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Mallory
Malware

Coyote

Coyote is a Windows banking trojan primarily targeting users in Brazil. First reported in February 2024, it was initially distributed as a Windows application updater built with the Squirrel installer framework. Reported infection chains include a Squirrel-based installer launching a Node.js/Electron application with obfuscated JavaScript, staging signed binaries, using DLL sideloading involving libcef.dll, and a Nim-based loader that unpacks a final-stage .NET payload for in-memory execution via the CLR. Later reporting also links Coyote-related activity to malicious LNK files and multi-stage PowerShell delivery chains.

Coyote targets users of more than 60 banking institutions, with one report citing 61 monitored Brazilian applications and another noting expansion to 1,030 sites and 73 financial institutions. It monitors running applications, browser sessions, and banking websites, then contacts its C2 when a targeted banking application or site is accessed. Its capabilities include credential theft, keylogging, screenshot capture, fake banking overlays and phishing windows, requesting bank card passwords, process termination, blocking the machine with a fake update screen, mouse control, and system shutdown. Multiple reports also state that it can harvest credentials from banks and cryptocurrency exchanges.

A notable evolution is Coyote’s abuse of Microsoft Windows UI Automation (UIA), described as the first confirmed malware known to weaponize the Windows accessibility framework in the wild to interact with victims’ browsers and extract sensitive information. Reporting also states it can serve overlays on login pages associated with financial enterprises.

Persistence mechanisms reported for Coyote include abuse of Windows logon scripts via HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript and reuse of obs-browser-page.exe across reboots. C2 communications have been described as using SSL with mutual authentication, with an attacker-issued certificate stored as an encrypted .NET resource and decrypted via the .NET X509 library. Kaspersky reported that up to 90% of observed infections originated from Brazil and detects the malware as HEUR:Trojan-Banker.MSIL.Coyote.gen.

Coyote is repeatedly discussed alongside other Brazilian banking malware families including Grandoreiro, Mekotio, Maverick, and GoPix. Multiple sources note code and behavioral overlaps between Coyote and Maverick, with Maverick assessed by some researchers as an evolution of Coyote. Sophos and Trend Micro also reported possible links between Coyote and WhatsApp-propagated Brazil-focused campaigns such as Water Saci/SORVEPOTEL, though those links were described as under investigation or not definitive.

Known infrastructure directly mentioned in the content includes the domain cloridatosys[.]com, linked to the Coyote banking trojan, and reporting that BlackBerry published 18 domains associated with its infrastructure. Additional high-confidence indicators from the content include the registry path HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript, the sideloading target libcef.dll, the persistence binary obs-browser-page.exe, and the detection name HEUR:Trojan-Banker.MSIL.Coyote.gen.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Desktop threats continued to be distributed via traditional delivery methods like malicious emails, compromised websites, and droppers.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

“Show an overlay window of a fake banking app… Show a full-screen overlay… create a phishing overlay to capture user credentials.”

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

The target field of the LNK file contained an obfuscated Windows command that constructed and ran an initial Base64-encoded PowerShell command.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The campaign ... seeks to trick users into executing a malicious file attached to a self-spreading message received from a previously infected WhatsApp web session. | The archive contained a malicious Windows LNK file that, when launched, initiated a series of malicious PowerShell commands.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“The banker is loaded through DLL sideloading of a dependency of these executables… DLL sideloading occurs in the libcef.dll library.”

Persistence

2 techniques
T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Evidence1

“Coyote achieves persistence by abusing Windows logon scripts; it first checks if HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript exists… inserts… obs-browser-page.exe.”

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The archive contained a malicious Windows LNK file that, when launched, initiated a series of malicious PowerShell commands.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1037.001Logon Script (Windows)Evidence1

“Coyote achieves persistence by abusing Windows logon scripts; it first checks if HKCU\Environment\UserInitMprLogonScript exists… inserts… obs-browser-page.exe.”

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

The archive contained a malicious Windows LNK file that, when launched, initiated a series of malicious PowerShell commands.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The target field of the LNK file contained an obfuscated Windows command that constructed and ran an initial Base64-encoded PowerShell command.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

“It then runs a signed application from that directory… Several executables have been identified in use, including those associated with Chrome and OBS Studio.”

T1564.002Hidden UsersEvidence1

“Length 32 Move mouse cursor to specific X, Y position”

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

“The banker is loaded through DLL sideloading of a dependency of these executables… DLL sideloading occurs in the libcef.dll library.”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

“The loader’s objective is to unpack a .NET executable and execute it in memory using the CLR… reminiscent of how Donut operates.”

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

“The most important available commands are… 31 Enable a keylogger… The Trojan can also request specific bank card passwords…”

Discovery

1 technique
T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

“It monitors all open applications on the victim’s system and waits for the specific banking application or website to be accessed.”

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

“The most important available commands are… 31 Enable a keylogger… The Trojan can also request specific bank card passwords…”

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

“Length 12 Take a screenshot”

T1185Browser Session HijackingEvidence1

"...facilitate credential theft by serving fake overlays."

Command and Control

1 technique
T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

“The Trojan establishes communication with its command and control server using SSL channels with a mutual authentication scheme… possesses a certificate… stored as a resource in an encrypted format.”

Impact

2 techniques
T1489Service StopEvidence1

“Length 17 Kill a process”

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence1

“Length 21 Shut down the machine”

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
8 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
1 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app9 months ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
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IOC matching13

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Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping18

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.