GraphicalProton
GraphicalProton is a loader/backdoor malware associated with APT29/Cozy Bear/Midnight Blizzard and attributed in the provided content to Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). It is also referred to as GraphDrop and SPICYBEAT. The malware has been described as a loader capable of delivering second-stage malware and as a simplistic backdoor used by SVR operators for follow-on access. Reported command-and-control behavior includes abuse of legitimate cloud services, primarily Microsoft OneDrive and also Dropbox, to exchange data with operators. The content states that data transiting these services was obfuscated inside randomly generated BMP files using compression, encryption, and pixel-bit encoding. An HTTPS C2 variant is also mentioned, including the URL hxxps://matclick[.]com/wp-query[.]php reported in December 2023. In TeamCity-related intrusions exploiting CVE-2023-42793, GraphicalProton was reportedly wrapped in multiple layers of encryption, obfuscation, encoders, and stagers, and variants were observed using DLL hijacking via the open-source monitoring tool Zabbix or hiding activity within the vcperf build analysis tool. The malware was used after SVR exploitation of unpatched, internet-reachable JetBrains TeamCity servers beginning in late September 2023, where the actors used access for privilege escalation, lateral movement, persistence, credential theft, Active Directory enumeration, disabling antivirus/EDR, and planting additional backdoors. The content ties this activity to opportunistic compromise of organizations across the United States, Europe, Asia, and Australia, including software, IT, hosting, medical device, financial management, marketing, sales, video game, and energy-related entities.
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Vulnerabilities exploited
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
hxxps://matclick[.]com/wp-query[.]php GraphicalProton HTTPS C2 URL C&C December 2023 December 2023
Groups observed using it
2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Techniques & procedures
6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 techniqueStealth
2 techniquesMITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Defense Evasion T1027: Obfuscated Files or Information .001: Binary Padding .002: Software Packing .003: Steganography .005: Indicator Removal from Tools .006: HTML Smuggling
Command and Control
2 techniquesMITRE ATT&CK Table... Command and control Application Layer Protocol Web Protocols Used HTTPs to communicate with C2 infrastructure, often over ports 443 to blend with normal traffic.
Known Malware: APT29 GraphicalNeutrino - A backdoor used to target Windows devices that uses notion databases as a C2... ICEBEAT - A downloader malware that uses the open source Zulip messaging platform for C2.
Exfiltration
2 techniquesMITRE ATT&CK Table... Exfiltration Exfiltration over C2 channel... Data was exfiltrated over the same encrypted channel used for C2 to avoid detection.
MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Exfiltration T1567: Exfiltration Over Web Service .001: Exfiltration to Code Repository .002: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage
IOCs tracked for this family
25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Their toolkit includes ... GraphicalNeutrino, GraphicalProton, HammerDuke...
A backdoor used by Russia's SVR to maintain access and facilitate follow-on operations after exploiting TeamCity, including enabling lateral movement and persistence within victim networks.
A backdoor used by SVR in post-exploitation activity following TeamCity (CVE-2023-42793) compromise, leveraging heavy obfuscation/encryption and using legitimate cloud services (e.g., Dropbox/OneDrive) to mask C2 and data transfer, including obfuscation inside randomly generated BMP files. Variants were observed packaged to execute via DLL hijacking (e.g., using Zabbix) and to hide activity within vcperf.
Backdoor used with HTTPS C2 and tunnel endpoints for command-and-control and lateral movement in APT29-linked activity.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.