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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actor

LP-Notes

LP-Notes is a custom credential stealer associated with the Iran-aligned threat actor MuddyWater (also tracked as Mango Sandstorm and TA450). Reporting in the provided content places it in MuddyWater campaigns targeting organizations primarily in Israel, with at least one confirmed target in Egypt, across sectors including technology, engineering, manufacturing, local government, education, telecom, government, oil, and energy. LP-Notes was used post-compromise alongside other MuddyWater tooling such as the Fooder loader, the MuddyViper backdoor, CE-Notes, Blub, VAX One, and go-socks5 reverse tunnels.

The malware is described as a credential stealer written in C/C++. Its documented behavior includes stealing Windows credentials by presenting a fake Windows Security dialog box to trick users into entering their system username and password. Multiple sources in the content also describe LP-Notes as staging and verifying stolen credentials. It was used to extract login credentials and other sensitive data, and one cited artifact states that collected credentials were stored in C:\Users\Public\Downloads\lp-notes.txt.

High-confidence indicators and behaviors directly mentioned in the content include the malware name LP-Notes / LP Notes, use of a fake Windows Security prompt for credential theft, local staging of stolen credentials, and storage of collected credentials in C:\Users\Public\Downloads\lp-notes.txt. The content consistently links LP-Notes to MuddyWater operations observed from late 2024 into 2025.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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MuddyWater

The two stealers share the same design - although LP-Notes can steal Windows credentials by displaying a fake Windows Security dialog box.

via govinfosecuritygovinfosecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence1

"MuddyWater hackers in this campaign continued their usual practice of gaining access through phishing emails. The messages often contain PDF attachments with links to remote monitoring and management tools hosted on free file-sharing platforms."

Stealth

1 technique
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, hexadecimal encoding, string encryption, code flattening, custom crypters, and other obfuscation methods to hide payloads, strings, configuration data, URLs, and scripts.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

“MuddyViper enables… exfiltrate Windows login credentials… The campaign leverages additional credential stealers.”

T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence1

"LP-Notes can steal Windows credentials by displaying a fake Windows Security dialog box."

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

"...stealing ... browser data..."

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

The threat actor also downloaded credential stealers tracked as CE-Notes and LP-Notes.

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.002GUI Input CaptureEvidence1

"LP-Notes can steal Windows credentials by displaying a fake Windows Security dialog box."

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

"...enabling file execution and exfiltration."

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping8

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.