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MalwareUsed by 4 actors

NETWIRE

NetWire is a publicly available remote access trojan (RAT)/backdoor, identified in ATT&CK as S0198, with cross-platform support including Windows and macOS. Reported capabilities include command-and-control over web protocols and web services, encrypted communications using symmetric cryptography, keylogging, screen capture, reverse shell access, system and process discovery, file and directory discovery, system information collection, CPU usage monitoring, archive/staging of collected data, and credential theft from multiple sources. Specifically, the content states that NetWire can retrieve passwords from messaging and mail client applications and steal credentials from web browsers including Internet Explorer, Opera, Yandex, and Chrome; decoded strings also showed targeting of Outlook profile data, Windows Vault, Mozilla login storage, Chromium-based browsers, Comodo Dragon, and Internet Explorer IntelliForms. FireEye reporting cited additional capabilities including mouse and keyboard event recording, session logon capture, and creation of a fake HTTP proxy.

Persistence mechanisms directly mentioned include Windows Registry Run keys, scheduled tasks, and on macOS LaunchAgents; ATT&CK-style mappings also note XDG autostart entries, login items, and cron. The content specifically notes creation of HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire and an autorun entry under HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run, as well as use of scheduled tasks for persistence. NetWire has also been observed using process injection/process hollowing, including injection into notepad.exe, svchost.exe, and vbc.exe. In one documented 2019 campaign, a phishing-delivered VBScript/PowerShell/.NET fileless chain loaded a .NET assembly in memory and hollowed a suspended InstallUtil.exe process to execute the final NetWire payload without writing PE files to disk.

Initial access and delivery vectors mentioned include phishing emails with malicious attachments, malicious documents, phishing links, and malicious files. The content states NetWire has been spread via email campaigns utilizing malicious attachments and executed by luring victims into opening malicious documents. GuLoader has also been observed distributing NetWire. A documented campaign targeted airline industry victims using a malicious VBS hosted on Google Drive, with subsequent stages fetched from paste.ee, persistence established via a scheduled task running every 15 minutes, and the payload executed in memory.

Threat actor and campaign associations directly mentioned in the content include Bahamut, which used NetWire alongside Revenge RAT for remote control; Nigerian BEC actors tracked as SilverTerrier, for whom NetWire was one of the top RAT families used; and the Nigerian BEC group TMT, which used NetWire along with AgentTesla, Lokibot, AzoRult, and Pony to steal credentials and compromise mailboxes. The content also notes NetWire use in malware-assisted BEC activity and references shared infrastructure analysis in which C2 IP 34.41.139.193 was associated with NetWire RAT along with other malware families, though this is infrastructure co-occurrence rather than exclusive attribution.

Known indicators and artifacts explicitly mentioned in the content include Registry key HKCU\SOFTWARE\NetWire; C2 IP/domain pairs 178.239.21.62:1919 / kingshakes.linkpc.net and 105.112.35.72:3575 / homi.myddns.rocks; a LOGS directory used to store encrypted collected data; the malicious VBS hash dac4ed7c1c56de7d74eb238c566637aa from the 2019 campaign; and import hash ad9d11227a86b863e31ddf6019cc7ab5, which has been associated with NetWire distribution in past MalwareBazaar reporting, though the source explicitly warns that this hash is not definitive for NetWire.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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WindShift

Bahamut utilized the publicly available, cross-platform remote administration tools (RATs) NETWIRE and Revenge RAT for remote control.

via ptsecurity globalglobal.ptsecurity.com
SilverTerrier

The top 10 of the RATs used in Nigerian BEC scams is formed by NetWire, DarkComet, NanoCore, LuminosityLink, Remcos, ImminentMonitor, NJRat, Quasar, Adwind, and Hworm.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
TMT

The group relied exclusively on a variety of publicly available spyware and Remote Access Trojans (RATs), including AgentTesla, Lokibot, AzoRult, Pony, and NetWire.

via group ibgroup-ib.com
RATicate

"...identified at least 5 different malware families used as final payload—all of them InfoStealer or RAT malware: ... Netwire"

via sophos threat researchnews.sophos.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware being delivered through phishing or spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments such as Microsoft Office documents, PDFs, RAR/ZIP archives, CHM, ISO, IMG, HTA, LNK, and executable files disguised as documents.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware using PowerShell scripts/commands for execution, download, staging, reconnaissance, persistence, credential access, lateral movement, and defense evasion; e.g., "Sandworm Team used PowerShell scripts to run a credential harvesting tool in memory to evade defenses."

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3
TacticExecution

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used the xp_cmdshell command in MS-SQL. During the 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks, the adversaries leveraged PsExec to run cmd.exe commands on multiple victim machines. Numerous malware families and groups are described as using cmd.exe, cmd /c, Windows command shell, or command-line interfaces to execute commands, payloads, reconnaissance, persistence, cleanup, and ransomware actions.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1
TacticExecution

Lokibot ... Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic ... NanoCore ... Visual Basic ... NETWIRE ... Visual Basic

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

The content repeatedly describes victims being lured into opening malicious attachments, enabling macros, launching installers, clicking embedded files/links, or otherwise directly executing malicious content.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2
TacticExecution

Examples include: "Sandworm Team leveraged Microsoft Office attachments which contained malicious macros..."; "Bumblebee has relied upon a user opening an ISO file to enable execution of malicious shortcut files and DLLs"; "Lumma Stealer has gained initial execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives, and MSI files within RAR files."

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry. | The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

Bundlore can persist via a LaunchAgent. Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence. CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist to establish persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

During the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware injecting code, shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

T1543.001Launch AgentEvidence1

Bundlore can persist via a LaunchAgent. Calisto adds a .plist file to the /Library/LaunchAgents folder to maintain persistence. CoinTicker creates user launch agents named .espl.plist and com.apple.[random string].plist to establish persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors establishing persistence by adding values under HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run or RunOnce, and by placing executables, scripts, .lnk files, or .bat files in the Windows Startup folder.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3
TacticStealth

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using obfuscated code, encrypted strings, Base64/XOR/RC4/AES encoding, VMProtect/ConfuserEx/SmartAssembly, stack strings, control-flow flattening, opaque predicates, and hidden payloads to evade analysis and detection.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, DLLs and EXEs with filenames associated with common electric power sector protocols were used to masquerade files.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware injecting code, shellcode, DLLs, or payloads into legitimate processes such as svchost.exe, explorer.exe, iexplore.exe, wuauclt.exe, lsass.exe, and browser processes.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence5

Many malware families store configuration, payloads, encryption keys, C2 addresses, or other operational data in Registry keys, such as QakBot storing configuration in a randomly named subkey under HKCU\Software\Microsoft and PolyglotDuke writing encrypted JSON configuration files to the Registry. | The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware modifying, creating, deleting, or storing data in Windows Registry keys and values for persistence, configuration storage, defense evasion, credential access, privilege escalation, and execution.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Agent Tesla ... Input Capture: Keylogging ... DarkComet ... Keylogging ... Lokibot ... Keylogging ... NanoCore ... Keylogging ... NETWIRE ... Keylogging

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

Agent Tesla has the ability to steal credentials from FTP clients and wireless profiles... APT33 has used a variety of publicly available tools like LaZagne to gather credentials... Mimikatz performs credential dumping to obtain account and password information useful in gaining access to additional systems and enterprise network resources. It contains functionality to acquire information about credentials in many ways, including from the credential vault and DPAPI.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors and malware stealing usernames, passwords, cookies, session tokens, and other saved credentials from web browsers such as Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer, Edge, Opera, Safari, and Yandex.

T1555.005Password ManagersEvidence1

Evilnum can collect email credentials from victims... Malteiro has obtained credentials from mail clients via NirSoft MailPassView... MgBot includes modules for stealing stored credentials from Outlook and Foxmail email client software... PLEAD has the ability to steal saved passwords from Microsoft Outlook.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes actors and malware using commands and APIs such as ipconfig /all, ifconfig, arp -a, route print, netsh interface show, GetAdaptersInfo, and GetIpNetTable to gather IP addresses, MAC addresses, DNS, DHCP, gateways, routing tables, ARP cache, proxy settings, and network adapter/interface details.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors obtaining lists of running processes, using utilities such as tasklist, ps, WMI, Get-Process, CreateToolhelp32Snapshot, EnumProcesses, and similar APIs/commands to enumerate active processes on victim systems.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors collecting host details such as OS version, hostname, architecture, CPU, memory, BIOS, domain, language, and other configuration data; e.g., "APT41 uses multiple built-in commands such as systeminfo and net config Workstation to enumerate victim system basic configuration information."

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Lokibot ... File and Directory Discovery ... NETWIRE ... File and Directory Discovery

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Agent Tesla ... Input Capture: Keylogging ... DarkComet ... Keylogging ... Lokibot ... Keylogging ... NanoCore ... Keylogging ... NETWIRE ... Keylogging

T1074Data StagedEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes adversaries and malware storing collected data, command output, credentials, archives, or files in local temporary folders, working directories, hidden directories, registry locations, recycle bins, or specific files prior to exfiltration.

T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence1

Agent Tesla ... Archive Collected Data ... NETWIRE ... Archive Collected Data

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

The content repeatedly describes threat actors, malware, and campaigns using HTTP and/or HTTPS for command and control, including examples such as BlackEnergy communicating with C2 over HTTP POST requests and many other families using HTTP/S for C2.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

This detail "suggests that Nigerian actors are moving away from legacy information stealers in favor of remote administration tools which provide greater capabilities to achieve their goals," the researchers say.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

NanoCore ... Encrypted Channel ... NETWIRE ... Encrypted Channel

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

NanoCore ... Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography ... NETWIRE ... Symmetric Cryptography

Impact

1 technique
T1657Financial TheftEvidence1
TacticImpact

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
6 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
1 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app2 months ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app6 years ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
hash.md5●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app7 years ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping28

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.