njRAT
njRAT, also known as Bladabindi and sometimes referred to as NJW0rm/LV in the provided content, is a long-running commodity Remote Access Trojan first noted in the content as dating back to 2012. It is described as a VB.NET/.NET RAT, including references to njRAT v0.7d, and is widely used in cybercrime activity. The malware is designed to collect and steal sensitive information from compromised Windows systems and provide remote access to operators. Reported capabilities in the content include keylogging, remote desktop access, execution of PowerShell commands, reading specific registry values, identifying remote hosts on connected networks, detecting whether the victim system has a camera, detecting removable drives, activating microphones and webcams, exfiltrating the title of the current user window, stealing passwords saved in web browsers, and receiving stolen information over HTTP. The content also states that njRAT uses Base64 encoding for C2 traffic and has used auto-run registry key persistence. One cited variant was observed with the ability to overwrite the Windows Master Boot Record (MBR). The malware has been associated with SilverTerrier/Nigerian BEC activity and is described as predominantly used in the Middle East region. It also appears in reporting on surveillance-oriented campaigns against activists and opposition targets in Syria and the UAE, where njRAT was among the commodity RATs used. The content further notes that njRAT started as a cybercrime tool and was later adopted by APT groups, and that other malware has reused njRAT-derived class architecture. A specific IOC-like detail directly mentioned is an njRAT sample communicating with 196.251.107.24 on port 5552.
Hunt this family in your stack
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
Vulnerabilities exploited
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Windows Office Product Spawned Uncommon Process ... CVE-2023-21716 Word RTF Heap Corruption, CVE-2023-36884 Office and Windows HTML RCE Vulnerability ...
Groups observed using it
7 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The top 10 of the RATs used in Nigerian BEC scams is formed by NetWire, DarkComet, NanoCore, LuminosityLink, Remcos, ImminentMonitor, NJRat, Quasar, Adwind, and Hworm.
TAG-144 leverages a range of commodity remote access trojans (RATs), including AsyncRAT, REMCOS RAT, DcRAT, njRAT, LimeRAT, QuasarRAT, BitRAT, and a Quasar variant known as BlotchyQuasar.
TAG-144 leverages a range of commodity remote access trojans (RATs), including AsyncRAT, REMCOS RAT, DcRAT, njRAT, LimeRAT, QuasarRAT, BitRAT, and a Quasar variant known as BlotchyQuasar.
"However, the ultimate malware payload in this case is njRat, another well-known RAT tool."
"Some of the payloads identified for campaign 2... included... RAT Bladabindi"
Transparent Tribe has used websites with malicious hyperlinks and iframes to infect targeted victims with Crimson, njRAT, and other malicious tools.
This article presents a reverse engineering analysis of njRAT v0.7. njRAT, also known as Bladabindi, is a remote access tool (RAT) with user interface which allows the operator to control the victim’s computer.
Techniques & procedures
29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniquesAdditionally, the branding of trusted organizations (for example the World Health Organization (WHO)) is abused in order to build credibility and trust in order to have people, for example, open malicious attachments or web pages.
The attacks we have documented usually involve the use of malicious links or e-mail attachments, designed to obtain information from a device.
Execution
4 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."
During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.
By relying on basic social engineering – an attack technique that takes advantage of human traits such as curiosity, trust and greed in order to obtain confidential information or to have the victim perform a certain action – it is suffice to say that certain threat actors (both criminal and nation state) are exploiting these unprecedented times for various nefarious means.
The messages usually include text, often in Arabic, that attempts to persuade the target to execute the file or click the link.
Persistence
2 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Privilege Escalation
1 techniqueThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, or .lnk files in the Startup folder.
Stealth
4 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
HTML smuggling, a highly evasive malware delivery technique that leverages legitimate HTML5 and JavaScript features, is increasingly used in email campaigns... When a target user opens the HTML in their web browser, the browser decodes the malicious script, which, in turn, assembles the payload on the host device.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware deleting files, tools, scripts, logs, droppers, staged data, and artifacts from compromised systems to cover tracks, remove evidence, or self-delete.
Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.
Defense Impairment
1 techniqueCredential Access
2 techniquesWe found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture...
The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.
Discovery
6 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."
The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors identifying, monitoring, or enumerating connected peripheral devices such as USB mass storage, Bluetooth devices, printers, smart card readers, cameras, Apple devices, VGA/display devices, and removable drives.
Several entries describe malware examining running processes to determine if a debugger, sandbox, virtual environment, or analysis/security tools are present, such as AsyncRAT checking for a debugger, RogueRobin enumerating Wireshark and Sysinternals processes, and P8RAT checking for processes associated with virtual environments.
Collection
5 techniquesThe content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware collecting, stealing, identifying, copying, or staging files, documents, credentials, logs, databases, and other information from compromised hosts or local systems.
We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture...
We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture (from over 20 applications) and recording of screenshots...
We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture... and input from the computer’s microphone and webcam.
We found that the spyware has a modular design, and can download additional modules from a command & control (C&C) server, including password capture... and input from the computer’s microphone and webcam.
Command and Control
4 techniquesC2 Tracker is a free-to-use-community-driven IOC feed that uses Shodan and Censys searches to collect IP addresses of known malware/botnet/C2 infrastructure.
The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.
C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.
4H RAT has the capability to create a remote shell. AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands. PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim. QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.
Exfiltration
1 techniqueADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2... Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers... numerous malware and groups sent victim data, files, credentials, or host information over existing C2 channels.
Impact
1 techniqueScammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.
IOCs tracked for this family
115 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
Recent activity
139 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A .NET remote access trojan delivered as the final-stage payload. In this case it used a custom AES-256-ECB encrypted configuration, was injected into RegAsm.exe via process hollowing, and communicated with laohe1[.]myvnc[.]com:5000.
A remote access tool/family discussed as an example of malware used for unauthorized remote access and persistent control of compromised systems.
njRAT is a remote access trojan family discussed through multiple closely related variants that share the same core architecture and functionality, with most changes described as cosmetic redesigns, reused features, and minor functional extensions.
A remote access trojan family serving as the foundation for multiple variants. In this content, njRAT v0.7 is described as the base architecture for later editions, with plaintext C2 communications and core RAT functionality.
The version that knows your environment.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.