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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

BS2005

BS2005 is a backdoor malware family associated with the China-linked espionage group APT15, also tracked as Ke3chang and Flea. The content describes BS2005 as an older APT15 backdoor that later evolved into Ketrican and then Graphican, with BS2005/Ketrican/Graphican characterized as one family with minor functional differences between members. BS2005 has traditionally been used by APT15 and was observed alongside the group’s additional backdoors RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. In a May 2017 intrusion investigated by NCC Group at a UK government services provider, BS2005 was present together with RoyalCli and was part of an operation involving theft of sensitive documents related to UK government departments and military technology. BS2005 communicated with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP, using Base64 encoding in the message body of HTTP requests. The malware also communicated through Internet Explorer via the COM interface IWebBrowser2, a technique that caused C2 data to be cached on disk and enabled responders to recover attacker commands. Reported BS2005 C2 domains include Run.linodepower[.]com, Singa.linodepower[.]com, and log.autocount[.]org. The content also notes BS2005 activity during 1 March to 22 March 2012.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Ke3chang

BS2005/Ketrican/Graphican (one family with minor differences in functionality between members)... This matches the capabilities of the BS2005 malware family used by the Ke3chang actor.

via ptsecurity globalglobal.ptsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

APT15 developed its own malware, allowing it to persist within victim networks (T1587.001).

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“All of the backdoors identified – excluding RoyalDNS – required APT15 to create batch scripts in order to install its persistence mechanism. This was achieved through the use of a simple Windows run key.”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“All of the backdoors identified – excluding RoyalDNS – required APT15 to create batch scripts in order to install its persistence mechanism. This was achieved through the use of a simple Windows run key.”

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

BS2005 uses Base64 encoding for communication in the message body of an HTTP request... Helminth encodes data with base64 and sends it via the "Cookie" field of HTTP requests. For C2 over DNS, Helminth converts ASCII characters into their hexadecimal values... RDAT can communicate with the C2 via base32-encoded subdomains.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1
INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
3 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.