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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actors

EDRSandBlast

EDRSandBlast is an open-source EDR-killing and defense-evasion tool used to disable endpoint security products at the kernel level via bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) techniques. The provided reporting states it has been used by multiple threat actors, including in Qilin ransomware intrusions and by Russian SVR/APT29 operators during post-exploitation of JetBrains TeamCity compromises. In observed Qilin activity, attackers deployed a legitimate signed Carbon Black Cloud Sensor executable (upd.exe) to sideload a malicious avupdate.dll, which decoded an XOR-encoded payload (web.dat) into a customized EDRSandBlast variant. That customized variant used the signed Toshiba driver TPwSav.sys rather than the tool’s more commonly associated vulnerable drivers, abused the driver’s arbitrary physical memory read/write capability, hijacked Beep.sys for arbitrary kernel memory access, and removed kernel callback routines and kernel event tracing used by EDR products. Reporting also notes EDRSandBlast can be used to disable or kill EDR/AV products and remove Protected Process Light (PPL) protections. Sophos reporting cited it as one of the most frequently seen EDR killer tools in 2024, appearing in waves of attempted ransomware attacks, with a notable peak around the U.S. Thanksgiving period. High-confidence observables directly tied to the described customized deployment include upd.exe, avupdate.dll, web.dat, and TPwSav.sys.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SVR

“This was done using an open source project called ‘EDRSandBlast.’”

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
APT29

“This was done using an open source project called ‘EDRSandBlast.’”

via cisa advisoriescisa.gov
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

In this case, the TA used these capabilities to overwrite the BeepDeviceControl function in the native Windows driver Beep.sys. The shellcode replacing this function implements a custom handler...

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

the threat actor (TA) opted to use a driver named TPwSav.sys... making it an attractive choice for bypassing EDR protections through a bring-your-own-vulnerable-driver (BYOVD) attack.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1
TacticStealth

“T1014: Rootkit” and tools/drivers listed (e.g., YDArk; vulnerable drivers used for BYOVD).

T1211Exploitation for Defense EvasionEvidence1
TacticStealth

The decoded PE is a customized variant of the tool EDRSandblast, designed to disable EDR products at the kernel level by exploiting a vulnerable signed driver.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

In this case, the TA used these capabilities to overwrite the BeepDeviceControl function in the native Windows driver Beep.sys. The shellcode replacing this function implements a custom handler...

T1553Subvert Trust ControlsEvidence1

脆弱な署名済みドライバを武器化し ... Process Explorer(ProcExp)ドライバ(Microsoft署名済み)を悪用

T1003.001LSASS MemoryEvidence1

EDRSandblast ... LSASS保護(RunAsPPL/Credential Guard)のバイパスとダンプ

Other

2 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

The TA proceeds with removing kernel callback routines and kernel event tracing, rendering most EDR solutions ineffective.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

taskkill、net stop、sc deleteなどの組み込みの管理ツールやコマンドを悪用して、セキュリティ製品のプロセスやサービスを改ざんします。

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
5 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching5

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.