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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

PondRAT

PondRAT is a remote access trojan associated with North Korea-linked Lazarus activity. Reporting links it with moderate confidence to the Lazarus sub-cluster tracked as Gleaming Pisces, Citrine Sleet, Labyrinth Chollima, Nickel Academy, and UNC4736, and notes overlap with AppleJeus-related tradecraft. Unit 42 described PondRAT as a lighter version of POOLRAT/SIMPLESEA and documented its delivery via poisoned Python packages uploaded to PyPI, including real-ids, coloredtxt, beautifultext, and minisound. Those packages executed an encoded next-stage payload that retrieved and ran Linux and macOS RAT payloads from a remote server. Documented PondRAT capabilities include arbitrary command execution, file upload, file download, and pausing/sleeping for a predefined interval. The activity was associated with Operation Dream Job-style social-engineering lures using fake job offers and was assessed as targeting developers in order to gain access to supply-chain vendors and ultimately their customers. Additional context shows PondRAT as older Lazarus tooling later replaced in some intrusions by a more advanced memory-only framework. Fox-IT also noted behavior consistent with Lazarus malware development, including a seven-pass secure deletion pattern later seen as consistent with PondRAT and POOLRAT. Detection context mentions YARA coverage for PondRAT and that one Linux detection approach matches hexadecimal patterns in ELF binaries.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

Researchers identified the malware during incident response investigations where older Lazarus tooling, including ThemeForestRAT and PondRAT, had been replaced with a significantly more advanced memory-only framework.

via polyswarmblog.polyswarm.io
AppleJeus

In one investigation, we observed that the actor had replaced ThemeForestRAT and PondRAT with a more sophisticated memory-only toolset.

via foxit blogblog.fox-it.com
TraderTraitor

Lazarus Group Expands Malware Arsenal With PondRAT, ThemeForestRAT, and RemotePE

via cloudatg insightscloudatg.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

5 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

"The attackers behind this campaign uploaded several poisoned Python packages to PyPI..." ... "Successful installation of malicious third-party packages can result in malware infection that compromises an entire network."

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"Operation Dream Job, wherein prospective targets are lured with enticing job offers in an attempt to trick them into downloading malware."

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1
TacticStealth

Before contacting its command-and-control server, it removes security hooks placed by endpoint protection products and disables Windows event tracing, allowing the malware to operate with little or no visibility to defenders.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence3
TacticStealth

RemotePE also implements secure file deletion functionality by repeatedly overwriting files seven times prior to deletion, behavior previously associated with Lazarus-linked malware families such as PondRAT and POOLRAT.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

"...runs the Linux and macOS versions of the RAT malware after retrieving them from a remote server." ... "the mechanism that handles commands from the [command-and-control server] is nearly identical."

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Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping5

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.