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MalwareUsed by 4 actors

TAMECAT

TAMECAT is a modular PowerShell-based backdoor used in espionage operations and attributed in the provided reporting to the Iranian state-sponsored actor APT42; some reporting also associates related activity and tooling overlap with SpearSpecter and GreenCharlie. It is described as operating largely in memory/filelessly to minimize forensic artifacts and evade detection. Reported targeting includes senior defense and government officials, defense and government organizations, NGOs, media, educational institutions, activists, legal services, and family members of officials.

The described intrusion chain begins with social engineering, including long-term rapport building and WhatsApp-based lures, followed by delivery of a malicious file or link. Multiple reports describe an initial VBScript downloader that queries installed antivirus products via WMI and conditionally launches PowerShell via conhost or uses cmd.exe/curl to retrieve later stages. The loader, reported as nconf.txt hosted on tebi[.]io, is heavily obfuscated and uses Base64 decoding, custom byte/bit transformations, and AES decryption to release functional modules only after decryption.

TAMECAT supports reconnaissance, file harvesting, browser data theft, screenshot capture, and remote command execution. Reported capabilities include collecting OS version and computer name, generating victim-specific identifiers, writing an identifier to %LocalAppData%\config.txt, creating a Chrome directory under %LocalAppData%, stealing browser data from Microsoft Edge and Google Chrome via remote debugging, suspending browser processes to access cached credentials and passwords, capturing screenshots, crawling the filesystem for documents of interest, and downloading/executing additional scripts or code. Command handling described in the content parses decrypted C2 responses into language, command, thread name, and start/stop fields, with support for PowerShell or C# execution and actions such as downloadutils, start, and stop.

Its command-and-control and exfiltration traffic is described as encrypted and obfuscated. The content states TAMECAT has encoded C2 traffic with Base64 and uses AES encryption for communications and stolen data. Multiple reports cite the AES key kNz0CXiP0wEQnhZXYbvraigXvRVYHk1B for encrypted content/exfiltration, with a randomly generated 16-character IV transmitted in an HTTP header named Content-DPR. One loader-related value T2r0y1M1e1n1o0w1 is also reported, and one analysis lists IV 0T9r1y1M2e0N0o1w in the script. TAMECAT forges browser user-agent strings and uses HTTP POST requests for exfiltration. Reported C2 channels and infrastructure include HTTPS, Telegram bots, Discord, Cloudflare Workers, WebDAV, Firebase, and accurate-sprout-porpoise[.]glitch[.]me; darijo-bosanac-dl[.]workers[.]dev and tebi[.]io are also mentioned in the delivery/C2 chain.

High-confidence indicators directly mentioned in the content include the VBScript SHA-256 5404e39f2f175a0fc993513ee52be3679a64c69c79e32caa656fbb7645965422, loader nconf.txt SHA-256 bd1f0fb085c486e97d82b6e8acb3977497c59c3ac79f973f96c395e7f0ca97f8, loader MD5 081419a484bbf99f278ce636d445b9d8, the hardcoded token GILNH9LX6TCZ9V8ZZSUF, and infrastructure including accurate-sprout-porpoise[.]glitch[.]me, darijo-bosanac-dl[.]workers[.]dev, and tebi[.]io.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT42

TAMECAT’s attack flow is highly automated, proceeding from initial user interaction with a malicious file to complete data exfiltration without perceptible intrusion.

via osint team blogosintteam.blog
spearspecter

Iran APT SpearSpecter Uses Weeks-Long WhatsApp Lures and Fileless TAMECAT Backdoor to Hit Defense

via security online infosecurityonline.info
GreenCharlie

“GreenCharlie’s toolset centers on a multi-stage PowerShell-based malware framework, including variants known as GORBLE, TAMECAT, and POWERSTAR.”

via picus security blogpicussecurity.com
Cuboid Sandstorm

Analysis of recent campaigns introduces TameCat, a modular, PowerShell-based backdoor used to target senior defense and government officials.

via huntio bloghunt.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

34 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1593.001Social MediaEvidence1

Utilizes not only dedicated servers but also social platforms such as Discord and Telegram as backup control channels

T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

"The group utilizes the commercial registrar Namecheap to register domains that are thematically aligned with their social engineering lures..."

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Initial access continued to rely on spear phishing — delivering macro-enabled documents or malicious links.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The attack typically originates from a spear-phishing email disguised as official correspondence, with an attachment that appears to be an ordinary document but actually contains embedded VBScript.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

Initial access continued to rely on spear phishing — delivering macro-enabled documents or malicious links

Execution

6 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence2
TacticExecution

Upon execution, it immediately queries the target device’s installed antivirus software list via WMI

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

which tend to rely on the use of command and scripting interpreters (T1059) like PowerShell (T1059.001).

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4
TacticExecution

it invokes conhost to launch PowerShell and retrieves the core payload via remote download utilities

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3
TacticExecution

with an attachment that appears to be an ordinary document but actually contains embedded VBScript. This script functions as a “reconnaissance operative.”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

“phishing (T1566) … often leading to execution via user execution (T1204) of malicious files …”

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

To maintain a footprint, attackers have focused on persistence, frequently employing registry run keys or startup folders (T1547.001).

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Fileless Execution : Operates entirely in memory without writing any malicious files to disk, making detection by traditional antivirus software extremely difficult.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

To maintain a footprint, attackers have focused on persistence, frequently employing registry run keys or startup folders (T1547.001).

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

Command Obfuscation : Utilizes ambiguous expressions to replace plaintext execution commands, evading script detection mechanisms; AES Double Encryption : Core code is first Base64-encoded, then subjected to high-strength encryption

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

Forges browser user-agent strings to masquerade as legitimate network traffic

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Fileless Execution : Operates entirely in memory without writing any malicious files to disk, making detection by traditional antivirus software extremely difficult.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1
TacticStealth

“weaponizing LOLBins, including … Rundll32” / “rundll32.exe … davclnt.dll, DavSetCookie … .lnk”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

GhostForm RAT via in-memory PowerShell execution within invisible Windows forms

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The backdoor's capabilities span keylogging, screen capture, browser credential and session cookie theft

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

browser credential and session cookie theft

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Browser Data Theft : Extracts data from mainstream browsers via remote debugging, suspending browser processes to read cached credentials, passwords, and other sensitive information

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

During the credential access phase, Iranian-linked attackers have prioritized stealing credentials from web browsers (T1555.003)

Discovery

4 techniques
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

Upon execution, it immediately queries the target device’s installed antivirus software list via WMI

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

For discovery, system information discovery (T1082) and file and directory discovery (T1083) have been the most prevalent methods used to map the environment.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

APT42 has used a VBScript to query anti-virus products. TAMECAT has used VBScript to query anti-virus products.

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The backdoor's capabilities span keylogging, screen capture, browser credential and session cookie theft

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

Screen Surveillance : Captures screenshots silently to comprehensively record target operational trajectories

T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

The backdoor's capabilities span keylogging, screen capture, browser credential and session cookie theft, email collection

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Command Reception : Receives control commands via Telegram bots, enabling download of additional scripts, execution of various code types, and flexible termination of attack processes.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

it invokes conhost to launch PowerShell and retrieves the core payload via remote download utilities

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1
T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

"GreenCharlie leveraged dynamic DNS (DDNS) to establish and manage its infrastructure..."

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

Collected sensitive data is encrypted and transmitted to control servers via network requests.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
5 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Other
6 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 months ago
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping34

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.