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MalwareRansomwareUsed by 2 actors

LightPeek

LightPeek is an information-stealing malware family written in PowerShell. In the provided reporting, it is described as a stealer that captures screenshots and collects file lists. It was identified by S2W TALON as one of more than nine malware samples used in a campaign targeting South Korean users and organizations. That campaign used phishing lures themed as postal-code or address update notices, with a malicious LNK file embedded in a RAR archive as the initial infection vector; execution led to an AutoIt loader that retrieved additional payloads from an external server. LightPeek was deployed alongside other malware including FadeStealer, NubSpy, CHILLYCHINO, TxPyLoader, and VCD ransomware. The activity is attributed by the cited researchers to ChinopuNK, a subgroup of ScarCruft/APT37, a North Korean state-sponsored threat actor. High-confidence behaviors directly mentioned for LightPeek are screenshot capture and file-list collection; no specific indicators of compromise are provided in the content.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

2 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT37

LightPeek : An information stealer written in PowerShell.

via medium s2wblogmedium.com
ChinopuNK

LightPeek : An information stealer written in PowerShell.

via medium s2wblogmedium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Upon execution, the LNK dropped an AutoIt loader, which then fetched and executed additional payloads including a stealer, ransomware, and backdoor from an external server.

What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution2

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping1

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.