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MalwareRansomwareExploits 3 CVEs

P2PInfect

P2PInfect is a Rust-written, self-propagating malware family and decentralized peer-to-peer worm/botnet first observed in mid-2023. It primarily targets Redis instances exposed to the internet, including unauthenticated or vulnerable deployments, and has also been observed compromising Kubernetes environments, including Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) clusters. Reported Redis tradecraft includes abuse of misconfigured replication via the SLAVEOF command and exploitation of CVE-2022-0543; FortiGuard also linked some P2PInfect activity to exploitation of CVE-2025-11953 (Metro4Shell) against React Native Metro servers, and assessed with low confidence that CVE-2025-49844 (RediShell) may also have been incorporated as an access vector.

The malware uses a resilient P2P mesh rather than centralized C2, with peer communications over non-standard ports and bootstrap node lists embedded in malware arguments. Payload delivery has been observed via uniform peer-hosted paths such as /Linux, /Windows, and /IP. Recovered samples in the cited cluster were Rust binaries generally packed with UPX. A FortiGuard-observed deployment script, deployer.sh/deplyoer.sh (MD5: 80676a539765a9e117f20b6b99887eca), downloaded a Linux x86_64 client from http://8[.]210[.]50[.]65:60126/linux, wrote it to /top/RarF51vUe0, and dropped a sample with MD5 5d1ca537c4bedebf2f4d276d4199ea95. Additional reported sample hashes include Linux client MD5 a1a35afebb585917675534de3d610c93 and Windows client MD5 08ad2c2877edda9a050b81d011c1c003. FortiGuard reported the malware processed a base64 argument blob with ChaCha20 using an all-zero key and nonce, serving as obfuscation, and that decrypted data contained structured bootstrap peer IP:port records.

Operationally, P2PInfect has shown long-lived persistence: FortiGuard documented infections in GKE clusters at several client companies, including one compromise lasting six months, with no second-stage payload executed in the monitored environments. The malware has been described as capable of remaining dormant for extended periods before later delivery of ransomware and cryptominers, and some variants reportedly include usermode rootkit capabilities. Reporting also states there is evidence P2PInfect may function as a botnet-for-hire platform where other actors deploy their own second-stage payloads.

Observed follow-on activity associated with P2PInfect includes deployment of Monero cryptominers and ransomware on internet-exposed, unpatched Redis servers. Separate reporting on Linux SSH honeypot activity found P2PInfect to be the dominant attack source in Q1 2026, accounting for 70.3% of observed attack sources, and noted that the malware also includes a basic SSH password sprayer. Targeted environments explicitly mentioned in the content include Linux systems, Windows systems, Redis servers, React Native Metro servers, Kubernetes clusters, and cloud-hosted GKE environments.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

3 CVES
CVE-2022-0543Redis Lua sandbox escape RCE in Debian/Ubuntu packagesExploited in the wild

RediShell has the same sandbox escape vulnerability as CVE-2022-0543, a confirmed vector of P2Pinfect, and the infected hosts were vulnerable to it. | FortiGuard Labs recently identified persistent P2Pinfect presences within Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) clusters at several client companies... While our telemetry indicated that no second-stage payload was ever executed, this botnet has been observed in the wild to remain dormant for extended periods before delivering ransomware and crypto miners.

via fortinet threat researchfortinet.com
CVE-2025-11953Metro4Shell: OS Command Injection in React Native Community CLI Metro Development ServerExploited in the wild

We also observed that some infected Redis nodes contacted P2Pinfect peers that were deployed by exploiting CVE-2025-11953 (aka Metro4Shell, a React vulnerability) in November 2025. | FortiGuard Labs recently identified persistent P2Pinfect presences within Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) clusters at several client companies... While our telemetry indicated that no second-stage payload was ever executed, this botnet has been observed in the wild to remain dormant for extended periods before delivering ransomware and crypto miners.

via fortinet threat researchfortinet.com
CVE-2025-49844RediShell: Use-after-free RCE in Redis Lua scripting

FortiGuard Labs recently identified persistent P2Pinfect presences within Google Kubernetes Engine (GKE) clusters at several client companies... While our telemetry indicated that no second-stage payload was ever executed, this botnet has been observed in the wild to remain dormant for extended periods before delivering ransomware and crypto miners. | We also speculate with low confidence that P2Pinfect botnet might have incorporated CVE-2025-49844 (aka RediShell) in their repertoire.

via fortinet threat researchfortinet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The infection begins the moment a Redis instance inside a Kubernetes cluster is reachable without proper access controls in place. Attackers connect to the exposed service and issue the SLAVEOF command...

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence4

“The compromises originated from exposed Redis instances, which allowed the botnet to gain an initial foothold.” | the botnet successfully incorporated the critical Metro4Shell vulnerability affecting React Native development servers

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

these open database configurations left enterprise clusters entirely vulnerable to remote command execution

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

This shell-based dropper retrieves a P2Pinfect client binary from http://8[.]210[.]50[.]65:60126/linux and writes it to /top/RarF51vUe0... It then executes the binary with a large base64-encoded argument blob.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence3
TacticExecution

These clients were further linked to active exploitation of CVE-2025-11953, a critical unauthenticated remote code execution vulnerability in the React Native Metro development server, publicly designated “Metro4Shell”.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Attackers connect to the exposed service and issue the SLAVEOF command, turning the legitimate Redis node into a follower of a malicious server under their control. This tricks the node into loading arbitrary modules from attacker infrastructure...

Persistence

2 techniques
T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The infection begins the moment a Redis instance inside a Kubernetes cluster is reachable without proper access controls in place. Attackers connect to the exposed service and issue the SLAVEOF command...

T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence2

P2Pinfect has been observed in the wild abusing the SLAVEOF command to turn discovered open nodes into followers of the attacker’s server, thereby gaining code execution.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

RediShell (CVE-2025-49844) is a critical RCE that allows an authenticated user to bypass the Lua sandbox by sending a maliciously crafted script to manipulate the garbage collector, thereby granting native code execution.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1
TacticStealth

Some variants of the P2Pinfect clients also have usermode rootkit capabilities.

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

The base64 argument blob passed to the binary at execution is processed through a ChaCha20 stream cipher before use. However, the encryption key and nonce are both composed entirely of zero bytes, rendering the encryption effectively decorative and serving as an obfuscation layer.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Once a node was enrolled in the P2P mesh, it stayed relatively quiet, a behavior the researchers described as dormant. The bots appeared to be waiting, ready to receive tasks from operators at any time.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

Attackers connect to the exposed service and issue the SLAVEOF command, turning the legitimate Redis node into a follower of a malicious server under their control. This tricks the node into loading arbitrary modules from attacker infrastructure...

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

P2Pinfect primarily spreads by exploiting Redis vulnerabilities and also includes a basic SSH password sprayer.

T1110.003Password SprayingEvidence1

P2Pinfect primarily spreads by exploiting Redis vulnerabilities and also includes a basic SSH password sprayer.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The botnet used this network to distribute payloads, gather information about the infected environment, and maintain communication without relying on a centralized command server.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Once a node was enrolled in the P2P mesh, it stayed relatively quiet, a behavior the researchers described as dormant. The bots appeared to be waiting, ready to receive tasks from operators at any time.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.004SSHEvidence1

Several peer nodes were independently flagged for SSH and exploit attacks.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Once inside, infected hosts begin communicating with other botnet peers, slowly growing the network while waiting for further instructions.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence2

P2Pinfect is a self-propagating malware strain that combines worm-like spreading capabilities with a decentralized botnet architecture. This peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture makes it highly resilient to sinkholing and infrastructure takedowns.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

“P2Pinfect is a resilient botnet that uses a peer-to-peer mesh of compromised computers to eliminate single points of failure, making it significantly harder to sinkhole and take down.”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

This shell-based dropper retrieves a P2Pinfect client binary from http://8[.]210[.]50[.]65:60126/linux and writes it to /top/RarF51vUe0.

T1571Non-Standard PortEvidence3

P2PInfect peers’ communication occurs over non-standard ports.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence3
TacticImpact

While our telemetry indicated that no second-stage payload was ever executed, this botnet has been observed in the wild to remain dormant for extended periods before delivering ransomware and crypto miners.

T1496Resource HijackingEvidence3
TacticImpact

The malware remains dormant for extended periods and has been observed hosting and deploying crypto miners and ransomware in the wild.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

12 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
7 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

8 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

security online infoNews
May 24, 2026
P2Pinfect Botnet Activity Spreads to Kubernetes

A resilient Rust-based peer-to-peer botnet/worm that compromises exposed Redis instances and other targets, maintains persistence through a decentralized mesh architecture, and is reportedly rented out to other criminals for deploying follow-on payloads such as ransomware or crypto miners.

Read more
cyber security newsNews
May 21, 2026
P2PInfect Botnet Compromises Kubernetes Clusters Through Exposed Redis Instances

A Rust-based peer-to-peer botnet malware that targets exposed or vulnerable Redis instances, abuses Redis replication and CVE-2022-0543 for code execution, enrolls hosts into a decentralized mesh, and can maintain dormant persistence in Kubernetes and cloud environments. The content also notes earlier versions deployed ransomware and cryptocurrency miners.

Read more
fortinet threat research blogNews
May 20, 2026
Misconfigured, Enrolled and Dormant: Anatomy of a P2Pinfect Kubernetes Compromise | FortiGuard Labs

A Rust-based self-propagating P2P botnet/worm that primarily spreads via Redis exploitation and SSH password spraying. It targets Linux, Windows, containers, Kubernetes, and routers, can remain dormant for long periods, and has been observed delivering second-stage payloads including ransomware and crypto miners. Some variants also have usermode rootkit capabilities.

Read more
fortinet threat researchNews
May 20, 2026
Misconfigured, Enrolled and Dormant: Anatomy of a P2Pinfect Kubernetes Compromise | FortiGuard Labs

A self-propagating Rust-based malware strain that combines worm-like spreading with a decentralized peer-to-peer botnet architecture. It primarily spreads via Redis exploitation and SSH password spraying, can remain dormant for long periods, and has been observed delivering second-stage payloads such as ransomware and crypto miners. Some variants also have usermode rootkit capabilities.

Read more
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IOC matching12

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities3

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.