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MalwareUsed by 2 actors

TEARDROP

TEARDROP is a previously unknown memory-only dropper and post-exploitation malware associated with the 2020 SolarWinds Orion supply-chain compromise. It was observed as a second-stage payload delivered after SUNBURST/Solorigate activity and was used to deploy customized Cobalt Strike Beacon, with some reporting also noting delivery of other malware. FireEye described it as a novel in-memory dropper with no code overlap to previously seen malware. TEARDROP has been attributed in the broader campaign to the actor tracked as UNC2452 and by Microsoft as NOBELIUM; the activity is also associated with APT29/Cozy Bear/The Dukes.

High-confidence behavior described in the source material includes execution as a Windows service, spawning a thread, reading payload data from a file such as gracious_truth.jpg, checking for the registry key HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF before decoding its embedded payload, decoding that payload with a custom rolling XOR algorithm, and manually loading the decoded payload into memory using a custom PE-like loader without leaving an on-disk payload. TEARDROP was observed running from or associated with C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsetupsvc.dll, and reporting states it modified the registry to create a Windows service for persistence/execution on a compromised host.

Within the SolarWinds intrusion chain, TEARDROP was used after compromise of SolarWinds Orion environments to enable follow-on hands-on-keyboard activity, including deployment of Cobalt Strike for lateral movement and further intrusion operations. It is explicitly referenced alongside other malware families used in the campaign, including SUNBURST, RAINDROP, GoldMax, Sibot, and GoldFinder. The malware is tied to victim environments affected by the SolarWinds compromise, including U.S. government and private-sector targets; broader reporting on the actor identifies targeting of government, NGOs, think tanks, military, IT service providers, health technology and research organizations, and telecommunications providers. Reported host indicators and artifacts include the registry path HKU\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\CTF, the DLL path C:\Windows\SysWOW64\netsetupsvc.dll, and the file gracious_truth.jpg used to hold encoded payload data.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SVR

If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment, enumerating the domain and allowing for the collection and exfiltration of information of value using hands-on-keyboard techniques.

via ca ccscyber.gc.ca
APT29

If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment, enumerating the domain and allowing for the collection and exfiltration of information of value using hands-on-keyboard techniques.

via ca ccscyber.gc.ca
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1587.001MalwareEvidence1

For the SolarWinds Compromise, APT29 used numerous pieces of malware that were likely developed for or by the group, including SUNBURST, SUNSPOT, Raindrop, and TEARDROP.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence6

We assess that threat actors will almost certainly continue to develop their capability to compromise organizations through supply chains as an alternative to direct action against a target’s network defences.

T1195.003Compromise Hardware Supply ChainEvidence1

State-sponsored threat actors have demonstrated their ability to compromise service providers such as MSPs as a method of infiltrating the supply chain of organizations of strategic interest, establishing persistence, and securing access to downstream targets.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

"It is distributed through a wide-scale malicious email campaign operated by NOBELIUM"

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

“On May 25, 2021, the campaign escalated as NOBELIUM leveraged the legitimate mass-mailing service, Constant Contact, to masquerade as a US-based development organization and distribute malicious URLs…”

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

This week, VA officials told reporters there are currently no signs the hackers took advantage of the backdoor in their network, which was unwittingly installed by roughly 18,000 SolarWinds clients this year.

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... System Services: Service Execution [T1569.002]

Persistence

3 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

Catchamas creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a Windows Service; TEARDROP modified the Registry to create a Windows service for itself; NightClub set the ServiceDLL for a service created by the malware.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Privilege Escalation T1055: Process Injection .002: Portable Executable Injection

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence5

Catchamas creates three Registry keys to establish persistence by adding a Windows Service; TEARDROP modified the Registry to create a Windows service for itself; NightClub set the ServiceDLL for a service created by the malware.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

If further actions were taken, TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1
TacticStealth

"SHOTPUT is obscured using XOR encoding and appended to a valid GIF file." / "TEARDROP created and read from a file with a fake JPG header" / "Ramsay has base64-encoded its portable executable and hidden itself under a JPG header."

T1027.009Embedded PayloadsEvidence1
TacticStealth

JPIN uses a encrypted and compressed payload that is disguised as a bitmap within the resource section of the installer. Ramsay has base64-encoded its portable executable and hidden itself under a JPG header. TEARDROP created and read from a file with a fake JPG header.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2
TacticStealth

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK Mappings: APT29 Privilege Escalation T1055: Process Injection .002: Portable Executable Injection

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors decoding, decrypting, or deobfuscating payloads, strings, configuration data, commands, and C2 traffic prior to execution or use, e.g., 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode to decode contents of a .txt file storing the base64 encoded payload' and 'Action RAT can use Base64 to decode actor-controlled C2 server communications.'

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1
TacticStealth

“...lateral movement using Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to run the attacker’s payload using the Rundll32.exe process.”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4
TacticStealth

Leveraging memory-only droppers to deploy Cobalt Strike BEACON and potentially other backdoors.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The malware deployed into the Orion Platform, known as Teardrop, was highly sophisticated, according to experts, and in addition to harvesting users’ credentials and monitoring their keystrokes...

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The malware deployed into the Orion Platform, known as Teardrop, was highly sophisticated, according to experts, and in addition to harvesting users’ credentials and monitoring their keystrokes...

Discovery

2 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors querying, enumerating, searching, reading, or checking Windows Registry keys and values, e.g., "ADVSTORESHELL can enumerate registry keys," "APT41 queried registry values to determine items such as configured RDP ports and network configurations," and "Reg may be used to gather details from the Windows Registry of a local or remote system at the command-line interface."

T1482Domain Trust DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

TEARDROP or RAINDROP backdoors would be deployed, which would install a customized Cobalt Strike beacon in the environment, enumerating the domain and allowing for the collection and exfiltration of information of value.

Collection

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The malware deployed into the Orion Platform, known as Teardrop, was highly sophisticated, according to experts, and in addition to harvesting users’ credentials and monitoring their keystrokes...

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques... Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols [T1071.001]

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

This dropper then requested the download and execution of the second-stage WINELOADER.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Hashes
4 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 year ago
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping24

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.