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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

Fscan

FScan is an open-source network scanning utility written in Go and described in the reporting as an intranet/network scanner used to identify open ports across IP subnets and support internal reconnaissance. It has been observed post-compromise in multiple intrusion sets as a public tool rather than a bespoke malware family. Cisco Talos reported Chinese-speaking APT cluster UAT-7237 using FScan during intrusions targeting web infrastructure entities in Taiwan, including a compromised Taiwanese web hosting provider, to search for open ports, discover endpoints, and support lateral movement alongside SMB scanning and stolen credentials. Talos also reported UAT-9921 using Fscan from compromised hosts in support of internal and external scanning tied to the VoidLink framework. Palo Alto Networks Unit 42 observed CL-STA-0969, a nation-state-linked cluster overlapping with Liminal Panda, using FScan in 2024 operations against telecommunications providers in Southwest Asia. JPCERT/CC reported attackers exploiting Ivanti Connect Secure vulnerabilities CVE-2025-0282 and CVE-2025-22457 deploying Fscan via DLL side-loading/FilelessRemotePE-based loaders during post-exploitation to scan internal systems; the same reporting notes Fscan has been adopted by various Chinese hacking groups. Additional reporting on attacks against South Korean web servers also describes use of Fscan for system and network discovery. High-confidence behavior directly mentioned in the content is limited to network/intranet scanning for open ports and endpoint discovery; no unique persistence or payload-delivery capability is attributed to FScan itself in the provided material.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Liminal Panda

...using a mix of custom and public tools such as Microsocks, FRP, FScan, and Responder...

via securityaffairssecurityaffairs.com
UAT-7237

"For its network-scanning activities, UAT-7237 uses FScan to search for open ports..."

via register securitygo.theregister.com
UAT-9921

The threat actor has also been observed deploying a SOCKS proxy on compromised servers to launch scans for internal reconnaissance and lateral movement using open-source tools like Fscan.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

3 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

T1608.002Upload ToolEvidence1

Due to mistakes on the attacker’s side, we managed to retrieve multiple files from Earth Krahang’s servers, including samples, configuration files, and log files from its attack tools.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actor spreads in networks using tools like FScan and SMB scans to find accessible systems. They pivot using stolen credentials and maintain long-term access via SoftEther VPN, with configurations in Simplified Chinese, indicating operator proficiency.

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actor spreads in networks using tools like FScan and SMB scans to find accessible systems. They pivot using stolen credentials and maintain long-term access via SoftEther VPN, with configurations in Simplified Chinese, indicating operator proficiency.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actor spreads in networks using tools like FScan and SMB scans to find accessible systems. They pivot using stolen credentials and maintain long-term access via SoftEther VPN, with configurations in Simplified Chinese, indicating operator proficiency.

Stealth

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

The threat actor spreads in networks using tools like FScan and SMB scans to find accessible systems. They pivot using stolen credentials and maintain long-term access via SoftEther VPN, with configurations in Simplified Chinese, indicating operator proficiency.

Discovery

1 technique
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence5
TacticDiscovery

UAT-7237 exploits unpatched servers for initial access, then performs rapid reconnaissance using commands like nslookup, systeminfo, and ping before establishing persistence via SoftEther VPN and RDP rather than web shells.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app10 months ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching2

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping3

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.