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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 4 CVEs

SimpleHelp

SimpleHelp is a legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) platform that is widely abused by threat actors as a remote access and persistence tool. Reporting in the provided content describes its use as a post-compromise access mechanism, a stealthy RAT-like capability when repackaged or wrapped, and a redundant persistence layer alongside other remote tools. Documented capabilities in the cited reporting include interactive remote control, file transfer, script or command execution, and long-term persistent access. SimpleHelp binaries are described as portable, self-contained, and often embedding their configuration internally; observed artifacts include VirusTotal metadata identifying renamed samples as a SimpleHelp remote access client, child process execution of "remote access.exe", URL paths containing "/access/JWrapper-Remote%20Access-version.txt", and use of the User-Agent "JWrapperDownloader".

The content links SimpleHelp abuse to multiple intrusion sets and campaigns. Iranian actors including MuddyWater/TA450 have used or tested SimpleHelp alongside other RMM tools such as Atera, PDQ Connect, ScreenConnect, and RemoteUtilities. North Korea-linked KONNI campaigns used malware chains that ultimately dropped or installed a SimpleHelp client for persistent remote access. Storm-1175, a Medusa ransomware affiliate, reportedly used SimpleHelp and MeshAgent for persistence after exploiting CVE-2025-10035 in Fortra GoAnywhere MFT. Cybercriminal campaigns targeting trucking and logistics firms used SimpleHelp with other RMM tools to gain access, conduct reconnaissance, harvest credentials, and maintain control in support of cargo theft. Huntress also documented intrusions chaining Net Monitor for Employees Professional with SimpleHelp, including overlap with attempted Crazy ransomware deployment.

Observed infection and delivery vectors in the content include phishing emails, tax-themed phishing, invitation-themed lures, spear-phishing, malicious MSI or EXE installers, JWrapper-wrapped payloads, and follow-on deployment by other malware or backdoors. Specific examples include invitation-themed phishing with filenames such as Ecard9140.exe; IRS-themed campaigns where IRS-doc.msi delivered either ScreenConnect or SimpleHelp; DocuSign-, Adobe Sign-, and Zoom-themed phishing that delivered a JWrapper-packaged SimpleHelp client disguised as Adobe.ClientSetup.exe; and malware chains where tools such as OneDriveUpdater or PowerShell backdoors installed SimpleHelp after initial compromise.

Targets mentioned in the content span U.S. tax filers and organizations, accountants and tax preparers, financial services, healthcare, education, retail, manufacturing, technology, trucking and logistics companies, cryptocurrency and blockchain-focused developers, and organizations targeted by Iranian state-sponsored activity. The content also notes use by threat actors against Israeli entities and broader APAC targeting in KONNI-related campaigns.

High-confidence indicators and artifacts directly mentioned in the content include filenames Adobe.ClientSetup.exe, Remote Access.exe, vhost.exe, IRS-doc.msi, and Ecard9140.exe; installation path C:\ProgramData\JWrapper-Remote Access; service name "Remote Access Service"; domains and infrastructure such as klmgskmtn[.]com, dronemaker[.]org, telesupportgroup[.]com, microuptime[.]com, irs-doc[.]com, gov-irs216[.]net, and multiple IPs including 124.198.131.250, 160.191.182[.]41, 192.144.34[.]42, 192.144.34[.]35, 146.70.149[.]61, 146.70.124[.]102, 37.120.237[.]204, and 37.120.237[.]248. Reported hashes include Adobe.ClientSetup.exe SHA256 fb165ff21d772cd7a2a4b0bb040f0ef88e99c5d40f49ceb74b5047f13413f044 and Remote Access.exe SHA256 77b8f597b7d20d4f7ae84caa5c22b94a8d9e09051f7cdaa17f41890ccf8c77a2.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

4 CVES
CVE-2025-31161Authentication Bypass in CrushFTP S3 Authorization HandlingExploited in the wild

CVE-2025-31161 is a 9.8 CVSS critical severity vulnerability that affects how the CrushFTP file transfer application handles user authentication... CrushFTP versions 10.0.0 through 10.8.3 and 11.0.0 through 11.3.0 are affected by a vulnerability in the S3 authorization header processing that allows authentication bypass.

via huntress bloghuntress.com
CVE-2025-55182React2ShellExploited in the wild

Initial Access Exploitation of React2Shell (CVE-2025-55182) against crypto staking platforms... We observed this threat actor perform mass scanning to identify targets vulnerable to React2Shell...

via ctrlaltintel blogctrlaltintel.com
CVE-2024-57727Unauthenticated Path Traversal in SimpleHelp

“the Cofense Phishing Defense Center (PDC) identified multiple samples using the SimpleHelp Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) tool… JWrapper-wrapped SimpleHelp is increasingly abused by threat actors as a stealthy Remote Access Trojan (RAT).”

via cofense blogcofense.com
CVE-2026-1731Pre-auth OS Command Injection RCE in BeyondTrust Remote Support and PRAExploited in the wild

Arctic Wolf has issued a warning regarding CVE-2026-1731, a nearly maximum-severity flaw (CVSS 9.9) in self-hosted BeyondTrust Remote Support and Privileged Remote Access environments... allows unauthenticated attackers to execute operating system commands... added to CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog... threat actors using the exploit to deploy SimpleHelp...

via security online infosecurityonline.info
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
MuddyWater

...TA450 historically using several RMM tools, such as Atera, PDQ Connect, ScreenConnect, and SimpleHelp...

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
Storm-1175

"To maintain persistence, they abused remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools, specifically SimpleHelp and MeshAgent."

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

30 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

The content repeatedly states that threat actors 'obtained,' 'acquired,' or 'used' publicly available, open-source, legitimate, or modified tools such as Mimikatz, Cobalt Strike, PsExec, Empire, Impacket, and many others.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

Network edge devices and other internet-facing systems remain the front door to victim networks for these groups. Fortinet, Ivanti, SonicWall, SimpleHelp, Microsoft SharePoint, SmarterMail, SolarWinds Web Help Desk, and Gladinet CentreStack all appear across these three profiles.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

SimpleHelp ... is often used in phishing campaigns involving “invitation” lures in which the victim is encouraged to download and execute an invite to a party (e.g. Ecard9140.exe ).

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment U.S. SSA government impersonation email with link to compromised [.]com.mx frontend

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

MuddyWater began using "fully signed" and legitimate RMM tools as part of its attack chain in 2020, often by including links in phishing emails designed to trick victims into downloading and executing RMM installers.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

SimpleHelp is the primary RMM channel, which the threat actor is using to run scripts and commands, execute automated tasks...

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

multiple ransomware groups, including initial access brokers with ties to Play ransomware operators, are also exploiting three vulnerabilities - CVE-2024-57727 - in remote monitoring and management tool SimpleHelp to conduct remote code execution

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

C:\Windows\Temp\mesch.exe run ... C:\Windows\Temp\mesch.exe b64exec ... C:\Windows\Temp\mesch.exe -fullinstall

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

In reality the file is a malicious executable that initiates a sequence of actions leading to the installation of the SimpleHelp and ScreenConnect RMM tools on their system.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service Remote Access Service installed via SCM

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

the malware installs itself as a Windows service with Safe Mode persistence, makes sure it's running by means of a "self-healing watchdog" that automatically restarts it when killed

Privilege Escalation

6 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

To facilitate fully interactive desktop access, the SimpleHelp remote access client acquires SeDebugPrivilege via AdjustTokenPrivileges, while "elev_win.exe" – a legitimate executable file associated with the software – is used to gain SYSTEM-level privileges.

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation winlogon.exe token theft via session_win.exe

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token CreateProcessAsUserW with stolen token

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service Remote Access Service installed via SCM

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

the malware installs itself as a Windows service with Safe Mode persistence, makes sure it's running by means of a "self-healing watchdog" that automatically restarts it when killed

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1548.002 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism: Bypass UAC elev_win.exe –runas via ShellExecuteEx

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information Hex-encoded C2 config in JWrapper launch properties

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Even when the file is renamed to something like party_invite.exe , or Voicemailaudioext.exe ... A common lure is themed as a Social Security statement ( ssa.msi ) ... using lures such as a document ( docmentfilecsm_jw98evavuqm5gb3.exe ) or an IRS tax-related file ( IRS-Statement_Pr2ui4J9cfA6YEu.exe ).

T1036.003Rename Legitimate UtilitiesEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1036.003 Masquerading: Rename System Utilities wmic.exe renamed to wmic.exe.bak

T1134.001Token Impersonation/TheftEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1134.001 Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation winlogon.exe token theft via session_win.exe

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1134.002 Access Token Manipulation: Create Process with Token CreateProcessAsUserW with stolen token

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks Mouse position polling for user presence detection

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Technique ID Implementation Resource Development Obtain Capabilities: Tool T1588.002 Legitimate SimpleHelp + ScreenConnect licenses Resource Development Acquire Infrastructure: VPS T1583.003 Fresh /24 subnet on bulletproof hosting Initial Access Phishing T1566 Signed RAT distributed to victims Execution User Execution: Malicious File T1204.002 Legitimately signed binary Persistence Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service T1543.003 Remote Access Service Defense Evasion Subvert Trust Controls: Code Signing T1553.002 Valid DigiCert certificate

Discovery

5 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery netsh wlan show interfaces every 15 seconds

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

...including checks on network connectivity, user activity, and installed security tools.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

They directed the SimpleHelp agent to search the desktop for cryptocurrency-related keywords, as well as keywords associated with remote access, "likely to detect if anyone was actively connecting to the machine."

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1497.001 Virtualization/Sandbox Evasion: System Checks Mouse position polling for user presence detection

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1518.001 Software Discovery: Security Software Discovery SecurityCenter2 WMI queries every 67 seconds

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence5

Over the last few years, threat actors have flocked to exploit legitimate remote monitoring and management (RMM) tools—blue-chip IT software like ScreenConnect, LogMeIn Resolve, and PDQ Connect—blurring the line between legitimate IT administration and malicious intrusion.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

File IOCs ... AnyDesk.exe ... SimpleService.exe ... elev_win.exe ... KslD.sys ... winupdate.exe (Restic)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence9

On one host, Huntress observed a threat actor installing a malicious AnyDesk RMM instance post-exploitation... On some hosts, the threat actor was observed deploying MeshAgent... On April 7, a threat actor was observed... to install the SimpleHelp RMM on a host as a persistence mechanism.

Other

3 techniques
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

Hackers used it to download SimpleHelp, from which they made commands including attempting to tamper with Windows Defender.

T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

When mx.exe was uploaded, Defender initially quarantined the executable. The threat actor then made multiple attempts to add to the Defender exclusions list for the directory... Add-MpPreference -ExclusionPath "c:\windows"

T1562.009Safe Mode BootEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Matrix Technique ID Technique Name Observed Behavior T1562.009 Impair Defenses: Safe Mode Boot SafeBoot\Network registry key for Safe Mode persistence

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

52 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
22 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
22 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
8 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app5 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app15 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app15 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app23 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app26 days ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching52

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities4

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping30

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.