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MalwareUsed by 5 actors

Kazuar

Kazuar is a backdoor and modular espionage malware family associated with the Russian state-sponsored threat actor Secret Blizzard, also known as Turla and Venomous Bear; multiple sources in the content link it to Turla/Secret Blizzard activity, and CISA attribution in the cited reporting ties Secret Blizzard to Center 16 of Russia’s FSB. Kazuar has been described as Turla’s flagship backdoor and has been observed in espionage operations against government, diplomatic, defense, military, embassy, and research targets, including European government organizations and high-value targets in Ukraine and Eastern Europe.

The malware has evolved from an earlier .NET backdoor into a modular framework or botnet architecture with Kernel, Bridge, and Worker modules. Reported capabilities include command execution, JavaScript execution on infected devices, keylogging, screenshot capture, file harvesting, window monitoring, MAPI and email collection, system and network reconnaissance, collection of recent files, theft of event log data, system file information, authentication tokens, cookies, and credentials from browsers, FTP clients, VPN software, KeePass, Azure, AWS, and Outlook. Microsoft reporting in the content also states that operators specifically sought Signal Desktop message files, documents, images, and archive files.

Kazuar uses internal coordination mechanisms including named pipes, Mailslots, hidden Windows messaging, and Google Protocol Buffers, while external communications can use HTTP, WebSockets, and Exchange Web Services. Communications to C2 have been reported as Base64-encoded. Kazuar stages command output and collected data in files before exfiltration, and newer reporting says it encrypts collected information locally in a dedicated working directory before exfiltration. The malware also performs anti-analysis checks such as process inspection, canary file detection, and sandbox DLL verification. Recent reporting cited in the content describes a leader-election design in which only one infected host communicates externally, while other infected systems remain in a silent mode to reduce observable traffic.

Observed delivery and deployment methods in the content include phishing campaigns using malicious Excel XLSM attachments whose macros launch PowerShell and ultimately lead to Turla payload deployment; use of the Pelmeni dropper to embed an encrypted second-stage payload; and a lightweight .NET COM-object loader that decrypts and executes payloads in memory. Some payloads were reported as cryptographically tied to the victim hostname. In 2025 incidents in Ukraine, ESET reported that Gamaredon tooling including PteroGraphin, PteroOdd, and PteroPaste was used to deploy or restore Turla’s Kazuar access, which researchers assessed as evidence of operational collaboration between Gamaredon and Turla.

The content also describes Kazuar C2 tradecraft using compromised WordPress blogs and both internal and external command-and-control nodes on victim networks. Accenture reported novel Kazuar C2 configurations on a European government victim network, including internal nodes and proxying through internet-facing shared locations, and listed Kazuar-related URLs including bombheros[.]com, simplifiedhomesales[.]com, mtsoft.hol[.]es, and polishpod101[.]com. Additional reported Kazuar-related infrastructure and artifacts include domains echange-afrique-insa[.]fr, afci-newsoft[.]fr, antoniosalieri[.]es, and aviatnetworks[.]com; filenames dbgsview.exe, DebugView.exe, adflctlmon.exe, PSExtendPrivacy.exe, and Agent.exe; and sample hashes 1749c96cc1a4beb9ad4d6e037e40902fac31042fa40152f1d3794f49ed1a2b5c, 44cc7f6c2b664f15b499c7d07c78c110861d2cc82787ddaad28a5af8efc3daac, 1fca5f41211c800830c5f5c3e355d31a05e4c702401a61f11e25387e25eeb7fa, 2d8151dabf891cf743e67c6f9765ee79884d024b10d265119873b0967a09b20f, 69908f05b436bd97baae56296bf9b9e734486516f9bb9938c2b8752e152315d4, c1f278f88275e07cc03bd390fe1cbeedd55933110c6fd16de4187f4c4aaf42b9, 6eb31006ca318a21eb619d008226f08e287f753aec9042269203290462eaa00d, and 436cfce71290c2fc2f2c362541db68ced6847c66a73b55487e5e5c73b0636c85.

The content further notes historical analytical interest in code overlaps between Kazuar and the SUNBURST/Sunburst malware used in the SolarWinds compromise, including similarities in victim ID generation, sleep-delay logic, and use of FNV-1a hashing with XOR, but the cited reporting does not treat that overlap as conclusive proof that Turla conducted the SolarWinds intrusion.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

5 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Turla

The talk also examines Kazuar v2 and v3, Turla’s flagship backdoor, and unpacks what those versions reveal about the group’s operational priorities.

via malware newsmalware.news
Gamaredon Group

The talk also examines Kazuar v2 and v3, Turla’s flagship backdoor, and unpacks what those versions reveal about the group’s operational priorities.

via malware newsmalware.news
UAC-0003

...на уражені ЕОМ довантажується складний багатофункціональний бекдор KAZUAR, в якому реалізовано більше 40 функцій...

via cert uacert.gov.ua
APT28

...угрупуванням UAC-0028 (APT28) та UAC-0003 (Turla), зокрема, із застосуванням модифікованого флагманського шкідливого програмного забезпечення KAZUAR.

via cert uacert.gov.ua
UAC-0003 (Turla)

...угрупуванням UAC-0028 (APT28) та UAC-0003 (Turla), зокрема, із застосуванням модифікованого флагманського шкідливого програмного забезпечення KAZUAR.

via cert uacert.gov.ua
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

5 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using WMI/WMIC/wmiexec for remote execution, lateral movement, discovery, persistence, and administrative actions; e.g., 'APT41 used WMI in several ways, including for execution of commands via WMIEXEC as well as for persistence via PowerSploit' and 'Scattered Spider used Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to move laterally via Impacket.'

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3
TacticExecution

Across incidents observed between February and June 2025, Gamaredon tooling, including PteroGraphin and PteroOdd, was used to deploy Turla’s Kazuar backdoor and, in at least one case, restore Turla’s access after the group appeared to have lost its foothold.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

A second method drops a lightweight .NET loader configured as a COM object, decrypting and executing the payload entirely in memory with almost no trace left on disk.

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence2
TacticExecution

A second method drops a lightweight .NET loader configured as a COM object, decrypting and executing the payload entirely in memory with almost no trace left on disk. | The malware uses hidden Windows messaging, named pipes, Mailslots, and Google Protocol Buffers for structured internal routing

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

2020-05-21 ⋅ PICUS Security ⋅ T1055 Process Injection ... Kazuar

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

2020-05-21 ⋅ PICUS Security ⋅ T1055 Process Injection ... Kazuar

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The Kernel module serves as the central coordinator, managing tasks, updating configurations, and running anti-analysis checks including process inspection, canary file detection, and sandbox DLL verification.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

decrypting and executing the payload entirely in memory with almost no trace left on disk

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Across the content, malware repeatedly 'adds Registry Run keys', 'creates Registry entries', 'modifies the Windows Registry', or 'overwrites registry keys' to maintain persistence.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Worker modules handle operational tasks including capturing keystrokes

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

...steal authentication tokens, cookies, and credentials from a wide variety of programs, including browsers, FTP clients, VPN software, KeePass, Azure, AWS, and Outlook.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

...steal authentication tokens, cookies, and credentials from a wide variety of programs, including browsers, FTP clients, VPN software, KeePass, Azure, AWS, and Outlook.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

...steal authentication tokens, cookies, and credentials from a wide variety of programs...

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The Kernel module serves as the central coordinator, managing tasks, updating configurations, and running anti-analysis checks including process inspection, canary file detection, and sandbox DLL verification.

Collection

6 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

...allows the threat actors to launch javascript on the device, steal data from event logs, steal information about systems files...

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Worker modules handle operational tasks including capturing keystrokes

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

Worker modules handle operational tasks including capturing keystrokes, taking screenshots

T1114Email CollectionEvidence1

Its configuration system now supports roughly 150 options covering transport selection, injection methods, keylogging, screenshot capture, and MAPI email monitoring.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

All gathered information is encrypted and staged in a dedicated working directory before exfiltration.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence4

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... Command and Control ... T1071 Standard Application Layer Protocol ... The C&C URLs correspond to compromised legitimate websites for Turla to proxy commands and exfiltrate data to Turla backend infrastructure.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1090ProxyEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... Command and Control ... T1090 Proxy ... The October sample likely acts as a transfer agent used to proxy commands from the remote Turla operators to the Kazuar instances on internal nodes in the network via an internet-facing shared network location.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK techniques ... Command and Control T1102 ... Web Service ... Turla has relied on traditional C&C implementations, using compromised web servers as C&C, as well as utilizing legitimate web services like Pastebin.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

To compromise the organization's network, the attackers used a combination of recently updated remote administration trojans (RATs) and remote procedure call (RPC)-based backdoors including HyperStack

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

the attackers used a combination of recently updated remote administration trojans (RATs) and remote procedure call (RPC)-based backdoors

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence3

Many entries state malware or actors can upload, transfer, send, or exfiltrate files from compromised hosts to command-and-control servers or attacker infrastructure.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
6 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
16 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
3 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app11 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app22 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app22 days ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

72 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

malware newsNews
Jun 2, 2026
LABScon25 Replay | Gamaredon x Turla: Unveiling a 2025 Espionage Alliance Targeting Ukraine - Malware Analysis - Malware Analysis, News and Indicators

Turla's flagship backdoor used as an advanced espionage platform on high-value Ukrainian targets.

Read more
cyber security newsNews
May 25, 2026
Kazuar Malware Evolves Into Modular Espionage Ecosystem for Secret Blizzard Operations

A modular espionage backdoor/framework used for long-term covert intelligence collection. It uses Kernel, Bridge, and Worker modules to coordinate tasks, maintain stealth, proxy C2 communications, and perform surveillance functions such as keylogging, screenshot capture, file harvesting, window monitoring, and email collection.

Read more
polyswarmNews
May 22, 2026
Kazuar Evolves From Backdoor to Resilient Espionage Ecosystem

Kazuar is a modular espionage malware framework used for long-term intelligence collection. It employs Kernel, Bridge, and Worker modules, leadership election to limit external communications to a single leader node, encrypted IPC via named pipes, Mailslots, and hidden Windows messaging, and supports HTTP, WebSockets, or Exchange Web Services for C2. It also supports persistence, anti-analysis, keylogging, screenshot capture, file harvesting, MAPI email monitoring, and staged encrypted exfiltration.

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bleeping computerNews
May 16, 2026
Russian hackers turn Kazuar backdoor into modular P2P botnet

Kazuar is a modular backdoor evolved into a peer-to-peer botnet for long-term persistence, stealth, and espionage. It uses kernel, bridge, and worker modules to coordinate infected hosts, proxy C2 traffic, and perform intelligence collection such as keylogging, screenshots, filesystem and network reconnaissance, email/MAPI theft, window monitoring, and recent-file theft. It also supports AMSI, ETW, and WLDP bypasses and configurable tasking, scheduling, exfiltration, and process injection.

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IOC matching25

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution5

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping31

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.