Skip to main content
Live Webinar with SANS (June 25)— Agentic CTI Automation for Fun & ProfitRegister Free
Mallory
MalwareRansomware

Nefilim

Nefilim is a ransomware family and ransomware operation, also spelled "Nephilim," that emerged in March 2020 and is described as a successor to the Nemty ransomware family. It operated as an affiliate-based ransomware scheme in which administrators provided affiliates with the malware and supporting resources in exchange for a share of ransom proceeds; multiple reports in the content state affiliates paid or surrendered 20% of ransom revenue to the administrators. The malware was used to encrypt victim networks worldwide and was paired with double-extortion tactics: operators stole data, encrypted systems, and threatened to publish stolen information on "Corporate Leaks" sites if victims did not pay. The operation generated customized ransomware executables, unique decryption keys, and tailored ransom notes for each victim. Reported targeting focused on large, high-revenue corporate victims, especially companies in the United States, Canada, and Australia, with references to thresholds above $100 million and later above $200 million in annual revenue. Victim industries mentioned in the content include aviation, engineering, chemicals, eyewear, insurance, construction, energy/oil and gas transportation, and pet care, with additional victims in the U.S., Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, France, and other countries. The content also notes Nefilim’s use in attacks causing millions of dollars in ransom and recovery losses. Operationally, Nefilim has been associated with fast-flux infrastructure, and Mandiant research cited process kill lists deployed alongside Nefilim samples. Trend Micro reporting in the content states Nefilim drops MegaSync into its normal file path under its normal name, consistent with data-exfiltration support tooling. The content links the operation to Ukrainian national Volodymyr Viktorovich Tymoshchuk, identified in charging documents as an administrator of the LockerGoga, MegaCortex, and Nefilim ransomware operations and currently at large, and to affiliate Artem Aleksandrovych Stryzhak, who pleaded guilty to deploying Nefilim against corporate networks after receiving access to the ransomware code in June 2021.

Share:
For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Discovery

1 technique
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

FireEye Mandiant originally explored the link between financially motivated actors and OT in July 2020, when researchers found process kill lists deployed alongside seven different ransomware families... The second kill list was deployed alongside Clop ransomware.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1568.001Fast Flux DNSEvidence1

Fast flux refers to a domain-based technique that is characterized by rapidly changing the DNS records (e.g., IP addresses) associated with a single domain [T1568.001].

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567.002Exfiltration to Cloud StorageEvidence1

On top of client applications such as those provided by Mega, many ransomware families may use other software or built-in operating system utilities to exfiltrate data. We’ll use Mega as the example here... you can look for execution of any process that is not chrome.exe ... initiating a network connection to the domains mega.io or mega.co.nz .

Impact

3 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

The second kill list was deployed alongside Clop ransomware. The kill list alongside the Clop sample was attributed to FIN11.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

The process kill lists were designed to amplify the effects of known ransomware strains.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

The process kill lists were designed to amplify the effects of known ransomware strains.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping6

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.