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MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 2 CVEs

PowerShower

PowerShower is a PowerShell-based backdoor used by the Cloud Atlas APT group. It has been described as a second-stage backdoor and reconnaissance tool deployed alongside VBCloud in Cloud Atlas intrusion chains. Recent reporting ties it to phishing campaigns targeting primarily government agencies, diplomatic organizations, and other entities in Russia and Belarus, where ZIP archives containing malicious LNK files launched external PowerShell scripts that established persistence, opened decoy PDFs, removed infection traces, and deployed PowerShower and VBCloud. Earlier reporting also states Cloud Atlas previously dropped PowerShower directly after exploiting Microsoft Equation Editor vulnerabilities CVE-2017-11882 and CVE-2018-0802.

PowerShower is primarily used for network reconnaissance and further propagation within victim environments. Reported capabilities include collecting information about running processes, administrator groups, domain controllers, and the current user; downloading and executing additional PowerShell scripts from command-and-control infrastructure; saving and executing VBScript; and conducting Kerberoasting attacks. It can encode C2 communications with Base64. It has also been associated with a PowerShell document-stealer module that uses 7Zip to compress and exfiltrate .txt, .pdf, .xls, and .doc files smaller than 5 MB that were modified within the previous two days, sending the data over its C2 channel.

For stealth and cleanup, PowerShower has been reported to add a registry key so future powershell.exe instances spawn off-screen by default, remove registry entries left by the dropper process, and delete files created during the dropper process. In Cloud Atlas operations, PowerShower has been observed persisted as C:\Users[username]\Pictures\googleearth.ps1. Associated infrastructure and activity in the same campaigns included attacker-controlled domains hosting PowerShell payloads and broader Cloud Atlas use of reverse SSH tunnels, RevSocks, and Tor-backed access, though those mechanisms are part of the surrounding intrusion set rather than confirmed intrinsic PowerShower functionality.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2018-0802Microsoft Office Equation Editor Memory Corruption RCEExploited in the wild

Previously, Cloud Atlas dropped its “validator” implant named “PowerShower” directly, after exploiting the Microsoft Equation vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) mixed with CVE-2018-0802.

via securelistsecurelist.com
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

Previously, Cloud Atlas dropped its “validator” implant named “PowerShower” directly, after exploiting the Microsoft Equation vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) mixed with CVE-2018-0802.

via securelistsecurelist.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Inception

When a victim opens the shortcut, it quietly runs a PowerShell script pulled from an external server. That script sets up persistence, downloads a decoy PDF to distract the user, removes infection traces, and deploys payloads including a backdoor called VBCloud and a reconnaissance tool called PowerShower.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

23 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence2

Для получения повышенных привилегий скрипт использует технику обхода UAC через fodhelper.exe ... позволяет запустить PowerShell с правами администратора без прямого запроса пользователю.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

Copies the SAM ... and SECURITY system files from this shadow copy to C:\Users\Public\Documents\, disguising them as PDF files.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence3
TacticStealth

Examples throughout the content include deleting tools, logs, malware-related files, staged archives, screenshots, temporary files, and exfiltrated data 'to cover their tracks,' 'reduce their footprint,' 'remove traces of activity,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup.'

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence5
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

PowerShower загружает дополнительный скрипт для кражи учетных данных ... копирует системные файлы SAM ... и SECURITY из теневой копии

T1003.003NTDSEvidence1

Creates a Volume Shadow Copy of the C:\ drive. Copies the SAM ... and SECURITY system files from this shadow copy

T1558.003KerberoastingEvidence2

PowerShower может выполнять следующие задачи ... проведение атак типа Kerberoasting (кража хэшей паролей учетных записей Active Directory).

Discovery

7 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes actors and malware using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, netsh interface show, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, and network adapter/interface details.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

That script sets up persistence, downloads a decoy PDF to distract the user, removes infection traces, and deploys payloads including a backdoor called VBCloud and a reconnaissance tool called PowerShower.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1069.001Local GroupsEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

PowerShower can perform the following tasks: Collect information about running processes, administrator groups, and domain controllers.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

PowerShower может выполнять следующие задачи: сбор информации о ... контроллерах домена.

Collection

1 technique
T1119Automated CollectionEvidence1

Winter Vivern delivered a PowerShell script capable of recursively scanning victim machines looking for various file types before exfiltrating identified files via HTTP... Tomiris can upload files matching a hardcoded set of extensions... PowerShower packed and exfiltrated .txt, .pdf, .xls or .doc files smaller than 5MB modified during the past two days.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

This is the main module that connects to a C2 server to receive additional scripts or execute built-in commands.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

When a victim opens the shortcut, it quietly runs a PowerShell script pulled from an external server.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

24 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
23 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

30 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching24

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping23

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.