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Mallory
MalwareUsed by 1 actorExploits 1 CVE

PHASEJAM

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EXPLOITED CVES

Vulnerabilities exploited

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

1 CVES
CVE-2025-0282Unauthenticated RCE in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons for ZTA GatewayExploited in the wild

"...installed by exploiting a zero-day vulnerability at that time, CVE-2025-0282, during attacks against organizations in Japan around December 2024..."; "CVE-2025-0282 refers to a critical security flaw in ICS that could allow unauthenticated remote code execution. It was addressed by Ivanti in early January 2025." | UNC5337 to deliver the SPAWN ecosystem of malware, as well as other tools like DRYHOOK and PHASEJAM.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details
UNC5337

UNC5337 to deliver the SPAWN ecosystem of malware, as well as other tools like DRYHOOK and PHASEJAM.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1
TacticExecution

LIGHTWIRE can imbed itself into the legitimate compcheckresult.cgi component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs to enable command execution.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

APT5 has modified legitimate binaries and scripts for Pulse Secure VPNs including the legitimate DSUpgrade.pm file to install the ATRIUM webshell for persistence.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes adversaries using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, hexadecimal encoding, string encryption, code flattening, custom crypters, and other obfuscation methods to hide payloads, strings, configuration data, URLs, and scripts.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.

T1601Modify System ImageEvidence1

PHASEJAM 'has modified Ivanti Connect Secure appliances and blocks the system upgrades by altering the DSUpgrade.pm file'; SPAWNCHIMERA 'has modified the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool to evade detection.'

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

ADVSTORESHELL exfiltrates data over the same channel used for C2. Agrius exfiltrated staged data using tools such as Putty and WinSCP, communicating with command and control servers. AppleSeed can exfiltrate files via the C2 channel.

Other

1 technique
T1562Impair DefensesEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware disabling or modifying security tools, EDR/AV, logging, firewall rules, integrity checkers, and security settings; e.g., 'Agrius used several mechanisms to try to disable security tools' and 'BlackByte disabled security tools such as Windows Defender and the Raccine anti-ransomware tool during operations.'

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities1

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping7

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.