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MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 4 CVEs

HARDPULSE

HARDPULSE is a webshell used in compromises of Pulse Secure (Pulse Connect Secure) VPN appliances. It is identified as compcheckjava.cgi, with reported SHA256 1d3ab04e21cfd40aa8d4300a359a09e3b520d39b1496be1e4bc91ae1f6730ecc. Mandiant/FireEye associated HARDPULSE with UNC2717, which targeted global government agencies between October 2020 and March 2021; reporting also notes UNC2717 activity at a European organization in March 2021. The broader intrusion set targeted government, defense, and financial organizations and involved exploitation of Pulse Secure vulnerabilities including CVE-2021-22893, alongside older flaws such as CVE-2019-11510, CVE-2020-8243, and CVE-2020-8260.

HARDPULSE supports arbitrary file read and write operations and may execute arbitrary commands via DSSafe::psystem, depending on implementation. It responds to HTTP GET and PUT requests. Reported functionality includes a ReadFile command that accepts a base64-encoded, RC4-encrypted filename via the img parameter and returns file contents base64-encoded and RC4-encrypted with Content-Type application/x-download and a Content-Disposition attachment filename of tmp. A WriteFile command accepts a base64-encoded, RC4-encrypted filename via the cert parameter and base64-encoded, RC4-encrypted file data via the md5 parameter and writes the data to disk. An Execute command accepts base64-encoded, RC4-encrypted commands via the name parameter, blocks the cd command by returning Error 404, redirects command output to /tmp/1 using ">/tmp/1 2>&1", and returns the output base64-encoded and RC4-encrypted while masquerading the response as Content-Type image/gif.

Its command-and-control/data handling uses base64 plus RC4. The first six characters of transmitted data are used as a random per-request nonce, which is combined with a static RC4 phrase to form the RC4 key; the static phrase is not sent over the wire. HARDPULSE also contains an embedded recovery URL of the form https://ive-host/dana-na/auth/recover.cgi?token=<varies>. Additional reporting states attacker interaction used parameters including checkcode, hashid, m, and filename.

Within the Pulse Secure exploitation ecosystem, HARDPULSE was deployed alongside QUIETPULSE and PULSEJUMP by UNC2717. High-confidence indicators directly mentioned in the content include the filename/path compcheckjava.cgi, the embedded recover.cgi tokenized URL path, use of HTTP GET/PUT, parameters img, cert, md5, and name for file and command operations, and temporary output redirection to /tmp/1.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

4 CVES
CVE-2021-22893Authentication Bypass RCE in Pulse Connect SecureExploited in the wild

"...newly discovered critical zero-day authentication bypass vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893) that is currently being exploited in the wild and for which there is no patch available yet." ... "Ivanti ... has released temporary mitigations to address the arbitrary file execution vulnerability (CVE-2021-22893, CVSS score: 10)"

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
CVE-2020-8260Authenticated RCE in Pulse Connect Secure admin web interface via uncontrolled gzip extraction

UNC2717 targeted global government agencies between October 2020 and March 2021 using HARDPULSE, QUIETPULSE, AND PULSEJUMP.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
CVE-2019-11510Pulse Secure Pulse Connect Secure Arbitrary File Read Vulnerability

UNC2717 targeted global government agencies between October 2020 and March 2021 using HARDPULSE, QUIETPULSE, AND PULSEJUMP.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
CVE-2020-8243Ivanti Pulse Connect Secure Admin Web Interface Template Upload RCE

UNC2717 targeted global government agencies between October 2020 and March 2021 using HARDPULSE, QUIETPULSE, AND PULSEJUMP.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
UNC2717

"UNC2717 - HARDPULSE, QUIETPULSE, AND PULSEJUMP"

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"...zero-day authentication bypass vulnerability in the Pulse Connect Secure (PCS) SSL VPN appliance actively exploited... vulnerability tracked as CVE-2021-22893... exploited in the wild... to hack the networks... and execute arbitrary code remotely on Pulse Connect Secure gateways."

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

"Execute... commands... executed via the system API with output piped to the file /tmp/1"; "compcheckresult.cgi... executes it verbatim... using the system API"; "webshell will execute the passed command on the victim host's command line".

Persistence

2 techniques
T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

"They modified scripts on the Pulse Secure system which enabled the malware to survive software updates and factory resets."

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

"...harvest Active Directory credentials and bypass multifactor authentication on Pulse Secure devices to access victim networks."

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

"They modified scripts on the Pulse Secure system which enabled the malware to survive software updates and factory resets."

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

"...harvest Active Directory credentials and bypass multifactor authentication on Pulse Secure devices to access victim networks."

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

"They developed malware that enabled them to harvest Active Directory credentials..."

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

"...harvest Active Directory credentials and bypass multifactor authentication on Pulse Secure devices to access victim networks."

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Multiple modified Pulse Secure CGI/Perl scripts act as webshells (e.g., licenseserverproto.cgi, secid_canceltoken.cgi, compcheckresult.cgi) that parse HTTP parameters/headers and execute attacker-supplied commands, returning output in HTTP responses (sometimes masquerading as GIF/text/html).

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"ReadFile... opens it for read... sent back..."; "WriteFile... filename... file data... written"; "HARDPULSE... matched against get and put which will read/write arbitrary files".

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
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IOC matching1

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities4

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.