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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 3 actorsExploits 2 CVEs

Mythic

Also known asmythic_c2

Mythic is a modern, open-source, multi-platform command-and-control (C2) and red-teaming framework written in Python 3 with a web-based UI, multi-user support, and a microservice architecture. It is commonly referred to as Mythic or Mythic C2 and supports multiple C2 profiles, including HTTP, WebSocket, and TCP, as well as SSL-encrypted communications and peer-to-peer C2 between agents. Mythic can also leverage a modified SOCKS5 proxy to tunnel egress C2 traffic, and reporting referenced a Mythic Azure Blob Storage profile designed to use Azure Blob Storage for C2 over whitelisted cloud-service egress paths.

Although developed as a legitimate red-team framework and publicly available on GitHub, the content states that it is often abused by threat actors. Recorded Future reported Mythic usage increased by 33% in 2022 compared with 2021. The framework has been observed in multiple intrusion chains and malware delivery operations. ESET reported that the Russia-aligned RomCom group exploited CVE-2025-8088, a WinRAR path traversal zero-day, in targeted spearphishing campaigns against financial, manufacturing, defense, and logistics organizations in Europe and Canada, with successful exploitation delivering RomCom-associated backdoors including a Mythic agent. Elastic Security Labs reported BLISTER loader campaigns deploying a MYTHIC implant, including execution inside an injected WerFault process. Breakglass Intelligence recovered a Rust-based Mythic "coffee" agent DLL (xolehlp.dll) delivered via DLL sideloading through msdtc.exe in malicious MSC-based campaigns; the recovered agent supported commands including coffee, upload, c2_update, download, continued_task, sleep, and exit, and used a hardcoded AES-256-HMAC pre-shared key. Additional reporting described a custom-built Mythic implant delivered through Python and C++ loaders that executed obfuscated shellcode from search.bin, created mutex 5df098b7-efe6-4c1d-a7d1-dbc6519a66c2, performed RSA-4096 key exchange with its C2, initially used a Base64-encoded AES key embedded in the stealer body, communicated with zeccecard[.]com/grain/duke using a staging_rsa JSON object, and sent host metadata including username, hostname, domain, OS, architecture, local IPs, executable path, integrity level, and PID before awaiting commands. The same reporting noted optional time-based execution restrictions.

The content also includes infrastructure and hunting artifacts associated with Mythic. A Mythic C2 server was reported hosted at 194.163.175.135 on port 7443 as of March 28, 2026, and Talos observed that same IP hosting additional offensive tooling. FOFA hunting guidance identified a default Mythic favicon hash of -859291042 and HTML title "Mythic" as useful fingerprints. Other references note sightings of Mythic C2 infrastructure and its use alongside frameworks such as Sliver and Havoc. Overall, the content supports that Mythic is a widely used open-source C2 framework that is regularly repurposed by threat actors across espionage and intrusion operations.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

2 CVES
CVE-2025-8088WinRAR Windows Path Traversal via NTFS Alternate Data StreamsExploited in the wild

ESET researchers have discovered a previously unknown zero-day vulnerability in WinRAR being exploited in the wild by Russia-aligned group RomCom... now assigned CVE-2025-8088: a path traversal vulnerability, made possible with the use of alternate data streams. | Successful exploitation attempts delivered various backdoors used by the RomCom group, specifically a SnipBot variant, RustyClaw, and the Mythic agent.

via eseteset.com
CVE-2025-26633MSC EvilTwinExploited in the wild

Three Attack Variants Observed GrimResource (CVE-2025-26633): XSS via apds.dll res:// protocol handler

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
RomCom

Successful exploitation attempts delivered various backdoors used by the RomCom group, specifically a SnipBot variant, RustyClaw, and the Mythic agent.

via eseteset.com
Indrik Spider

"Three minutes prior to the delivery of RomCom’s shellcode loader, the operator tests the connection to Mythic C2."

via arctic wolf blogarcticwolf.com
ShadowSyndicate

ShadowSyndicate continues to be associated with toolkits including Cobalt Strike, Metasploit, Havoc, Mythic, Sliver, AsyncRAT, MeshAgent, and Brute Ratel.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"CVE-2025-8088 was exploited by RomCom in an email spearphishing campaign... A malicious archive, disguised as a job applicant’s curriculum vitae or resume, was attached to the emails"

Execution

4 techniques
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The agent currently employs three commands that imitate standard Jamf policy instructions... execute_command execute_command Executes a bash command on the target device with root privileges.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

"A WinRAR zero-day vulnerability was exploited in the wild... CVE-2025-8088... enables attackers to misuse alternate data streams (ADSs) to achieve path traversal on Windows."

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1
TacticExecution

"A malicious LNK file Updater.lnk... Another LNK file runs... A third malicious LNK file executes..."

T1204.003Malicious ImageEvidence1
TacticExecution

Annotations ID Technique Tactic T1204.003 Malicious Image Execution Default Configuration

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

"Updater.lnk adds a registry value and sets it to %TEMP%\msedge.dll"

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"adds a registry value... using Component Object Model (COM) hijacking to execute the malicious msedge.dll"

T1546.015Component Object Model HijackingEvidence1

"adds a registry value... using Component Object Model (COM) hijacking to execute the malicious msedge.dll"

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

The typhon agent utilises functionality provided by the Jamf binary. As such no additional code needs to be introduced to the compromised device for this agent to operate... execute_command execute_command Executes a bash command on the target device with root privileges.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

"The DLL decrypts and deploys shellcode"

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1
TacticStealth

This post is about that loader, which we call WasmForge ... You point it at a Go project and you get back a Windows or macOS binary that runs your tool but doesn’t look anything like it ... The third generates an outer Go binary containing a Wazero runtime, embeds the encrypted WASM module into the binary’s PE sections.

T1480.001Environmental KeyingEvidence1
TacticStealth

"msedge.dll exits before deploying the Mythic agent if the target machine’s domain name does not match a hardcoded company name"

T1564.004NTFS File AttributesEvidence1
TacticStealth

"through the use of alternate data streams, malicious files were hidden and deployed when the PDF was extracted and opened"

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

"Updater.lnk adds a registry value and sets it to %TEMP%\msedge.dll"

Discovery

2 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Practical queries for identifying malware infrastructure with FOFA.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Tribunus – A custom internal Mythic implant ... We tested standard commands like shell, ps, netstat, whoami .

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

“CVE-2020-1472, also known as ZeroLogon, allows for compromising a vulnerable operating system and executing commands as a privileged user.” | “CVE-2021-34527, also known as PrintNightmare… enabling remote access to a vulnerable OS and high-privilege command execution.”

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

If your goal is simply to execute a C2 payload, you can include the binary in the project directory and then execute it.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence11

T1071 Application Layer Protocol — Мимикрия C2 под HTTP/HTTPS/DNS

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

APT28 used other victims as proxies to relay command traffic, for instance using a compromised Georgian military email server as a hop point to NATO victims.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The whole pipeline exists to solve one specific problem: take an existing offensive security tool, change zero lines of its source code, and produce a binary you can actually drop on a hardened endpoint.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

Multiple malware families and intrusion sets are described as encrypting C2 traffic using SSL/TLS/HTTPS (e.g., "used HTTPS for command and control", "encrypts C2 communications with TLS", "uses SSL for encrypting C2 communications", "TLS-encrypted WebSocket Protocol (WSS) for C2").

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

39 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
26 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
10 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
3 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app17 days ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app22 days ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app28 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app28 days ago
uri●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app28 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app28 days ago
What this page doesn’t show

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This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching39

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities2

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.