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MalwareUsed by 2 actorsExploits 1 CVE

Revenge RAT

Revenge RAT is a remote access trojan (identified in the content as S0379) with surveillance, credential access, discovery, persistence, and remote administration capabilities. Reported functionality includes audio capture/microphone interception, screen capture, video capture, keylogging, OS credential dumping, system information discovery, network configuration discovery, and gathering the username from the infected system. It supports remote control through a plugin for Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access and can transfer additional tools to victim systems.

Execution and persistence behaviors directly mentioned in the content include use of Windows command shell and PowerShell, including the PowerShell Reflection.Assembly technique to load itself into memory, use of mshta.exe to run malicious scripts, and creation of scheduled tasks to run malicious scripts at different intervals. The content also states it can establish persistence through scheduled tasks and a Winlogon Helper DLL.

For command and control, Revenge RAT uses bidirectional web-service communication, and the content specifically notes that it uses Base64 to encode information sent to its C2 server. In one campaign, blogpost.com was used as its primary command-and-control server.

The malware is described as publicly available and cross-platform in the provided content. It has been used by the Bahamut threat actor for remote control, alongside NETWIRE. The content also notes that campaigns in 2022 delivered a mixture of malware including Loda, Revenge RAT, and AsyncRAT. High-confidence indicators and artifacts explicitly mentioned in the content include use of blogpost.com as a C2 server, mshta.exe execution, PowerShell Reflection.Assembly in-memory loading, scheduled-task-based execution, and Base64-encoded C2 data.

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2017-11882Microsoft Office Equation Editor Remote Code Execution

“In 2022, campaigns delivered a mixture of malware such as, Loda, Revenge RAT, and AsyncRAT.”

via threatpostthreatpost.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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WindShift

Bahamut utilized the publicly available, cross-platform remote administration tools (RATs) NETWIRE and Revenge RAT for remote control.

via ptsecurity globalglobal.ptsecurity.com
TA558

“In 2022, campaigns delivered a mixture of malware such as, Loda, Revenge RAT, and AsyncRAT.”

via threatpostthreatpost.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence1

"Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL" (listed under Revenge RAT)

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1547.004Winlogon Helper DLLEvidence1

"Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Winlogon Helper DLL" (listed under Revenge RAT)

Stealth

3 techniques
T1202Indirect Command ExecutionEvidence1
TacticStealth

"Indirect Command Execution" (listed under Revenge RAT)

T1218.005MshtaEvidence2
TacticStealth

"System Binary Proxy Execution: Mshta" (listed under Revenge RAT)

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1
TacticStealth

"Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses," "Deep Panda has used PowerShell scripts to download and execute programs in memory, without writing to disk," and "Turla has also used PowerShell scripts to load and execute malware in memory."

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence2

"OS Credential Dumping" (listed under Revenge RAT)

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"Input Capture: Keylogging" (listed under Agent Tesla, AsyncRAT, Imminent Monitor, jRAT, NETWIRE, njRAT, Revenge RAT, WarzoneRAT)

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes actors and malware using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, netsh interface show, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, and network adapter/interface details.

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence3
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting usernames, identifying logged-in users, running whoami/query user/quser, checking admin status, and enumerating user sessions.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence7
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence2

"Remote Services: Remote Desktop Protocol" (listed under Imminent Monitor, jRAT, njRAT, Revenge RAT, WarzoneRAT)

Collection

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

"Input Capture: Keylogging" (listed under Agent Tesla, AsyncRAT, Imminent Monitor, jRAT, NETWIRE, njRAT, Revenge RAT, WarzoneRAT)

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

"Screen Capture" (listed under Agent Tesla, AsyncRAT, jRAT, NETWIRE, njRAT, Revenge RAT)

T1123Audio CaptureEvidence2

"Audio Capture" (listed under Imminent Monitor, jRAT, Revenge RAT)

T1125Video CaptureEvidence2

"Video Capture" (listed under Agent Tesla, AsyncRAT, Imminent Monitor, jRAT, njRAT, Revenge RAT, WarzoneRAT)

T1102Web ServiceEvidence3

The adversaries had communicated to both Dropbox and Pastebin. APT28 has used Google Drive for C2. APT37 leverages social networking sites and cloud platforms (AOL, Twitter, Yandex, Mediafire, pCloud, Dropbox, and Box) for C2.

T1102.002Bidirectional CommunicationEvidence1

"Web Service: Bidirectional Communication" (listed under Revenge RAT)

T1102.003One-Way CommunicationEvidence1

"Comnie uses blogs and third-party sites (GitHub, tumbler, and BlogSpot) to avoid DNS-based blocking"; "Revenge RAT used blogpost.com as its primary command and control server"; "Turla JavaScript backdoor has used Google Apps Script as its C2 server"

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

"Ingress Tool Transfer" (listed under Agent Tesla, AsyncRAT, Imminent Monitor, jRAT, NETWIRE, njRAT, Revenge RAT, Snip3, WarzoneRAT)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

"Data Encoding: Standard Encoding" (listed under njRAT, Revenge RAT)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

DarkComet can open an active screen of the victim’s machine and take control of the mouse and keyboard.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
1 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching1

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping24

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.