage, and what to do next.
Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping13

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables38

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.