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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

PureLogs

PureLogs is a .NET-based information stealer in the Pure family of malware products developed by PureCoder and sold as part of the PureCoder malware-as-a-service ecosystem. Reporting in the provided content describes both monolithic and plugin-based PureLogs variants, including a version identified as 5.0.0. PureLogs has been delivered through multiple phishing and ClickFix campaigns, including purchase-order, invoice, payments, and licensing-themed lures, as well as through multi-stage intrusion chains using loaders such as PureCrypter, PawsRunner, PowerLoader, Donut-based shellcode chains, malicious JavaScript, PowerShell, and process hollowing into MsBuild.exe. The malware is repeatedly described as executing filelessly or largely in memory, using layered obfuscation and protection including ConfuserEx, .NET Reactor, IntelliLock, AES, DES, TripleDES/3DES, GZip compression, protobuf serialization, and reflection-based assembly loading.

Across the cited campaigns, PureLogs profiles the victim environment and steals a broad range of data from Windows systems. High-confidence capabilities mentioned in the content include theft of browser credentials, cookies, session tokens, browsing history, autofill data, Windows secrets, screenshots, clipboard contents, hardware and OS details, installed security software information, Discord tokens and metadata, cryptocurrency wallet files and keys, password manager data, email client data, FTP client data, VPN client credentials, and data from applications such as Outlook, Thunderbird, Foxmail, MailBird, MailMaster, FileZilla, Pidgin, OpenVPN, ProtonVPN, DownloadManager, Steam, WinSCP, OBS Studio, Telegram, and Signal. Some reporting also states that PureLogs targets more than 80 browsers, more than 100 cryptocurrency wallet extensions and desktop wallets, and numerous browser extensions including crypto wallets, password managers, and authenticators.

The malware communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over TCP or HTTPS/TLS, depending on the variant, and exfiltrates encrypted and often GZip-compressed data to multiple endpoints. Reported PureLogs-related endpoints include /ping, /plugin, /userinfo, /browser, /discord, /crypto, /application, /filesearch/req, /filesearch/res, and /finish. The content associates PureLogs with several threat clusters and campaigns, including phishing activity analyzed by FortiGuard Labs, ClickFix delivery chains, the Fluffy Wolf campaign targeting Russian companies in construction, consulting, engineering, retail, e-commerce, and industrial sectors, and the SERPENTINE#CLOUD intrusion set where PureLogs appeared alongside PureCrypter, Violet RAT, PureHVNC, Remcos, and other commodity malware. The content also notes use by threat actor Alibaba2044 in an Italian-targeted spam campaign.

High-confidence indicators of compromise directly mentioned in the content include domains and infrastructure such as canndelta.com, 77.83.39.211:8443, 5.101.84.202, everycarebd.com/imagelkjh0987.png, ydspwie.duckdns.org:9045, and nhvncpure-related infrastructure shared with other PureCoder tools. Reported filenames and artifacts include kpankocrs.js, zgSGkYYzqVe.dll, Iwnflr.exe, Rmiyj.dll, Mvfsxog.dll, Qdjlj.dll, and Fviwknzr.exe. Additional IOCs listed in the content include URLs hosted on 158.94.208.104, IPs 178.16.52.232 and 158.94.208.92, and numerous SHA-256 hashes such as 3D510977D60A44322F88100B515F06CB5ED83BABC64247068D1A489595FAA6C5, 670384FAFB23140D96F2F8FE04A13FC8CC8E2A6E5E8C973E39B58D103C5FEA92, B90988400CCED319D260C4937F334ECC364785ED5C593CD2139965E62CA58173, E20B35A8C30E076CDD0E1DF05BA1FF2E418DBD39A674F084787CC0AF2FDA9E95, 07CD03E2082BCB0B890CC59CE4C770D1A095AC6F1AE9CF999F5542555C56F841, 8d0bcde739929fe41a6bcaaa62f7cba802af90b2ba8dea6ed1a4821236cdd588, 6910d27b9e1dc2229a8c280f5d0cea85146d50274c56a4d9a5b8d1793505b1b9, 93724f1a9ad3a28c171927fc449ac34dc6ca890f915f00210e8b305577388c6e, 0fcb86ae384e9975933314ac2a231f0ff46c0208556bf4a16f096a642d3f505e, 1b730de72f921458b6b162b105a9521a931f07e19d3cac53207c7a8efbc412f9, e2308749f6b7b7573009d0cac6616a6aa83cecb1f2933e868776400d122c86ec, 046d0e83c1e6dcaf526127b81b962042e495f5ae3a748f3a9452be62f905acf8, and cdf87d68885caa3e94713ded9dd5e51c39b7bc7ef9bf7d63a4ff5ab917a96b36.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Fluffy Wolf

Внутри архивов находились различные загрузчики и дропперы, предназначенные для доставки вредоносов PureLogs, PureRAT и шифровальщика Pay2Key.

via xakepxakep.ru
PureCoder

Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs analyzes a spam campaign dropping PureLogs stealer aimed at Italian users... This tool is used by the Threat Actor (TA) “Alibaba2044” to launch a malicious spam campaign at targets based in Italy on the 14th of December 2022.

via cyble comcyble.com
Alibaba2044

Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs analyzes a spam campaign dropping PureLogs stealer aimed at Italian users... This tool is used by the Threat Actor (TA) “Alibaba2044” to launch a malicious spam campaign at targets based in Italy on the 14th of December 2022.

via cyble comcyble.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

This research analyzes a ClickFix campaign leveraging the spoofed licensing-themed website canndelta.com to deliver the PureLogs stealer

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

The infection chain begins with targeted social engineering messages sent directly to company personnel. Threat actors carefully disguise these malicious emails as urgent corporate purchase orders. For instance, the message instructs recipients to open a compressed file named PO 2026-P0803.rar to check an invoice.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

...а в других случаях жертве предоставляли ссылку на GitHub-репозиторий, откуда загружался RAR-архив. По словам исследователей, Fluffy Wolf активно использует GitHub, потому что такие ссылки выглядят легитимно и помогают обходить почтовые фильтры...

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2
TacticExecution

If the victim extracts the archive, they find a script component called kpankocrs.js... Subsequently, the script launches an active PowerShell process with an execution policy bypass flag to run the code silently.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

This research analyzes a ClickFix campaign leveraging the spoofed licensing-themed website canndelta.com to deliver the PureLogs stealer through malicious PowerShell commands.

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2
TacticExecution

If the victim extracts the archive, they find a script component called kpankocrs.js. When executed, this malicious JavaScript file extracts a secondary encrypted shell file.

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence2

Specifically, the code targets the native utility MsBuild.exe located within the Microsoft .NET Framework folders.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The attack uses Donut shellcode, fileless execution, RWX memory allocation, and in-memory .NET assembly loading to evade detection.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The fileless script uses a custom wrapper block to run process hollowing against a trusted system file. Specifically, the code targets the native utility MsBuild.exe located within the Microsoft .NET Framework folders.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

To hide its footprint, the delivery pipeline utilizes multiple advanced encryption layers and fileless components... This dynamic tool relies on commercial runtime packing software to prevent static analysis by defensive teams.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence2

The attack uses Donut shellcode, fileless execution, RWX memory allocation, and in-memory .NET assembly loading to evade detection.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence2

The fileless script uses a custom wrapper block to run process hollowing against a trusted system file. Specifically, the code targets the native utility MsBuild.exe located within the Microsoft .NET Framework folders.

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence2

Specifically, the code targets the native utility MsBuild.exe located within the Microsoft .NET Framework folders.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

This hidden payload decodes an embedded assembly binary in host memory using an XOR rotation method.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence3
TacticStealth

The attack uses Donut shellcode, fileless execution, RWX memory allocation, and in-memory .NET assembly loading to evade detection.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence2

Similarly, the malware interrogates specific system directories to capture authentication tokens from messaging applications. It targets multiple Discord releases to perform unauthorized account takeovers without requiring passwords.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

Once executed, PureLogs steals browser credentials, Windows secrets, cryptocurrency wallet data, password manager information, and session tokens.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence4

Once executed, PureLogs steals browser credentials, Windows secrets, cryptocurrency wallet data, password manager information, and session tokens.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

Edge credentials are extracted from the '%LocalAppData%\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\Default\Login Data' file... Targeted web browsers include: Google Chrome... Microsoft Edge... Mozilla Firefox...

Discovery

2 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Moreover, the agent scans local registry keys to harvest private keys from popular cryptocurrency wallets.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

First, it takes interactive screenshots and scrapes detailed hardware properties like processor configurations. In addition, the spyware reads local clipboard balances and searches for security software details.

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Finally, it extracts data from email clients and file transfer applications like FileZilla.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

First, it takes interactive screenshots...

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

In addition, the spyware reads local clipboard balances...

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

The malware serializes all collected information, compresses it with GZip... After being encrypted... the collected credentials are submitted via an HTTP POST request... it then decompresses (GUNZIP) the decrypted data to restore the original plugin module in memory.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

The malware also establishes TCP-based C2 communication to exfiltrate stolen data and receive attacker-controlled configurations.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

To confirm server availability, the system sends a standard network request to a designated URL endpoint. For instance, the downloader invokes an asynchronous web client to ping the controller IP address.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Indicators of Compromise (IOC) List Domain : https://canndelta.com http://158.94.208.104/x7GkP2mQ9zL4/my_new_l.bin http://158.94.208.104/x7GkP2mQ9zL4/my_s.bin

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The malware also establishes TCP-based C2 communication to exfiltrate stolen data and receive attacker-controlled configurations.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

92 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
27 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
52 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
13 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

42 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

gurucul threat researchNews
Jun 3, 2026
Canndelta ClickFix Campaign Abusing Donut Shellcode to Deploy PureLogs Stealer | Community Portal | Gurucul

Information-stealing malware delivered via malicious PowerShell in a ClickFix campaign. It uses fileless execution, Donut shellcode, RWX memory allocation, and in-memory .NET assembly loading to evade detection, then steals browser credentials, Windows secrets, cryptocurrency wallet data, password manager information, and session tokens. It also uses TCP-based C2 to exfiltrate stolen data and receive attacker-controlled configurations.

Read more
security online infoNews
May 29, 2026
PureLogs Info Stealer Campaign: Evasive Phishing Exposed

A multi-stage, fileless information stealer delivered via phishing emails disguised as purchase orders. It uses JavaScript, PowerShell, in-memory .NET modules, process hollowing into MsBuild.exe, encrypted C2 communications, and an obfuscated DLL payload to steal screenshots, hardware details, clipboard data, browser credentials and cookies, Discord tokens, cryptocurrency wallet data, email client data, and FileZilla data.

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cyber security newsNews
May 28, 2026
New PureLogs Variant Uses MsBuild.exe Process Hollowing to Evade Detection

PureLogs is a .NET-based infostealer delivered via phishing emails with obfuscated JavaScript and PowerShell stages. This variant uses process hollowing into MsBuild.exe, in-memory loading of an encrypted .NET module, and commercial obfuscation to evade detection while stealing browser credentials, cookies, autofill data, cryptocurrency wallet data, email client data, FTP credentials, and VPN-related information, then exfiltrating it over encrypted HTTPS.

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xakepNews
May 28, 2026
Группировка Fluffy Wolf атаковала российские компании новой малварью - Хакер

Инфостилер, используемый для кражи учетных данных, файлов cookie, истории браузеров и данных из почтовых клиентов.

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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching92

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping26

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.