BianLian
BianLian is a Russia-linked ransomware and data-extortion malware/group first observed in attacks in June 2022, with the ransomware itself reported as emerging in August 2022. It has targeted organizations in the U.S. and abroad, including multiple U.S. critical infrastructure sectors, and has also affected Australian organizations. Reported victim sectors include media and entertainment, manufacturing, healthcare, professional services, property development, financial services, mining, and other private enterprises. Public reporting also links BianLian to incidents involving Northern Minerals in Australia, Alpine Ear, Nose, and Throat, and alleged attacks against Collins Aerospace.
BianLian initially operated as a double-extortion ransomware, combining data theft with file encryption, but shifted after Avast released a public decryptor in January 2023. Multiple sources state the group then moved to intensified extortion-only operations without system encryption, and by around January 2024 was operating exclusively as an exfiltration-only extortion actor. The group steals victim data and threatens to leak it if payment is not made.
The ransomware component is described as a Go-based 64-bit Windows executable. Avast analysis states it encrypts data using AES-256-CBC, searches drives A: through Z:, and encrypts files matching 1,013 hardcoded extensions. It uses a fixed hardcoded offset within files rather than encrypting from the beginning, appends the .bianlian extension to encrypted files, drops a ransom note named "Look at this instruction.txt" in affected folders, and self-deletes via "cmd /c del <sample_exe_name>" after execution. Avast noted common observed executable paths/names including C:\Windows\TEMP\mativ.exe, C:\Windows\Temp\Areg.exe, C:\Users%username%\Pictures\windows.exe, and anabolic.exe, and that samples are typically around 2 MB.
According to the FBI, CISA, and ASD’s ACSC, BianLian commonly gains initial access via valid RDP credentials, phishing, and exploitation of public-facing applications, including possible use of the ProxyShell exploit chain (CVE-2021-34473, CVE-2021-34523, CVE-2021-31207) against Windows and ESXi environments. The group deploys a custom victim-specific Go backdoor, uses remote management/access tools for persistence and command and control, creates or activates local administrator accounts, changes passwords, and may use Ngrok or a modified Rsocks utility for proxying and SOCKS5 tunnels. Reported post-compromise behavior includes use of PowerShell and cmd to disable defenses such as Windows Defender and AMSI, registry changes to disable Sophos tamper protection, packing executables with UPX, masquerading binaries and scheduled tasks, network and Active Directory discovery with tools such as Advanced Port Scanner, SoftPerfect Network Scanner, SharpShares, and PingCastle, credential theft from LSASS, attempts to access NTDS.dit, use of secretsdump.py in portable executable form, lateral movement via PsExec and RDP, firewall modification to allow inbound RDP, SMB lateral movement, creation of domain admin and Azure AD accounts, and installation of Exchange webshells. The advisory also notes exploitation of CVE-2022-37969 for privilege escalation and an artifact named exp.exe likely exploiting Netlogon CVE-2020-1472.
For exfiltration and extortion, BianLian has been reported using FTP, Rclone, and Mega. The group has also been associated in reporting with use of legitimate but vulnerable drivers on Windows to terminate EDR products. Infrastructure reporting linked Aeza Group bulletproof hosting to BianLian activity, and OFAC-sanctioned Aeza infrastructure has been described as enabling ransomware including BianLian.
BianLian remains a prominent ransomware/extortion threat in public reporting and complaint statistics, including being listed among major ransomware threats by the FBI and among common variants in 2024-2025 reporting. High-confidence indicators directly mentioned in the source material include the .bianlian file extension, the ransom note filename "Look at this instruction.txt," and the executable names/paths observed by Avast telemetry.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
SAP NetWeaver, a cornerstone for enterprise operations across countless global organizations, faces a severe threat from a newly discovered deserialization vulnerability, CVE-2025-42980. With a CVSS score of 9.1, this flaw could enable attackers to execute arbitrary code... Threat Intelligence Active exploitation by ransomware groups, including BianLian and Ransomexx, has been observed.
First observed in attacks in June 2022, BianLian was seen targeting critical infrastructure organizations and private entities in the US and abroad. The group has been stealing victim data, using it for extortion.
First observed in attacks in June 2022, BianLian was seen targeting critical infrastructure organizations and private entities in the US and abroad. The group has been stealing victim data, using it for extortion.
Groups observed using it
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
...BianLian Ransomware Gang... leveraged command and scripting tools
Techniques & procedures
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Credential Access
3 techniques
Credential Access
Keylogging: Hydra abuses the Accessibility permissions to set up an Accessibility service that receives every Accessibility event happening on the infected device. This way the malware receives change events for TextFields (to steal usernames and passwords) and button clicks.
Overlays/Injections: At the beginning of the infection, it sends a few requests to the C2 server, and receives a list of targeted applications and a URL that points to a ZIP file which contains the corresponding injections... Hydra saves these injections locally and shows them as soon as it detects a user opening a banking application.
Around June 2022 we found new samples introducing this new feature used to steal cookies from sessions after the victims log in to their accounts... after the victim successfully logs in to his account, the cookies of the loaded website in the WebView are forwarded to the C2 server.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
Keylogging: Hydra abuses the Accessibility permissions to set up an Accessibility service that receives every Accessibility event happening on the infected device. This way the malware receives change events for TextFields (to steal usernames and passwords) and button clicks.
Overlays/Injections: At the beginning of the infection, it sends a few requests to the C2 server, and receives a list of targeted applications and a URL that points to a ZIP file which contains the corresponding injections... Hydra saves these injections locally and shows them as soon as it detects a user opening a banking application.
Though not confirmed by Collins Aerospace, the ransomware group BianLian claimed to have breached Collins Aerospace in 2023, stealing around 20 gigabytes of data. If true, this event could have armed the attackers with the data leaks they needed to successfully execute this larger-scale attack.
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
Hydra creates a POST request to send credentials or cookies to the C2 server.
Using Tor: This variant includes a Tor (.onion) URL to the endpoint ‘/api/mirrors’. As response, it will receive a Base64-encoded JSON with the list of C2 servers to use. This variant includes code to download Tor native libraries in order to connect to this ‘backup C2’ using the Tor network.
This variant includes code to download Tor native libraries in order to connect to this ‘backup C2’ using the Tor network.
Hydra includes a screencast component that sends screenshots to the C2 server and receives commands used to simulate Accessibility events (click buttons, enter text in TextFields, etc.). This way the TAs can manipulate the target application on the victim’s device to monetize the account associated with that application.
Using Tor: This variant includes a Tor (.onion) URL to the endpoint ‘/api/mirrors’. As response, it will receive a Base64-encoded JSON with the list of C2 servers to use... Using GitHub: This variant includes a GitHub repository file containing a Base64-encoded JSON object with the list of C2 servers... Hardcoded C2 server: This variant includes the C2 server in the binary itself and eventually sends a request to the path ‘/api/mirrors’ in order to get a new list of C2 servers.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
IOCs tracked for this family
5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
Recent activity
54 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Financially motivated ransomware group that opportunistically targets multiple sectors and publishes stolen data on the dark web.
Ransomware family identified by the FBI as one of the biggest ransomware threats by complaint volume in 2025.
Named ransomware family referenced as hosted or transiting through related abuse-friendly infrastructure.
Ransomware group that claims intrusions and publishes victim data on a leak site; in this incident it is alleged to have accessed and exfiltrated protected health information from Alpine Ear, Nose, and Throat (Alpine ENT).
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.