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Mallory
MalwareExploits 6 CVEs

Kinsing

Kinsing is a Linux-focused malware/cryptomining threat best known for spreading cryptocurrency miners on compromised systems, including cloud and containerized environments. The content associates it with exploitation of exposed services and known vulnerabilities, including execution in an Ubuntu container via an open Docker daemon API, abuse of Apache ActiveMQ RCE CVE-2023-46604, exploitation of PHPUnit CVE-2017-9841, and delivery observed in Log4Shell-related activity. Kinsing has also been reported exploiting Apache ActiveMQ to add the Sharpire backdoor as part of a multi-stage intrusion.

Its post-compromise behavior includes SSH-based propagation and credential abuse. The content states Kinsing has used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts, attempted to brute-force hosts over SSH, used SSH for lateral movement, parsed files such as /etc/hosts and SSH known_hosts to discover remote systems, searched for private keys, and reused SSH-reachable trust relationships to spread. These behaviors align with worm-like expansion across Linux hosts.

Kinsing is repeatedly referenced as a common rival in the Linux cryptomining ecosystem: other malware families explicitly kill or remove Kinsing processes, and kill lists include typo variants such as kingsin and kinsin. This indicates Kinsing is a well-established Linux cryptojacking family. High-confidence targeting context in the content is Linux systems, especially exposed cloud/container infrastructure. No unique Kinsing-specific IOC set is provided in the content beyond the cited exploitation vectors and SSH-related behaviors.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

6 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

6 CVES
CVE-2026-33017Unauthenticated RCE in Langflow build_public_tmp Public Flow EndpointExploited in the wild

Threat actors are continuing to exploit a critical Langflow vulnerability as part of fresh attacks designed to deliver a Monero cryptocurrency miner. The activity has been found to weaponize CVE-2026-33017 (CVSS score: 9.3), an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Langflow, indicating threat actors are scanning and targeting exposed artificial intelligence (AI) application endpoints for obtaining initial access to enterprise networks.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
CVE-2023-46604Apache ActiveMQ OpenWire Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

Red Canary detected an adversary executing discovery commands on dozens of cloud-based Linux endpoints vulnerable to a critical remote code vulnerability (CVE-2023-46604) in Apache ActiveMQ... Security researchers have previously identified adversaries exploiting CVE-2023-46604 for malware deployment, to spread TellYouThePass, Ransomhub and HelloKitty ransomware, along with Kinsing... Finally, the adversary used curl to download two ActiveMQ JAR files... These two JAR files constitute a legitimate patch for CVE-2023-46604. | ...along with Kinsing, a malware strain known for targeting Linux systems to spread cryptominers.

via red canary blogredcanary.com
CVE-2017-9841PHPUnit eval-stdin.php Remote Code ExecutionExploited in the wild

VulnCheck's exploit intelligence data shows CVE-2017-9841 has been leveraged by several botnets including RondoDox, Kinsing, KashmirBlack, Sysrv and Androxgh0st.

via vulncheck blogvulncheck.com
CVE-2025-55182React2ShellExploited in the wild

"A critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability, identified as CVE-2025-55182 and dubbed React2Shell, exists within the React Server Components (RSC) architecture, allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary code..."

via f5 communitycommunity.f5.com
CVE-2021-44228Log4ShellExploited in the wild

"...delivery of the Kinsing cryptocurrency miner."

via talos intelligence blogblog.talosintelligence.com
CVE-2025-24893Unauthenticated RCE in XWiki SolrSearch

"x522, which kills competing miners such as XMRig and Kinsing, and launches the miner with a c3pool.org configuration"

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

"actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services"; "used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data"; "used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation"

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

"actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services"; "connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs"; "used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials"; "used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts"

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Doki was executed through an open Docker daemon API port; Kinsing was executed in an Ubuntu container deployed via an open Docker daemon API; TeamTNT used tools (e.g., Weave Scope) to target exposed Docker API ports and gain initial access.

Execution

5 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

Examples include "CookieMiner has looked for files in the user's home directory with 'wallet' in their name using find .", "Kinsing has used the find command to search for specific files", and "APT41 has executed file /bin/pwd on exploited victims."

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Red Canary detected an adversary executing discovery commands on dozens of cloud-based Linux endpoints vulnerable to a critical remote code vulnerability (CVE-2023-46604) in Apache ActiveMQ.

T1609Container Administration CommandEvidence1
T1610Deploy ContainerEvidence1

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

"actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services"; "used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data"; "used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation"

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence2

"actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services"; "connect remotely to victim networks using VPNs"; "used legitimate VPN, RDP, Citrix, or VNC credentials"; "used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053.003CronEvidence1
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

"actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services"; "used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data"; "used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation"

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

"actors leverage legitimate credentials to log into external remote services"; "used legitimate credentials to gain initial access, maintain access, and exfiltrate data"; "used valid accounts for initial access and privilege escalation"

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1222.002Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence1

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1110Brute ForceEvidence2

"Sandworm Team used a script to attempt RPC authentication against a number of hosts"; "Agrius engaged in various brute forcing activities via SMB"; "Chaos conducts brute force attacks against SSH services to gain initial access"; "Fox Kitten has brute forced RDP credentials"; "Turla may attempt to connect ... using net use commands and a predefined list ... of passwords."

T1552.003Shell HistoryEvidence1
T1552.004Private KeysEvidence2

Ebury has intercepted unencrypted private keys as well as private key pass-phrases. Hildegard has searched for private keys in .ssh. jRAT can steal keys for VPNs and cryptocurrency wallets. Kinsing has searched for private keys. Machete has scanned and looked for cryptographic keys and certificate file extensions. TeamTNT has searched for unsecured SSH keys. Troll Stealer collects all data in victim .ssh folders by creating a compressed copy that is subsequently exfiltrated.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

Earth Lusca used the command powershell "Get-EventLog -LogName security -Newest 500 | where {$_.EventID -eq 4624} | format-list - property * | findstr "Address"" to find the network information of successfully logged-in accounts to discovery addresses of other machines.

T1018Remote System DiscoveryEvidence2

During the 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team remotely discovered systems over LAN connections. OT systems were visible from the IT network as well, giving adversaries the ability to discover operational assets.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors listing files and directories, enumerating drives, searching for files by extension/name/path, retrieving file metadata, and browsing file systems (for example: "APT28 has used Forfiles to locate PDF, Excel, and Word documents during collection" and "cmd can be used to find files and directories with native functionality such as dir commands").

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

"used compromised credentials to log on to other systems"; "used compromised credentials to access other systems on a victim network"; "used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts"

T1021.004SSHEvidence2

"used valid SSH credentials to access remote hosts"; "acquires valid SSH accounts through brute force"

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence4

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using HTTP and HTTPS for command and control, such as: "Sandworm Team used BlackEnergy to communicate between compromised hosts and their command-and-control servers via HTTP post requests."

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Impact

1 technique
T1496.001Compute HijackingEvidence1

Other

1 technique
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"remove known cryptojacking malware already in place"; "removal and evasion of Aliyun and Tencent cloud security software"; "targets Kinsing... and other... miners"

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

51 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
26 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
25 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
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ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 months ago
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What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching51

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities6

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping22

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.