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MalTerminal

MalTerminal is an early proof-of-concept LLM-enabled malware prototype, described by SentinelLABS as potentially the earliest known malware to generate malicious payloads at runtime. It was presented at LABScon 2024 and later discussed in SentinelLABS research on hunting LLM-enabled malware. The malware uses OpenAI GPT-4 via a hardcoded API key and a deprecated chat completions endpoint, indicating the sample was likely written before early November 2023. Identified artifacts include a compiled Python2EXE sample named MalTerminal.exe and related Python scripts such as testAPI.py and TestMal2.py.

When executed, MalTerminal offers an operator a choice between generating ransomware functionality or a reverse shell. It sends requests to a GPT-4 endpoint and dynamically generates malicious code in memory, including encryption, exfiltration, or reverse-shell logic, without needing to write the generated payload to disk. This runtime code-generation model was highlighted as complicating traditional static signature-based detection.

The malware is characterized in the source material as experimental and Level 1 (Experimenting) under the AIM3 maturity model. It is described as an LLM-driven ransomware and remote-access-tool concept in which AI is primarily used for code generation in response to human prompts. SentinelLABS also cited it as an example of the broader 'prompts-as-code' pattern, where prompts and API keys are embedded directly into malware.

There is no high-confidence reporting in the provided content that MalTerminal was deployed in the wild, sold, or operationally used by a known threat actor. The content instead consistently frames it as a prototype or PoC. Related variants such as TestMal3.py and Defe.py were described as defensive tools under the name FalconShield that asked GPT to assess whether Python code was malicious.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

MalTerminal uses OpenAI GPT-4 via the now-retired chat-completions endpoint to create reverse shells or ransomware.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

When run, it offered a choice between ransomware or a reverse shell, sent requests to a GPT-4 endpoint, and generated encryption and exfiltration code in memory without writing to disk.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence3

PROMPTLOCK is a proof-of-concept AI-powered ransomware prototype... The Go binary invokes gpt-oss-20b via a local Ollama API running on the infected host to generate Lua scripts that perform file listing, encryption, exfiltration, and (unfinished) wipe logic.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

15 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
15 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 months ago
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hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 months ago
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Exploited vulnerabilities

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Detection signatures

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MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.